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SEMANTICS, SCIENCE, AND POETRY

RICHARD McKEON

I

SCIENCE and poetry are not things, somehow objectively determinable in their essences, natures, and relations. The principles employed in scientific inquiry and reflected in poetic production must have foundations in reality and in circumstances, but there are fashions in the fundamental distinctions discussed in philosophy, used in thought and inquiry, and exemplified in discourse, which are determined by other considerations than what is best for statement or most suited to subject matters. The differences and likenesses discovered between science and poetry depend not only on principles adequate to subject matters and on distinctions adapted to methods in science and poetry but also on the basic assumptions of the philosophies in which the distinctions are made and the principles established.

Among the fashions prominent in philosophic discussion today, at least in the United States of America, is a persistent effort to examine and state fundamental principles as they appear in language. There is no reason a priori why distinctions should not be made in linguistic, rather than in instrumental, epistemological, or ontological terms; and examples of how that has been done suggestively and effectively are readily found in the history of philosophy. Moreover, new departures

and new principles in philosophy bring decided advantages with them, not the least of which is the reduction of the number of problems that deserve consideration and the simplification of the problems that remain. As compensation for that advantage, however, the method by which it is achieved becomes itself a problem and a subject of speculation scarcely distinguishable from the problems and subject matters into which it affords new insights. Distinctions multiply and become more complex as they are adjusted more nicely to the requirements of the problems, which in turn are variously reformulated at succeeding stages of the re-examination of what they mean; and schisms arise from the suspicion that subtle doctrines have been intruded into the analysis to envelop and explain the remnants and vestiges of older distinctions. It has always been a source of sorrow in schools of thought that simplicity and orthodoxy become increasingly difficult to maintain by rational means alone as the analysis becomes more nearly adequate to the problems to which it is addressed.

"Semantics" is a comparatively late addition to the disciplines employed in the current phase of efforts to treat philosophic problems linguistically. In a strict sense, semantics is an inquiry concerning meanings and is limited to problems of truth and the scientific use of language. It is

then conceived either as a discipline to treat the relations between the expressions of a language and the objects referred to by those expressions or as a tool of logic to treat the formalization of concepts. At one extreme, the analysis of symbols may be placed in a context of referents, senses, images, and effects which influence linguistic phenomena; or, at the other extreme, all distinctions, oppositions, and levels may be reduced to kinds or uses or hierarchies of language. Sentences may signify propositions, in a shadowy epistemology without mind, and symbols may indicate referents, *denotata*, or *nominata*, in a shadowy ontology without world. But the uses of language are not all scientific, and therefore still another dimension has been added to linguistic analysis of the relations of symbols —not only to symbols and to objects or meanings, but also to speakers or hearers. Much of this analysis is in the form of prospectus and promise of what might be done, but there is a considerable literature indicating ways in which moral questions may some day be treated by examining persuasive or compulsive uses of symbols in expressing the intention or will of the speaker and ways in which aesthetic questions may be treated by examining the emotive uses of symbols in the reactions of hearers. "Semantics" is sometimes used broadly to include uses of language to effect moral purposes and to secure poetic effects as well as those cognitive uses related to deductive logic; or some other term, like "significs" or "semiotics," is found for that more inclusive linguistic analysis of language. Since all conceivable distinctions and all noticeable differences are expressed in language, "language," "expression," or "communication" has universal extension like "being" and "reason," and all other distinctions are rediscovered in the form, content, or context of statements. When

linguistic analysis achieves the generality required for the treatment of science and art, morals and politics, its relations to a broad field of data and to identifiable consequences can be treated more objectively than is possible in the narrower reaches of the technical analysis of language in one field. These relations and consequences provide criteria by which to judge the differences which separate the various approaches to semantics—the major sects of "general" semantics, positivistic semantics, and the semantics of practical criticism and propaganda analysis, and also the less noticed splinterings which have occurred in several of them—and, what is more important, the problems of linguistic analysis, placed in this broader context, throw some light on theoretic problems of basic principles as they affect science and poetry and on practical problems of action as they affect the lives and relations of men.

The problem of basic principles may be seen concretely in the alteration of principles required by the shift to the linguistic fashion of discussing science and poetry. When fundamental distinctions are discussed in terms of the nature of things, the difference between science and poetry is sought in their subject matter, in the characteristics of "natural" objects as contrasted to artificial objects, and in "natural" motions as contrasted to motions deliberately guided by human purposes. When the fashion changes and fundamental distinctions are discussed in terms of the nature and processes of knowledge, the differences between science and poetry must be found in the faculties of the mind from which they originate or in the modes of perception by which their properties are apprehended rather than in the nature of the subject matter which is the object, or in the character of the statement or artifact which is the product, of the mind's activities. The

problems of philosophy are simplified as a result of this change, since many metaphysical questions of being and becoming, essence and existence, cannot be answered by examining ideas and perceptions and therefore become meaningless, and many of the basic distinctions concerning the nature of things seem untenable or at best based on prior assumptions concerning the nature of knowledge. Thus the differentiation of intellect, will, and imagination or emotion may serve as a basis for distinguishing the theoretical, the practical, and the aesthetic; but, if the aesthetic is to be found, as the word itself suggests, in the perception of beauty and sublimity, the distinction between nature and art is not fundamental, since beauty and sublimity are found in both, if, indeed, sublimity is not a property of nature alone and not of art. Moreover, the supposition, which seemed plausible in explanation of the natural and the artificial, that art is an "imitation" becomes a blatant error, difficult to understand apart from lack of concern with art and insensitivity to its qualities, for the art which quickens *imagination* (usually distinguished from *fancy*) and which is appreciated by *taste* is the product of *genius* and its novelty must be the result of creation, not imitation. When the fashion changes again and when fundamental distinctions are discussed in terms of the nature and uses of language, the differences between science and poetry should be found in the characteristics and organization of language; and the effects of language on intellect, will, and emotion should be accounted for by analyses and distinctions which relate them to properties and arrangements of language, with the result, doubtless, that the distinction between intellect, will, and emotion ceases to be basic, since prior principles are available in linguistic analysis to account for their interrelations and interdependences. Nonetheless, it would appear, according

to recent semantic theory, that the semantic difference between science and poetry is a difference between cognitive and emotive—or between precise and ambiguous—uses of language, and the "practical" may be added to the "scientific" and "poetic" (if the suggestion of the adherents to the "significs" approach to semantics is credited) by adding a "volitive" or persuasive use.

Even if the basic distinctions of epistemology are correct, and understanding, will, and effects are easily distinguished (Spinoza to the contrary notwithstanding), a semantic distinction between science and poetry should be based on differences in linguistic devices and uses which can be stated in linguistic categories. Epistemological inquiries early tended in two directions: toward a logic of rules for the improvement of the understanding and a psychology of inquiry which was more successful in uncovering the laws of nonrational behavior than those of rational thought. This same disparate scheme reappears in the data selected by the epistemological basic categories employed in most forms of semantic analysis: the precisions of science cannot be found in natural languages or even in the languages actually employed in the sciences, and therefore artificial languages are constructed according to rules which recall the epistemological rules for the construction and formalization of clear, distinct, and adequate ideas, whereas the ambiguities of poetry are found in natural languages (in spite of the highly artificial language of the poet even when he employs the idiom of natural speech) for reasons which resemble the epistemological relation between inadequate ideas and emotions. All knowledge and all activities may be reclassified according to this epistemologically grounded linguistics: the metaphysician may be called a poet, since anything which is not science is poetry,

and metaphysics employs neither the methods of scientific inquiry and proof nor the rules of language by which scientific knowledge is formalized; and, once metaphysics is disposed of, philosophy becomes nothing other than logic, and logic becomes the syntax of language. It is not easy to test such assumptions about science and poetry empirically, and, indeed, scientists and poets are sometimes influenced by semantic theories or even write science, poetry, and semantics as if science consisted simply of achieving precision in statement, poetry simply of constructing paradoxes and ambiguities, and semantics simply of separating cognition from emotion. The fashions in distinctions and principles which engross philosophers affect scientists and poets, and changes in fashion influence even the similarities and differences perceived among distinctions and principles applied in philosophy, science, and poetry.

In the history of poetry, distinctions and principles must be sought in the succession of styles and subject matters adapted to human sensibilities and fitted to the structures of natural and human relations made plausible or necessary by art. In the history of science, distinctions and principles must be sought in the development of methods and structures formed to treat the problems encountered and the data assembled. The history of inquiries in science may therefore seem objectively to have a cumulative character which is absent in the history of art or in the history of political institutions and moral action, until the philosophic assumptions underlying that distinction become apparent in contrast to the consequences of opposed assumptions, such as that the history of man is the development of freedom, in which science, practice, and poetry proceed in comparable stages, or that the history of man is determined with scientific precision in a series of stages of de-

velopment in the relations of production and that science, politics, and poetry are comparable ideological expressions adapted to the structure of society or to the struggles of classes. Safe within the framework of our preferred principles, it is easy to see the absurdity of opposed assumptions, and they can be refuted by arguments based on principles which take into account all the available facts. But unfortunately the absurdity of opposed assumptions is equally apparent from the vantage point of any set of principles—Hegelian or existentialist, Marxist or positivist—and the facile discourtesies of refutations among the schools leave untouched the oppositions of the schools as they have been translated into existent data in the relations of disciplines, of peoples, and of cultures. It is a fact that, in a large body of literature and an influential body of criticism, men of letters try to employ the same methods and subject matters as they conceive scientists to employ, and they are "engaged" in the same practical issues as concern statesmen and politicians. It is a fact that a large proportion of the population of the world lives under political and social institutions which provide explicit means of determining for scientists and poets part, at least, of the methods, data, and objectives of their inquiries and compositions. It is a fact that much science and poetry has been produced on the assumption that truth has nothing to do with beauty or beauty with truth and that nothing in the method or content of the one is directly relevant to the method or content of the other.

What the relation between science and poetry really is and what the consequent relations are between the aesthetic principles applied by critics and anthropologists and the aesthetic principles embodied in works of art are questions complex enough to be left to philosophic and semantic dispute. But their treatment may

be made more concrete by consideration of the theoretic problems presented by the direct contacts of science and art brought about by the principles of dialectic and by the direct influence on the development of science and poetry of political restrictions, economic stringencies and inducements, and social needs and tensions. Moreover, in those theoretic and practical contexts, the ambiguities of principles, including the ambiguities of "language" as analyzed by "semantics," find their controls, not in dogmatisms about what science and poetry must be, but in the search for common requirements of accomplishment in the sciences and the arts and for common requirements of co-operative action and security. The assumptions about the nature of science and poetry and about their mutual relations are facts in the parts of the world and in the groups of men in which they are accepted, and they have theoretic, practical, and aesthetic consequences. These assumptions are among the facts that determine what propositions are accepted as scientific and what statements are accepted as poetic. If the assumptions are to be questioned, modified, or improved, it must be on grounds discovered by analysis of such propositions and statements and of the criteria by which they are determined and judged. These are facts which may be made the subject of semantic inquiry, and in such inquiry the differences of philosophic or semantic approach become themselves subjects for an analysis which might have a bearing on developments in science and poetry and on action and co-operation, as well as on the understanding and appreciation of science and poetry. Viewed in the light of these facts, science is seen to be related to poetry in three basically different ways which may serve to distinguish three principal semantic approaches to language.

II

All forms of the three approaches to semantics which have wide currency today are influenced to a degree by dialectic and the dialectical method, but the term "dialectic" may be reserved appropriately for that approach, reminiscent of Plato's linguistic theory and practice, in which "language" is a broad and flexible term, limited neither by literal meanings nor by the law of contradiction and inclusive not only of the written word, which is unable to answer questions and talk back, and of the spoken word, which is subject to sophistical manipulations, but also of the discourse of the mind and the discourse of nature and of God. In "dialectical" semantics, science and poetry are in some sense identical in methods, subject matters, and objectives; and the differences between them result from deviations from the ideal in one or the other. Dialectic is a process of definition and proof which simultaneously and by the same devices establishes the truth or falsity of a statement, persuades a mind of its credibility or unreliability, and tests its adequacy to fact and the nature of things. Language is inseparable from the meanings it expresses and the things it treats, and its peculiarities are fully reflected in the nature of being and the faculties of mind as well as in the combinations of symbols. The ideal in which that coincidence occurs can be found in scientific knowledge, moral activity, or artistic vision.

In the dialectical mode, consequently, science and poetry tend to be in competition, for either may fall short of the ideal achieved by the other. According to Wordsworth,[1] "poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge; it is the impassioned expression which is the counte-

[1] Wordsworth, "Preface to the *Lyrical Ballads*" (*The Prose Works of William Wordsworth*, ed. A. B. Grosart [London, 1876], II, 91).

nance of all science. . . . Poetry is first and last of all knowledge." It is, according to Shelley, "at once the center and circumference of knowledge; it is that which comprehends all science, and that to which all science must be referred."[2] By emphasizing accuracy instead of passion, Karl Pearson reverses the judgment:

The poet may give us in sublime language an account of the origin and purport of the universe, but in the end it will not satisfy our aesthetic judgment, our idea of harmony and beauty, like the few facts which the scientist may venture to tell us in the same field. The one will agree with all our experience past and present, the other is sure, sooner or later, to contradict our observation because it propounds a dogma, where we are yet far from knowing the whole truth. Our aesthetic judgment demands harmony between the representation and the represented, and in this sense science is often more artistic than modern art.[3]

This is the same process as that by which Plato argues that virtue and art are knowledge and that statesmanship and poetry are defective without science. The perfect poet and the perfect king must both be dialecticians; and, when the defects of poetry are censored in the *Republic* and in the *Laws*, they are discovered in the comparison with a superior poetry. According to Plato, the dialogues are poems, and the statesman, too, is a poet when he legislates against the errors of lesser and perverse poets.

The statement of such rivalry is the

[2] Shelley, *A Defense of Poetry* (*The Prose Works of P. B. Shelley*, ed. H. B. Forman [London. 1880], III. 104). The scope of the term "poetry" is broadened when it is raised to this elevated role; cf. *ibid.*, p. 104: "But poets, or those who imagine and express this indestructible order, are not only the authors of language and of music, of the dance, and architecture, and statuary, and painting; they are the institutors of laws and the founders of civil society, and the inventors of the arts of life, and the teachers, who draw into a certain propinquity with the beautiful and the true, that partial apprehension of the agencies of the invisible world which is called religion."

[3] Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science* (London, 1911), p. 17.

self-conscious recognition of a homogeneity between science and poetry which may be seen in more concrete form in the direct influences of science, poetry, and philosophy on one another. It is a mistake to think of it as an influence between otherwise unrelated processes and to seek to set what modern psychologists have learned from the insights of poets apart from what modern poets have borrowed from the technicalities of psychologists. The sequence of incidents which constitute the plot of a novel are made plausible by devices which do not always depend on the probabilities and necessities of the actual lives of ordinary men or extraordinary heroes, nor can they always be translated into literal arguments which derive plausible conclusions from unambiguous premises or into literal allegories or analogies which point to unmistakable morals. Ideas sometimes emerge as protagonists in the evolution of the action, as they do in some of the novels of Melville; or they follow a complex course of contradiction and synthesis, degradation and sublimation in the development of characters, as in Dostoevski; or they are enmeshed in a dialectic of intricate verbal formulation and statement, as in James; or they come into focus from a shifting continuum of thought and feeling, as in Kafka; or they are caught in the allusiveness of language, history, parody, and psychological association, as in Joyce. What passes for a cult of the unintelligible is frequently an emergence of thought into focal importance in art, as a means of conveying both insight into concrete situations and appreciation of profound significances. Philosophers, likewise, have continued to appropriate from poetry and prose literature devices for the expression and proof of their ideas. Kierkegaard ranked the aesthetic below the moral and religious; yet he could make use of the technique of the short story and the paradoxical analysis of familiar tales

and developments in poetry and music to expound even the truths of religion. Phenomenologists find a common source in the immediately given from which to construct the objects of science and those of poetry, and Husserl could hope to find analogies to his method in the literary techniques of Joyce. Existentialist philosophers move easily from treatises to tracts and dramas to expound the same doctrines and exemplify the same problems of thought and action. These relations are not arbitrary, since science and poetry are human constructions built of insights and statements, and the philosophy by which the likenesses of science to poetry as well as their differences from each other are discovered may prepare the pursuit of inquiries and the construction of plots and poems which, in turn, reinforce and illustrate the likenesses and differences.

The rivalries of science and poetry, with respect to truth and beauty and with respect to the influence of both on human associations and action, arise in dialectic from the possibility of bringing them into coincidence in a higher reality which might be conceived as Being, or Idea, or Word, or all three combined. Science and language may, on the other hand, be compared to one another with respect to material processes and empirical experiences rather than with respect to a higher reality and truth; and then "science" assumes a fundamental role, while "poetry" is determined in a subordinate place in accordance with the prescriptions of science. "Language" is not a fundamental term, nor is its scope as broad in such an "operational" semantics as it can be in the doctrines of a "dialectical" semantics. Since everything is process and experience, language, too, is activity—both a product of operations and an instrument by which to affect operations. The processes of science and poetry have a common origin in the problems of nature and the circumstances of society; but, whereas the language of science is easily translated into operations which affect natural processes and are tested by them, the language of poetry is determined in another dimension of communication, and the meanings of poets and the reactions of readers can be treated adequately only on the basis of a science which will bring them into line with what is justified as probable in theory and desirable in practice. The resolution of problems is dependent, in operational semantics, on actions and on rules of operation. Language and the arts may be effective when they are used as instrumentalities in the modification of the real and the resolution of problems or in the persuasion of an audience and the preparation for action. They are, however, primarily and for the most part means of expressing the peculiarities or the circumstances or the ideas of the author or of satisfying or of moving or edifying the audience in ways justified, if at all, by the enrichment of experience by art rather than by the science of things or the morals of action. Forms of operational semantics are usually developed by inverting or opposing the current forms of dialectical semantics, and the method of operational semantics is therefore often called dialectical. In ancient Greece, thus, the method of the sophists and the rhetoricians was thought to resemble the dialectic of Socrates and Plato closely, in spite of the fact that Protagoras and Isocrates inverted the relation of knowledge and opinion and found the true philosophy in practice rather than in speculation; and to Aristotle the methods of Plato and those of Democritus seemed simple inversions of each other, since Plato reduced material things to Ideas and Democritus reduced the processes of thought to the motions of material things.

The fundamental assumptions of opera-

tional semantics appear in their modern forms as a control of symbols and arts by referring them to the requirements either of operations and the practical or of production and the material. In pragmatism, thus, theory and practice are not separable, nor are fine arts distinct from applied; both nature and art are discerned in, and are integral parts of, experience, and science affords a model for the treatment of social and moral questions—although the science required for action must differ from physical science and technology—and philosophical inquiry is itself an art. The subject matters of technology, science, and logic are determined operationally, the operations being of two kinds, with existent materials and with symbols; and the objects of art are languages in which importance must be attached to the speaker and to the person spoken to as well as to what is said.[4] Language is a cultural institution, and it occupies a peculiar place among such institutions, since it permeates the forms and contents of other cultural activities; it is an instrument in the resolution of problems, since the consequences of hypotheses may be examined in symbols before commitment to action among things. The language of art is an important instrument in communication by which emotions are stirred and opinions formed. The language of science is determined by the problems to which it is adapted.[5] Marxism starts out from the similar basic principles that the production of ideas, of conceptions, and of consciousness is at first directly bound up with the material activity and the material intercourse of mankind and with the speech of actual life and that the same is true of mental production as expressed in the language of the politics, law, ethics, religion, and metaphysics of a

[4] John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (New York, 1938), pp. 45–50, 14–16; *Art as Experience* (New York, 1934), pp. 106–8. Cf. "By Nature and by Art," *Problems of Men* (New York, 1946), pp. 286–300.

nation.[6] Science and industry suggest that the way to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process is to make it ourselves, to bring it into being out of its conditions, and to use it for our own purposes into the bargain.[7] Art may therefore be merely the expression of the ideology of a class, and it can further the true interests of the worker only as it conforms to the conditions revealed by the science of society, for "a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production which can be determined with the

[5] Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York, 1927), pp. 163–64: "Science, in other words, is a highly specialized language, more difficult to learn than any natural language. It is an artificial language, not in the sense of being factitious, but in that of being a work of intricate art, devoted to a particular purpose and not capable of being acquired nor understood in the way in which the mother tongue is learned. It is, indeed, conceivable that sometime methods of instruction will be devised which will enable laymen to read and hear scientific material with comprehension, even when they do not themselves use the apparatus which is science. The latter may then become for large numbers what students of language call a passive, if not an active vocabulary. But that time is in the future." Cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 183–84: "Presentation is fundamentally important, and presentation is a question of art. . . . The freeing of the artist in literary presentation, in other words, is as much a precondition of the desirable creation of adequate opinion on public matters as is the freeing of social inquiry. Men's conscious life of opinion and judgment often proceeds on a superficial and trivial plane. But their lives reach a deeper level. . . . Artists have always been the real purveyors of news, for it is not the outward happening in itself which is news, but the kindling by it of emotion, perception and appreciation." Cf. *Logic*, p. iv: "In the present state of logic, the absence of any attempt at symbolic formulation [i.e., in this work] will doubtless cause serious objection in the minds of many readers. This absence is not due to any aversion to such formulation. On the contrary, I am convinced that acceptance of the general principles set forth will enable a more complete and consistent set of symbolization than now exists to be made. The absence of symbolization is due, first, to a point made in the text, the need for development of a general theory of language in which form and matter are not separated, and, secondly, to the fact that an adequate set of symbols depends upon prior institution of valid ideas of the conceptions and relations that are symbolized. Without fulfillment of this condition, formal symbolization will (as so often happens at present) merely perpetuate existing mistakes while strengthening them by seeming to give them scientific standing."

[6] K. Marx and F. Engels, *German Ideology*, ed. R. Pascal (London, 1938), pp. 13–14.

[7] F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach* (New York, 1935), pp. 32–33.

precision of natural science and the legal, political, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out."[8]

In operational semantics the devices of scientific languages and symbols are tested by translation to the operations of things, and the distortions of ideology, emotion, and personal predilection are thereby removed from scientific communication. Poetry and literature, on the other hand, may be improved (as Tolstoy hoped) by being made an expression and instrument of moral ideas rather than a reflection of the refinements of a corrupt upper class; or it may become genuine literature (as Marx argued) by treating and advancing social change instead of the ideological distortions of exploiter classes; or it may gain significance (as Dewey concluded) as a means of enriching experience and a medium of cultural communication rather than an artificial creation separate from ordinary experience and life. As in the case of dialectical semantics, there is a tendency to justify the intrusion of moral and practical criteria into the judgment or control of poetry on what passes for scientific grounds. What poetry is and how it should be read are determined by the nature of man, society, and the universe; but the science by which poetry is seen in operation or put to practical uses is not an eternal wisdom but an evolving process, and the beginning is not the Word, but (as Engels suggested, borrowing a quotation from Goethe) the Deed. "Language" is therefore a less rich term in operational semantics than in dialectical semantics, since it is separated from and contrasted to the operations to which it must conform; and, although the moralist or the lawgiver may, according to either form of

semantics, promulgate authoritative precepts concerning the proper themes, forms, and styles of the arts and establish proper criteria by which to treat them in appreciation and criticism, the method and the subject matter of science are separated from those of poetry. The philosopher, as a sign of this difference, does not argue like a poet but enunciates literal truths, while the poet concentrates on devices of presentation and arrangements of materials which encounter science only as they are likely to affect audiences to actions which are the proper subject matter of the truths of science.

In dialectical semantics, science and poetry are in competition, since poetry expresses truths and science achieves aesthetic values, but their opposition may be removed or harmonized at a higher level at which symbols and ideas may be adapted more adequately to things as they are. This is a process which can be stated in terms of nature, thought, or language: the three are inseparable, and, when the dialectic is given a linguistic formulation, the characteristic dialectical hierarchy appears as an ordering of languages, such as the derivation, first, of written language from spoken language, then of the conversation of men from the discourse of the soul, and the discourse of the soul from the logos of God or the language of nature, where object, idea, and formulation coincide. In operational semantics, the explanation of poetry and the determination of its purpose are scientific; the resolution of problems is by action and operation, and the instrumental or final uses of poetry are, on the one hand, conditioned by the biological processes of the human organism and the social circumstances in which it operates and are, on the other hand, never far removed from the practical situation in which problems must be solved, even though the effects of poetry may be acknowledged to extend beyond

[8] K. Marx, Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* in *Selected Works*, I, 356–57; quoted by J. Stalin, *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* (New York, 1940), p. 45.

the solution of immediate problems. Philosophy and science are concerned with processes and operations, and language is one such process and operation subject to reduction to nonlinguistic processes in science and transmuted into an object itself in poetry.

There is a third approach to the semantics of science and poetry in which linguistic analysis does not seek the conditions or characteristics of language either in the internal discourse of the mind and the processes of nature or in the requirements of action and communication. This third approach, like operational semantics, is in opposition to the dialectical device of relating knowledge, nature, and expression in a higher synthesis in which they are inseparable; but, whereas operational semantics seeks to explain and regulate operations in language relative to the operations of existent things, in the third approach problems of meaning, truth, and action are investigated by examination of languages, the rules by which they are constructed, and the languages in which they are discussed. For a pragmatist, language is one kind of operations; for a positivist, pragmatics is one level of analysis of languages. Language is taken in this approach as a phenomenon which is universal in scope and basic in metaphysical significance and therefore analyzable apart from or prior to the processes of thought or of nature which it expresses, while thought and nature, in turn, are properly distinguishable by characteristics or uses of language. The approach may therefore be called "circumstantial" semantics, since it continues the philosophic tradition in which the theoretic is distinguished from the practical and the aesthetic (although it is frequently combined with the doctrine of the unity of sciences which has dialectical or operational bases). Circumstantial semantics is, in this respect, easily differentiated from dialectical semantics,

in which theory, practice, and art are inseparable, and from operational semantics, in which theory and practice are inseparable, but the problems solved by scientific method are distinguishable from the objectives achieved by poetic expression.

In circumstantial semantics, language and the forms it assumes in use may be analyzed in the context of circumstances —the things referred to, the meanings expressed, the images evoked, the emotions aroused, the actions stimulated, the speaker or writer, and the hearer or reader —which condition language and its uses but themselves escape treatment in linguistic analysis; or the circumstances may themselves be assimilated to the kinds and usages of language by including in the subject matter of linguistic analysis, the linguistic usages by which such distinctions might be made and such principles established. "Language" is in one sense a narrower term in circumstantial semantics than in dialectical or operational semantics, for it means primarily symbols, with physical characteristics as sounds or characters, and arrangements of symbols in time or space; and the analysis consists in constructing the rules or examining the usages which are proper to the varieties and dimensions of languages or which are needed to detect the linguistic marks of the influence of nonlinguistic circumstances. In some modes of circumstantial semantics a point is made of beginning with linguistic wholes, while in others the wholes are built from linguistic elements and from rules of construction; but, whichever approach is made, the language of science must be distinguished from the language of poetry and both from the language of action, because the references of symbols to things present problems distinct from their influence on hearers or readers and from their consequences in action.

One widespread tendency is to distinguish science as a cognitive use of language from literature and poetry, which are emotive, and from morals and politics, which are volitive. Another tendency is to treat such distinctions as successive stages of abstraction, the analysis of language in itself in "syntax" being possible by abstraction successively from designata which are treated in "semantics" and from the user of the language who is an object of investigation in "pragmatics."[9] Science, qua science, would in such an approach require syntactic and semantic, but not pragmatic, analysis, since consideration of the peculiarities and purposes of the scientist who enunciated a scientific proposition would not be relevant to its truth or falsity, whereas the characteristic analysis of poetry would fall in pragmatics and no sharp difference would separate the linguistic problems of poetry from those of politics.[10] Still another tendency treats these distinctions by differentiating the uses of language according to the relations of the individuals in communication, the relations of language to the referents signified, and the relations of language to the effects evoked. Pragmatic uses of language become a subdivision of referential

uses sharply distinguished from the evocative uses of poetry, for example, in the classification of the uses of language into (1) phatic communion, which establishes the bond of social communities, (2) referential symbolism, which is subdivided into pure referential symbolism and pragmatic-referential symbolism, and (3) evocative symbolism, which is subdivided into literature and pseudo-literature.[11] Whether the practical is more like the poetic or the scientific, and whether the poetic is characterized adequately as the use of language to produce emotions, to present objects of interest, or to evoke experiences, the poetic use of language is distinct from the scientific.

The separation of science and poetry in circumstantial semantics, as contrasted to their relations to each other in dialectical semantics, is a consequence of the absence of a common method, like dialectic, which permits comparable presentations of the same matters for comparable purposes by scientist and poet; and, as a result, there exists no literature inspired by the language and imagery used in philosophic discussion according to the precepts of circumstantial semantics. As contrasted to the distinction and relation of science and poetry in operational semantics, moreover, the peculiarity of the separation of these two uses of languages in circumstantial semantics is a consequence of the absence of a common method, like operationalism, instrumentalism, or dialectical materialism, to refer linguistic operations ultimately to the test of natural processes and practical purposes; and, as a result, there is little prospect of developing, for good or evil, a program of practical action from any mode of circumstantial semantics to restrain, control, or promote the use of poetry for practical purposes or ideal ends. Circumstantial semantics re-

[9] R. Carnap, *Introduction to Semantics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1942), p. 9.

[10] C. W. Morris, *Foundations of the Theory of Signs* (Chicago, 1938), pp. 39–40: "Even linguistic signs have many other uses than that of communicating confirmable propositions: they may be used in many ways to control the behavior of one's self or of other users of the sign by the production of certain interpretants. Commands, questions, entreaties, and exhortations are of this sort, and to a large degree the signs used in the literary, pictorial, and plastic arts. For aesthetic and practical purposes the effective use of signs may require rather extensive variations from the use of the same sign vehicles most effective for the purposes of science." Cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 57–58: "Thus the mathematical form of expression is well adapted to stress the interrelation of terms in a language, letting the relation to objects and interpreters recede into the background; the language of empirical science is especially suitable for the description of nature; the languages of morality, the fine arts, and the applied arts are especially adapted to the control of behavior, the presentation of things or situations as objects of interest, and the manipulation of things to effect desired eventuations."

[11] T. C. Pollock, *The Nature of Literature: Its Relation to Science, Language, and Human Experience* (Princeton, 1942), pp. 165–66.

sembles operational semantics in separating science from poetry and in undertaking to examine poetry in the light of science; but, whereas all operations, including linguistic operations, are referred ultimately to experience in operational semantics, all statements, including statements about things and statements evocative of emotions, are referred for differentiation to statements about statements in circumstantial semantics. The scientific treatment proposed for poetry in circumstantial semantics has consequently taken a characteristic turn and has tended to be an inquiry into the ways in which men of different kinds or circumstances respond to arts of different kinds. It is sometimes purely analytic and devoted to the discovery, by the use of protocols, that different people interpret a poem differently; by the use of questionnaires, that people of different body types, personality types, economic circumstances, or social background, understand poetry differently and have different preferences; or by historical and sociological methods, that poems change in meanings and importance with changes in place and time and that tastes change with those alterations. When evaluation or criticism is added to analysis, it tends, therefore, to be relative to the circumstances of the reader, contextual to the circumstances of the poem, and organic to include any other circumstances previously omitted.

III

It would be difficult, not to say invidious, to try to judge the contribution made to the precision, organization, and verification of science or to the understanding, appreciation, and evaluation of poetry by these three approaches to semantics and by the variety of modes which fall under each. One of the advantages that might be expected to flow from the semantic approach to fundamental distinctions, however, is the possibility of constructing a basis of communication and translation among divergent approaches to common problems and of preparing an insight into their differences and deep lying identities or into their fundamental errors and methodological insufficiencies. Yet no means are provided in any of these varieties of semantics to consider the accomplishments or pretensions of the others seriously. Science and poetry are used more frequently as lay bodies by which to expound and develop niceties of semantic theory than as subjects to be treated in terms of their proper problems. Indeed, more light is thrown on the nature of science and poetry by the differences of semantic approaches to their consideration than by the accomplishments of semantic analysis in differentiating their natures or linguistic structures. The question whether science and poetry are distinct, in the manners suggested, respectively, by circumstantial or operational semantics, or inseparable, in the manners propounded by a variety of dialectical semantics, is at least in part a question of whether basic distinctions can be made best in terms of languages, operations, or dialectical combinations of things, thoughts, and discourse. This is a question which will doubtless continue to be the subject of extended, subtle, and intricate discussion and of spirited refutation and defense without consensus being secured with respect to unambiguous conclusions or even with respect to common data. On the other hand, there are three questions which depend, not on metaphysical differences concerning the proper principles of analysis, but on factual differences discernible in science and poetry which come into focus in the oppositions of semantic analyses. The first set of facts is found in the existence of metaphysical and dialectical poetry and literature and in the recognition of a poetic, mystic, suspensive

stage antecedent to the insights and discoveries of science. The second set of facts is apparent in the existence of political and economic censorship and restriction operating on the development of science and poetry and in the recognition of mutual influences between science and poetry and their social and material circumstances. The third is indicated in the existence of a body of critical interpretation, evaluation, and dispute. The relations between science and poetry vary as they are examined in these three factual contexts. The influences of science and poetry on one another by way of philosophies are great and diversified, not only because they can be explained in various aspects by various theories, but also because the variety of theories influences the nature of scientific inquiry and demonstration and of poetic expression and appreciation. The influence of sciences, arts, and social institutions and conditions on one another has in recent years been profound and pervasive, and the results can be seen in the natures, the determining influences, and the forms of science and poetry. Yet the relation of science and poetry depends ultimately on determining what is proper to each and what constitutes the proper development for each.

Dialectical semantics is peculiarly well adapted to treat the direct interrelations and interpenetrations of science, philosophy, and poetry. There is no reason why this phenomenon of mutual influence should not be examined in other semantic approaches, but the phenomenon itself is a result of what may be called broadly the "dialectical" mode of expression. It is employed by poets and novelists, like Eliot, Joyce, and Kafka, who use ideas and idea-laden expressions in opposition and merging reconciliation as the protagonists of plots and as the elements of descriptions and statements whose significance is not restricted to particular situations and

whose emotional effects depend on cognitive insights. Its effectiveness may be judged in the current vogue of Kierkegaard, Hegel, and Heidegger, and of Melville, Dostoevski, and James. Moreover, scientists recognize the poetic, religious, and mystical roots of science, often with the assistance of quotations from Whitehead, Newton, or Plato, when they leave their laboratories to deliver Gifford lectures on the broad implications of science or to speculate on the broad influences that affect developments in science. The truth of poetry and the aesthetic values of science are important even through their consideration is impeded by opposed predilections in philosophy or semantics.

Even beyond the truths perceived in the dialectic of poets and scientists, moreover, the interplay of science and poetry is apparent in the problems of knowledge and understanding, action and co-operation, expression and communication among nations, peoples, and cultures whose contacts variously affect what we know, what we believe, and what we imagine. Operational semantics is peculiarly relevant, both as causal factor and as instrument of inquiry, to knowledge and use of the influence of economic, social, and political conditions on both science and poetry. The influence is direct and deliberate in the operational semantics of Marxist theory, but other forms of operational semantics are adapted to the investigation of the influence of economic, social, and political conditions on science and poetry, of the conditions under which science and poetry can flourish, and of the significance and effect of science and poetry in the lives and communities of men. The interactions of science, poetry, and practical action are important even when their consideration is obscured by opposed predilections in philosophy or semantics.

The distinctive purposes and characteristic forms of science and poetry make it

important, finally, that some account be taken of scientific and aesthetic criteria and that they be distinguished at least to the extent required for the appreciation of their accomplishments and the effective use of their results. Circumstantial semantics should be useful in this task if the broad scope and rich diversity of science and poetry are not forced to conform to narrow assumptions and prescriptions concerning what they must be. There is no unambiguous semantic problem in the relations of science and poetry, even in the sense in which there is a metaphysical problem of the relation of nature and art or an epistemological problem of the relation of truth and beauty, for science is not merely what is verifiable or what is publicly discriminable, nor can poetry be equated with what pleases or what is evocative of an experience. Some indication of the broader scope of the semantic problems of appreciation and criticism may be derived from examination of the relations between science and poetry in the three sets of problems isolated in the oppositions of semantic theories.

There are, in the first place, historical and theoretical problems concerning the common sources of science and poetry. Science and poetry are undifferentiated in content or expression at early stages of history, and the determination of what is early or late depends on the theory of science and poetry employed. Once a poem has been composed, it is an object which may be examined and explained like other objects. Once a theory has been formulated, it is a hypothesis by which to relate what had seemed distinct phenomena or to differentiate what had seemed organically one. Problems of inquiry and discovery are no less germane to the nature and essence of science than are problems of formulation and proof, and problems of content and structure are as important to poetry as are problems of ex-

pressive intent or emotive effect. Neither the nature of science nor the nature of poetry can be treated adequately or satisfactorily by theories which neglect all reference to this common source; and the problems of cultural communication in which knowledge, poetry, and aspiration are all involved can never come to a successful practical issue, if questions of truth, fancy, and interest are assigned to separate and unrelated compartments.

There are, in the second place, practical and moral problems of the influence of science and poetry on the associations and communities of men and of the determinations and controls exercised by social conditions, customs, and institutions on science and poetry. The brutal intrusions of political censorship and control and of economic or social limitation and support in fascistic and communistic doctrines are reproduced subtly in the measures and doctrines improvised to combat them in disputes concerning loyalty tests for scientists, professors, and poets and in the enlarging circle of those whose freedom may be curtailed because their associations are said to make them enemies of freedom or whose communications should be limited because publication of their knowledge or dissemination of their sentiments might endanger security. Even apart from the dogmas of some varieties of operational semantics, the influence of science and poetry on society and the influence of society on science and poetry require examination in the interests of promoting knowledge and art as well as in the interests of social, economic, and political advancement.

There are, in the third place, aesthetic and artistic problems of the nature and quality of poetry, which are in danger of being lost in the mounting concern with the truth and the practical effects of poetry and in the increasing tendency to merge aesthetic questions of the values of

art with practical questions of its effects or scientific questions of the grounds by which to account for alleged effects. These are problems of appreciation, analysis, and criticism. In these problems, differences of semantic approach have important consequences both in poetry and in its appreciation. Since poetry is a creation of man, the form it takes and the content it expresses will be influenced if the poet is induced by a semantic theory to state a profound truth, or to contribute to social change, or to cause pleasure; and the judgment and even the enjoyment of the poem will be influenced by a semantic theory embodied in the reaction of the hearer or reader, frequently at variance with the theory according to which it was, consciously or unconsciously, conceived by the poet or widely accepted elsewhere or in other times.

Whatever semantic theory is employed in treating science and poetry, it will profit by the qualifications and supplementations suggested by the emphases and negations of other semantic approaches. The aesthetic may be distinguished from the practical and the scientific, and the conditions of verifying a scientific proposition may be segregated from the conditions that influenced the formulation of the problem and the practical or artistic consequences its statement entails; yet the poem is not therefore without practical effects or cognitive content, or the formula without influence on society or emotions. All three approaches are subject to distortions and misuses. Dialectical semantics is inclined to the mysticism of a science-dominated philosophy in which science is tinged with poetry and morals, but operational semantics is also subject to the domination of a science with practical determinations, and circumstantial semantics to that of a linguistically pure science. Operational semantics is easily degraded into a program of political control of science and art, but dialectical semantics also recognizes that the poet may endanger or further truth and justice, and circumstantial semantics may be adjusted to accepting as facts that politics is an architectonic science and that poetry has educational effects. Circumstantial semantics easily slips into a pedantry in which science is pure and art unconcerned and unconfined, but dialectical semantics is also given to raptures about truth and beauty, and operational semantics is addicted to the cultivation of scientific method and art for their practical and ultimately ennobling effects. The problems of semantics in treating science and poetry are marked off by these tendencies as if by guide posts. Semantics has an important task in avoiding the omnivorous and shadowy reconciliations of dialectic without ignoring the basic analogies and identities suggested by the common ancestry of science and poetry in religion which expresses knowledge and the sense of sublimity and beauty, in the world of nature and ideas which they share and set forth, and in the human needs and aspirations which they interpret and satisfy. It has an important task in providing means by which to combat the intrusions of violence and suppression brought by tensions, fears, and needs into the cultivation of art and the pursuit of knowledge without ignoring or slighting the social significance of knowledge and art or their influence on the determination of ways of life and the satisfaction of material needs. It has an important task, finally, in investigating the conditions determining the solution of scientific problems and the achievement of poetic expression, which cannot be reduced simply to tracing the consequences of a preferred philosophy or to referring the values of science, society, and art for explanation to the circumstances in which they were cultivated and esteemed.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

RAINOUART AND THE COMPOSITION OF
THE *CHANSON DE GUILLAUME*

ALFRED ADLER

STUDENTS of the Old French epics are fairly agreed that the *Chanson de Guillaume* is among the oldest, second only to the *Chanson de Roland*. It relates the heroic death of Vivien on the Archamp and the exploits of Guillaume, Vivien's uncle. Guillaume secures aid from King Louis in Laon. At this point begins what is supposed by many to be an independent second part (ll. 2648–3554). Rainouart, the giant kitchen knave, with club on shoulder, becomes the protagonist, avenges the previous defeats and the death of Vivien. Before the discovery of the manuscript of the *Chanson de Guillaume* in 1901, its content was known through the much longer and much more recent *Aliscans*, whose section dealing with Rainouart was thought to be a later addition.[1] One of the "lessons" taught by the discovered manuscript was that the "*Chanson de Guillaume* est en même temps une *Chanson de Rainouart*."[2] In 1911, H. Suchier stated his view that the genuine *Guillaume* ends with line 1983 and does not contain the episodes dealing with Rainouart.[3] Many accepted Suchier's conclusion.[4] As recently as 1944, Ph. A. Becker wrote that the Rainouart story is ". . . eine freie Nacherzählung nach dem Aliscamplied, wie es uns vorliegt."[5] A

main consideration against the genuine character of the Rainouart portion in the *Guillaume* seems to have been ideological in nature. The kitchen lad seemed out of place in a song of songs of Christian prowess. Bédier himself deplored the inclusion: "Ce qu'il choque en nous ... c'est un sentiment ... profond: on eû aimé que celui qui a communié Vivien mourant fût aussi son vengeur, et que Guillaume, dès qu'apparaît le bon géant Rainouart, ne fût pas rejeté tout à fait à l'arrière-plan."[6]

In 1949, Duncan McMillan published the complete, critical edition of the *Guillaume*.[7] Again the question of unity has arisen. The purpose of this study is to justify Rainouart in the composition of the poem. Specifically, we intend to show that the robust art of the author consisted in compelling his listeners to accept the paradox deplored by Bédier. Not without trepidation do we contradict Bédier with regard to a poem aside from which, "hormis la *Chanson de Roland*, il n'y a rien de plus grand dans notre vieille poésie";[8] yet there is an attentuating circumstance, i.e., the clerical nature of the poem should be made as evident as it is in the later poems of the cycle, where Bédier's theory

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[1] *Aliscans*, ed. E. Wienbeck, W. Hartnacke, and P. Rasch (Halle a.d. Saale, 1903).

[2] J. Bédier, *Les Légendes épiques* (3d ed.; Paris, 1926), I, 347.

[3] *La Chançon de Guillelme*, ed. H. Suchier (Halle a.d. Saale, 1911), pp. lxi ff.; see also H. Suchier, *ZRP*, XXIX (1905), 642 ff.

[4] For detailed reference cf. U. T. Holmes, Jr., *A Critical Bibliography of French Literature*. I. *The Mediaeval Period* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1947), pp. 59–62 (discussion by Ch. A. Knudson).

[5] Ph. A. Becker, "Der Liederkreis um Vivien," *Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philologisch-historische Klasse*, No. 223, 1. Abt. (Vienna, 1944), p. 7, and *Das Werden der Wilhelm- und der Aimerigeste* ("A.S.A.W.," Vol. XLIV, No. 1 [Leipzig, 1939]), pp. 82–89.

[6] Bédier, p. 97.

[7] *La Chanson de Guillaume*, ed. D. McMillan ("S.A.T.F." [Paris, 1949]). According to McMillan (p. xxviii), the edition of E. S. Tyler (*La Chanç-un de Willame* [New York, 1919]) fails to meet critical standards. We shall quote from the McMillan edition.

[8] Bédier, p. 86.

of the pilgrim routes is more easily demonstrable than for the *Guillaume*.[9]

I

By the time of the First Crusade, comical figures are well-established literary conventions in serious epics, ever since Thersites in the *Iliad*.[10] Through the Servius commentary on the *Aeneid* and through that of Lactantius Placidus on the *Thebais* of Statius, the insertion of comical details into the serious epic became accepted in secular poetry as well as in hagiography.[11] We now have several studies on the attitude of the church toward laughter.[12] According to Erich Auerbach, the mixture of the sublime with the "lowly" is a significant stylistic innovation of the Gospels. That Peter, denying his Lord, would be shown surrounded by maids and other lowly people, was a powerful device: the sublime (the Passion) was humanized, and the "lowly" were enhanced by their inclusion in the sphere of the sublime.[13]

Rainouart comes from the *cuisine*. The cook, *vilissimum mancipium* since Terence (*Eunuchus* 814 ff.), Livy (xxxix. 6), and Ovid (*Metamorphoses* x. 14), figured in the poetry of Venantius Fortunatus, Theodul-

fus, Alcuin, and in the *Bella Parisiacae urbis* of Abbon of St. Germain des Près. In Milon of St. Amand's *De sobrietate*, the cook Nabuzardan conquers Jerusalem for Nebuchadnezzar, as the vernacular writer of the *Ystore Job* tells us.[14] The heroic cook has a distinguished, literary background, even before the time when Ordericus Vitalis (around 1140) spoke of a "Harcherius regis Franciae coquus et miles insignis."[15] In *Guillaume* the culinary odor of Rainouart is no shock. Long before Rainouart's appearance, the reader has been accustomed to scenes of eating and drinking, to the serving of food, to an emphasis on hunger and thirst.[16] In the wide range of references to "meals," the associations evoked by Rainouart will be seen to be more than a superficial addition.

A literary *topos* (*coquus miles insignis*), Rainouart is also a folkloric type. Gaston Paris, Runeberg, and Krappe have studied him in this respect.[17] We may add the motif "priest who uses club where crucifix

[9] In this study we cannot accept the conclusion of F. Lot ("Études sur les légendes épiques françaises. 4. Le Cycle de Guillaume d'Orange," *R*, LIII [1927], 473): "J'admets que toutes les chansons de la geste de Guillaume s'expliquent par la Voie Rigordane, par Gellone ... sauf une, la plus ancienne, l'ancêtre, la Chanson de Guillaume." Bédier's theory has been reconfirmed by A. Burger, "La Légende de Roncevaux avant la *Chanson de Roland*," *R*, LXX (1948–49), 433–73.

[10] E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern, 1948), p. 420. The following draws heavily on the pioneering researches reflected in this book.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 426–29, 430.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 423–24; J. S. P. Tatlock, "Medieval Laughter," *Speculum*, XXI (1946), 289–94; Helen Adolf, "On Medieval Laughter," *Speculum*, XXII (1947), 251–53; W. J. Ong, "Wit and Mystery . . . ," *Speculum*, XXII (1947), 310–41; E. Auerbach ("Dante's Prayer to the Vergin [*Paradiso*, Canto XXXIII] and Earlier Eulogies," *RP*, III [1949], 13), trace "matris risus," Christ as "noster risus."

[13] E. Auerbach, *Mimesis* (Bern, 1946), pp. 46–50. A modern, yet similar, problem has been seen by Robert Penn Warren ("Pure and Impure Poetry," in *Critiques and Essays in Criticism*, selected by R. W. Stallman [New York, 1949], pp. 85–104): "The poet . . . proves his vision by submitting it to the fires of irony . . . in the hope that the fires will refine it" (p. 103).

[14] References in Curtius, pp. 430–34; *L'Hystore Job*, ed. R. C. Bates (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), ll. 727, 785, 791, and note to l. 785 (p. 146).

[15] Curtius, p. 434.

[16] To mention only a few: Girard's hunger and thirst (ll. 710–11); Vivien's hunger and thirst (ll. 840–41); Guiborc serves Girard (ll. 1042–61); Guillaume in despair says to Guiborc: "Des-ore serrez vus vostre keu e vostre pestur" (l. 1310); Guiborc serves Guillaume (ll. 1402–32); the young Gui's sufferings as he remembers the meals Guiborc used to serve him (ll. 1737–96). See Curtius, "Über die altfranzösische Epik," *ZRP*, LXIV (1944), 291 ("Die Gefrässigkeit der Wilhelmssippe").

[17] On Rainouart *héros de conte populaire*, cf. Bédier, p. 97 (note du cours de G. Paris); J. Runeberg, *Études sur la geste Rainouart* (Helsingfors, 1905), pp. 130–50; A. H. Krappe, *Neuphil. Mitteilungen*, XXIV (1922), 1–10.

is not enough."[18] Rainouart uses his *tinel;* when it is broken, he fights with a sword (ll. 3296–3330). The shift from club to sword marks a progress of the kitchen lad to knightly status. He uses his club in slaughtering Moors too numerous for any sword. A folkloric theme (Rainouart is not a priest, but a would-be monk) seems to have been adapted.

Furthermore, by 1100, the status of Rainouart in a serious epic is not without vernacular parallel. In the version of the *Chanson d'Antioche* as Guibert of Nogent must have read it, there were, side by side with knights in shining armor, the Tafurs.[19] Points of comparison between the Tafurs and Rainouart are not lacking. They were savage and poor; they went barefoot and unarmed save for clubs and variously improvised weapons.[20] "Their actions enhanced a reputation for ferocity which it already pleased them to foster, and inspired a wholesome terror among the Turks and Christians alike."[21] This description applies to Rainouart.[22] Almost certainly the Saracen Tabur, though

one of Rainouart's opponents (Guillaume, l. 3170, "Thabur," l. 3201) is—a Tafur. He is unarmed. "Ne porte arme for le bec et les ungles" (l. 3174). Like the Tafurs, he is a cannibal. "Baie la gule, si l'i quidat transglutre" (l. 3176).[23] If *Tafur* is Armenian *tahavor* ("king"), as Hatem thinks (p. 195), it may seem noteworthy that Guillaume (l. 2171) is said to speak (among other languages) *hermin,* and that Pierre l'Hermite "fu nés en Erminois" (*Chanson d'Antioche,* I, 13). Like the *n* in Naimeri (ll. 2553, 2557, 2626, 2932, 2987), the *b* (instead of *f*) may be Provençal.[24] The roi Tafur makes heroes out of paupers whom the knights despise.[25] Rainouart compels the *couards* to fight. "Ices couarz que vous ici veez, Ceste est ma torbe, mun pople, e mun barnez" (ll. 2975–76). And the poet: "Ices cowarz. ... Puis furent ... bers" (ll. 2981–82).[26] The analogy is remarkable. Rainouart is the reformer of *couards,* in contrast with Vivien (ll. 328 ff.), another point in favor of structural unity.

Hatem's conclusion notwithstanding,[27] the historicity of the Tafurs may still be doubted. The fact, however, that they were in the tradition of the crusade cycle is doubly significant for our purpose: first, the social meaning of the tradition may permit certain inferences on the social meaning of Rainouart; second, the localities involved in the Tafur tradition may be close to the locale of *Guillaume.*

Pierre l'Hermite, adviser of the roi Tafur, and the latter himself probably were from Normandy. P. Paris describes

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[18] Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk Literature* (Bloomington, Ind., 1932–36), V, 474 (J1085.1 under "Additions and Corrections"). The volume is found as "IUS." Vol. XXII (1935) or as "F. F. Communications," No. 116 (Helsinki, 1935); Johannes Pauli-*Schimpf und Ernst,* ed. J. Bolte (Berlin, 1924), No. 533.

[19] Guibert of Nogent (*Gesta Dei per Francos* vii. 23 ["Recueil des historiens occidentaux," IV, 241–42]) probably drew upon the original version of the *Chanson d'Antioche* which we have to read in the only printed edition by P. Paris (Paris, 1848).

[20] *Chanson d'Antioche,* ed. P. Paris, II, 254 ("Il n'ont auberc né elme né guige. ... Mais cous i ont ferus de piere et de maçue"). Pierre l'Hermite, their associate, fights, "son bordon en sa main, qui fu fois et *quarres*" (*ibid.,* p. 221). About the barefootedness see Guibert of Nogent (n. 19). Rainouart (*Aliscans,* ll. 84161–62), says: "Moi est a vis que n'est nus armes tes Com del tinel, quant il est bien *quarres.*" About the Tafurs see A. Hatem, *Les Poèmes épiques des croisades* (Paris, 1932), pp. 177–237, 326–50.

[21] W. Porges, "The Clergy, the Poor, and the Noncombatants on the First Crusade," *Speculum,* XXI (1946), 1–23, esp. p. 13.

[22] Rainouart is barefooted (*Deschalcez,* l. 2649; "et de sur sun col portat un tinel [l. 2651]). His inspired "savagery" is almost the standard for the French crusaders: "La devinrent sauvage por lor ames sauver" (*Chanson d'Antioche,* I, 9).

[23] See also l. 3185. The analogous king in *Aliscans* (pp. 370 ff.) is called "Walegrape." For *Ermine* being Amienois, cf. P. Paris' note (*Chanson d'Antioche,* I, 13). See also n. 28 below.

[24] About Naimeri-n'Aymeric, cf. Bédier, p. 362.

[25] The Tafurs are called *ribaus* (*Chanson d'antioche,* II, 4); see also *Aliscans,* l. 6912: "Nus et descaus comme ribaus alés," *et passim.*

[26] The analogous episode in *Aliscans,* pp. 274–77 (the verse counting is confusing here).

[27] See n. 20.

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the roi Tafur as "personnage normand d'origine, qui avait laissé l'épée pour la massue et le rang de chevalier pour celui d'une ... race ... indépendante des conditions sociales. ..."[28] Such conditions actually prevailed, not in France, but in northern Italy. At the time of Gregory VII, the *Pataria* was a similar social group, "proletarian," led by chiefs who rejected feudal distinctions and meeting with the approval of a pope anxious to gather forces against the emperor. Their antifeudal attitude was commended as humility.[29] In southern France, where feudalism was not so deeply rooted as in the north,[30] comparable attitudes were noticed. Raymond of Agiles, canon of Le Puy, chaplain of Raymond of Toulouse, was the Provençal chronicler of the First Crusade. He offers the most frequent references to *poor* crusaders.[31] He praises Raymond of Toulouse for his care of the poor, tells how Raymond (of Toulouse) went to besiege Albara with a mass of poor people, and— antifeudally—with very few knights.[32] Like Rainouart and the roi Tafur, Raymond of Toulouse went "nudis pedibus" at an important occasion.[33] He left his "poor" soldiers under the command of Ad-

hémar, bishop of Le Puy,[34] himself a great sponsor of the poor combatants.[35] Adhémar was the lieutenant of Urban II, the pope who had invited the poor to join not as noncombatants but as potential fighters.[36] Clearly, the First Crusade was to a certain extent a "proletarian" movement. The leaders, Cluniacs predominantly, opposed to blood-bound feudalism, aimed at a spiritualization of feudal relationships. Whatever the motives, a "Verinnerlichung des Kriegserlebens" was the order of the day. Bonizon of Sutri was its first theorist, followed by Bernard and John of Salisbury.[37] The reputation of Cluny as being "revolutionary" (in spite of the fact that many Cluniacs were noblemen) dates back to the beginning of the eleventh century, when Adalbero of Laon wrote his satire against them.[38]

F. Lot has emphasized that *Guillaume* contains no reference to the Via Tolosana, along which the later poems of the cycle were composed.[39] This view can hardly be accepted, not even with regard to the first part of the poem, before Rainouart's appearance. The cemetery of Arles is situated on the Via. This Campo santo is the locale of the battlefield in *Aliscans*. Now, according to the most recent editor of *Guillaume*, "malgré tous les efforts de la critique ... il ne semble pas qu'il y ait lieu de distinguer entre l'*Archamp* de la *Chan-*

[28] The quotation above is from *Chanson d'Antioche*, II, 370. The relationship betwen *Ermine* ("Amienois") and *hermin* ("Armenian") should be studied (see n. 23). It is certainly strange that the "Armenian" Tafur has something to do with the Amienois in Normandy.

[29] C. Erdmann, *Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens* (Stuttgart, 1935), pp. 127–29. Cf. *Le Roman de Flamenca*, ed. P. Meyer (Paris, 1901), ll. 3817 ff.

[30] A. R. Lewis, "The Development of Town Government in Twelfth Century Montpellier," *Speculum*, XXII (1947), 51–67, and "Seigneurial Administration in Twelfth Century Montpellier," *ibid.*, pp. 562–77.

[31] Raymond of Agiles, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Jerusalem* ("Recueil des historiens occidentaux," III, 235–309). About his emphasis on the poor see Porges, p. 10.

[32] Raymond of Agiles, chap. xiv, p. 266D.

[33] *Histoire anonyme de la Première Croisade*, ed. and trans. L. Bréhier (Paris, 1924), p. 180. According to H. Hagenmeyer (*Le Vrai et le faux sur Pierre l'Hermite*, trans. F. Raymond [Paris, 1883], p. 294), after the capture of Marra almost all the poor stayed with Raymond of Toulouse.

[34] Bréhier, p. 152.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 166, and Porges, p. 11.

[36] Porges, p. 2, and D. C. Munro, "The Speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont, 1095," *AHR*, XI (1906), 231–42.

[37] See Curtius, p. 523; Erdmann, p. 84 (part of Normandy in "kirchlicher Symbolik des Kriegserlebens"!); Bonizo, *Liber de vita Christiana*, ed. E. Perels (Berlin, 1930). About Bonizo's praise of the Pataria cf. Erdmann, p. 235, and *MG, Libelli*, I, 620; Bernard, *De laude novae militiae, PL*, CLXXXII, 921–40; *Joannis Saresberiensis episcopi Carnotensis Policratici sive de nugis curialium et vestigiis philosophorum*, ed. Cl. C. I. Webb (Oxford, 1909), II, 8–58.

[38] C. A. Hückel, *Les Poèmes satiriques d'Adalbéron* (Paris, 1901), pp. 87 ff. About Adalbero's attack on the "revolutionary" Cluniacs cf. Erdmann, pp. 338–47.

[39] See n. 9.

son de Guillaume et les *Archanz, Aliscans* des autres poèmes du cycle de Guillaume d'Orange" [McMillan's note on p. 140]. If we assume—and there is no cogent reason to the contrary—that the Rainouart episodes were in the original structure, certain connections between places and persons are suggested. In Brioude (on the Via), Rainouart became monk and left his *tinel*. We have no reference to Brioude in *Guillaume*, but we have a reference to Rainouart's *enfances*, his flight on a boat, the "vent merveillus" (ll. 3517–20). This boat trip is amplified in the *Moniage Rainouart*, where Julien (de Brioude!) is said to have guided him.[40] Now Brioude is close to Le Puy (on the Via), whence came Adhémar and Raymond of Agiles, the former a sponsor, the latter a chronicler, of such "poor" combatants as, in the crusade cycle, are called "Tafurs."[41] One of the followers of Adhémar or of Raymond of Agiles or a follower of the "barefooted" Raymond of Toulouse, back home in Le Puy or in Brioude, easily might have told our poet about the barefooted *ribaus* with club on shoulder. Gellone, shrine of St. Guillaume, is near Montpellier, "droit es desers encoste Montpellier," the city with its nonfeudal society.[42] In the *Moniage Guillaume*, II, the hero says: "Or m'en irai en estrange regné; Hermites ere ens en un bois ramé *Ou en desert se jou le puis trouver*" (ll. 2014–17). He means Saint-Guilhem-du-Désert (on the Via). In *Guillaume*, he says: "Or m'en fuierai en estrange regné, A Saint Michel al Peril de la mer ... *U en un guast u ja mes ne seie trouve*" (ll. 2414–17).[43] There is no reason for rejecting the passage.[44] There is no reason for doubting that the author of

[40] Bédier, pp. 383–93.

[41] In the *Chanson d'Antioche* (II, 6), Bishop Adhémar is a guest of the Tafurs.

[42] The quotation is from the *Moniage Guillaume*, ed. W. Cloetta, Vol. I, l. 828.

[43] See Bédier, p. 102.

Guillaume knew about the *guast* of Guillaume's *moniage*, namely, Saint-Guilhem-du *Désert*. Line 2415 may reflect the information that Guillaume used to pray in an "*oratoire* construit par lui en l'honneur de saint Michel."[45] Guillaume, bishop of Orange, was the successor of Adhémar in the Holy Land. The facet of Christian chivalry in Guillaume d'Orange may have been fused with that of St. Guillaume.[46]

Roaming north, somewhere toward the Amienois, our poet could hear of Pierre l'Hermite (*Ermine, hermin*), of the Tafurs (*Tabur*), and of the *coquus miles insignis*.[47] Gellone, Montpellier, Arles, Le Puy, Brioude—all on the Via Tolosana— Amiens (near the Via from London to Jerusalem), in all these places the poet could hear about sturdy poor, like the Pataria,[48] with "proletarian" motivations glorified by the church.

[44] F. Lot (see n. 9), who doubted it, did not consider the Rainouart episodes as a genuine part of the *Guillaume*.

[45] See Bédier, p. 114.

[46] His possible part in the formation of the cycle should be studied.

[47] Becker (*Der Liederkreis um Vivien*, p. 6) thinks that the reference to the Guillaume cycle by Ordericus Vitalis (around 1140) is the only evidence of the existence of the cycle after the Vita (1120). But could not the *Guillaume* have been composed before 1140, possible before 1120, closer to the First Crusade? The fact, however, that Ordericus Vitalis knew about the cycle *and* about a *coquus miles insignis* is all the more interesting because this Norman historian speaks also very strongly of the poor and their necessities (cf. Ordericus Vitalis, *Historiae ecclesiasticae libri tredecim*, ed. A. Le Provost [Paris, 1838–55], III, 505–6). That the Norman Ordericus offers three points relevant to the *Guillaume* increases the significance of Pierre l'Hermite's (and the roi Tafur's) Norman provenience (see n. 28). It is at Amiens (see n. 28) that our poet may have learned about the Amazons of Amiens (cf. Bédier, IV, 82, n. 2, and A. Adler, *MLN*, XLI [1946], 451–54). Already in the *Guillaume*, Guiborc has Amazon leanings (ll. 2445–49). If Amiens is a factor, F. Lot's suggestion that the region of Ponthieu is relevant for the *Guillaume* (*R*, LIII [1927], 470 f.), should be considered. If Amiens and the Amazons there are factors in *Gormond et Isembart* (Bédier, IV, 82, n. 2), the connection between the two should be studied again, after Becker's "Vom Kurzlied, zum Epos," *ZFSL*, LXIII (1939–40), 299–341, 385–444.

[48] The heroes of the Pataria were likened to the Maccabeans. I. N. Raamsdonk (*Neoph.*, XIV [1929],

One may then be justified in beginning an analysis of the poem by setting it off against the background of a society, which, though feudal, felt some impulse to stress the spiritual and, incidentally, to enhance those of lowly station. Proved a soldier of Christ, a kitchen lad inherits the land of Vivien. Different from *Roland*, in which spirituality is, in the main, *aggressive*,[49] *Guillaume* is *defensive* and constitutes a literary response to a *defensive doctrine* of the crusade.[50] France has been invaded, she has to be *defended*. For the sake of the *Faith*, "Sarraceni sunt repellendi, non trucidandi." This principle— an argument against the Third Crusade[51] —was somehow outlined at the time of *Guillaume*. Young Gui is rebuked by Guillaume for killing the wounded enemy: " 'cum fus unc tant osé, que home maigné osas adeser. En halte curt te serrat reprové' " (ll. 1965–67). Not so tangible as before the Third Crusade, arguments *against* the First Crusade were not lacking,[52] either in Normandy[53] or in the

south.[54] By rendering the "crusade" a home affair, *Guillaume* responded to the advocates of a spiritualized, defensive doctrine—fighting for "Jerusalem" was to *defend* "Jerusalem" at home—and to such grumblers as might claim that there was enough to do in one's own backyard.

Homebound at the time of the First Crusade or shortly after, the *Guillaume* author does not directly mention localities on the Via Tolosana. To infer, however, that the poem developed independently from the ideology of the pilgrim routes seems premature. We have the "lessons" inferred by Bédier.[55] In view of the connections between social trends and centers for these trends on the Via, Bédier's hypotheses are not refuted. Why, then, are stations on the Via left unmentioned? It is a thankless task to explain *ex silentio*. Two reasons, however, may be mentioned. First, a heroic poem sung "at home" would not easily have avoided the attack of unheroic insinuations, if, at a time filled with enthusiasm for the crusade, it had been studded with references to pilgrimages of more peaceful days. Second, "On ne trouve guère, en effet, d'œuvre littéraire qui soit comme l'autopeinture ... d'un groupe social par lui-même."[56] Direct references to stations for pilgrims occur in *chansons* of an age slightly beyond the peak of pilgrim fervor. When this fervor was high, quite early after 1100, direct references were more likely to dispel the illusion of distance.

168–70) believes that the biblical bases for the *Guillaume* were Deuteronomy, chap. 20 and I Maccabees, chap. 3.

[49] About the ecclesiastical conception of knighthood and kingship in *Roland* see also R. N. Walpole, "Philip Mouskés and the Pseudo-Turpin Chronicle,' *University of California Publications in Modern Philology*, XXVI (1947), 381–93. In the *Guillaume*, there is no "perfect king" but perfect knights. For the cowardly king and for the objectionable queen in the *Guillaume*, Philippe I and his notorious Bertrade may have served as models in the Loherain cycle (cf. H. J. Green, *PMLA*, LVIII [1943], 911–19).

[50] See Erdmann, pp. 320–21; see also P. Kehr, *Italia pontificia* (Berlin, 1906–35), III, 89, n. 8.

[51] For the Third Crusade see G. B. Flahiff, "Deus non vult: A Critic of the Third Crusade," *Medieval Studies*, IX (1947), 162–88, esp. 182.

[52] We have, for Germany, Ekkehard of Aura, *Chronicon universale*, in *MGH, SS*, XVII, 214. For the reaction of such "unreformed" characters as William of Aquitaine, the first troubadour, see A. G. Richard, *Histoire des comtes de Poitou* (Paris, 1903), I, 409; A. R. Nykl, *Hispano-Arabic Poetry* (Baltimore, 1946), pp. 375–76; and R. R. Bezzola, *R*, LXVI (1940–41), 145–237.

[53] Cf. *De expugnatione Lyxboneusi*, ed. C. W. David (New York, 1936), pp. 11–12.

[54] Surveying all the objectionable incidents mentioned by various historians and discussed by Porges (*passim*), one must infer that those happenings were widely criticized. Public opinion, powerful before the Third Crusade (see P. A. Throop, *Criticism of the Crusade* [Amsterdam, 1940]), had become important after the beginning of the investiture struggle (see J. de Ghellinck, *L'Essor de la littérature latine au XIIe siècle* [Brussels and Paris, 1946], I, 159–60).

[55] Bédier, pp. 346–57.

[56] E. Faral, "Les Chansons de toile ou chansons d'histoire," *R*, LIX (1946–47), 459.

II

For the analysis of a work of literature, background studies are useful but do not replace analysis. According to a recent felicitous formulation, we may expect a poem to respond to social factors, but to respond in terms of the laws of an "institution," as an epic, a ballad, a drama, or any other literary genre.[57] Dealing not with "the epic" but with "this epic," *Guillaume*, we must study each part of the poem as the sum total of effects produced by all the previous parts. Questions of background will assume the form of word studies. The Tafurs, for instance, are in the background of this epic. We cannot study *this* epic, however, *as* a response to a pauper movement. All the use we can make of "background" is to index *certain words* (and groups of words) *in the epic* with connotations derived from the Tafur context. The word "Rainouart" in the poem may evoke a response partly due to what we read in the poem about Rainouart *and* partly due to what we know about Tafurs. The epic *as a whole* is a stylistic organism, not an illustration of the background of one or several words in the epic. A stylistic analysis does not begin with questions of background but with the beginning of the poem.

In the beginning we are told about the despicable flight of Tedbald and Estourmi. Vivien and a few valiant knights remain on the field to face Déramé's army: "Si cum li ors s'esmere fors de l'argent, Li couart s'en vont od Tedbald fuiant, Od Vivien remistrent tuit li chevaler vaillant" (ll. 328–30). "Si cun li ors fors de l'argent s'en turne" (l. 333). The simile has its origin in a *topos*. It is used twice—twice ambiguously. If *or* stands for *vaillant*, the *couart* should not be signified by *argent*—

a metal of value, after all. Isolated, this use of the *topos* would indicate carelessness.[58] In the context, however, we find several instances of the distinction of alternatives, where the inferior does not seem entirely worthless. When Girard speaks to Vivien about Tedbald in terms of more than justified contempt, the hero says: "Par vostre lange ne seit prodome honiz" (l. 464). So the *couart* is still a *prodome* (*argent*). As we have mentioned already, for Rainouart, the *cowarz* (l. 2954) are "ma torbe, mun pople, e mun barnez" (l. 2976). If Rainouart is *or*, his *cowarz* are at least *argent*. Indeed, one of the poem's more recondite purposes seems to be the (temporary) confusion between (socially) "good" and "bad," so in the case of Vivien himself, the purest worthy at his worthiest moments.[59]

During his heartbreaking agony, after a prayer for help "Que ne m'ocient ... Surazin" (l. 816), Vivien rises to the level of a real imitator of Christ. *Repenting* (l.817) for a moment of "weakness," he remembers: "Respit de mort, sire, ne te dei jo rover, Car a tei meisme ne la voilsis pardoner" (ll. 823–24). Yet, in the following lines (825–27), he *repeats* his previous supplication for help: "Tramettez mei, sire, Williame. ... Par lui veintrun. ..." Has he regressed from the high level of *imitatio Christi* to supplications previous to the *imitatio* (such as ll. 485–86, 563–64, 751–52, 798)? Strictly, once resigned to die, how can this most scrupulous of all

[58] E. R. Curtius, *ZRP*, LXIV (1944), 288–89 (origins: Prov. 27:21 and 17:3; Wisd. of Sol. 3:6; I Peter 1:7, and *MGH*, *Poetae*, IV, 455–511).

[59] Estourmi, on his flight, as an indication of abject cowardice, "derump l'enseigne blanche" (l. 268). Vivien, at one of his most heroic moments, suffers that "La blanche enseigne li chai del destre braz" (l. 780). Whereas Vivien owes it to his *corenant* never to withdraw on the field (*or*), he permits his companions to leave because they owe no allegiance to him (ll. 303–4). Are they *argent*? Later, they actually leave him (l. 600), but then return to him (l. 613); again, they are not first rate but are still of some value (*argent*).

heroes keep on including himself (*vein-trun*) among those whose victory is not sealed with death? Is he *or* through and through? To suggest certain points of possible relevance to this dilemma, we must study more closely Vivien's "failure" and the character of Guillaume himself.

The "flaw" in Vivien—a factor detracting from his excellence in his oversensitive conscience only—is his "failure" fully to keep his *covenant*. In *Aliscans*, Vivien confesses to Guillaume: "Je criem mon veu ne m'aient fait fauser" (l. 856). The *covenant* (*veu*) was: "Je ne fuiroie por Turc ne por Escler, Lonc une lance ..." (*ibid.*, ll. 850–51). In *Guillaume*, Vivien remembers his *covenant* (ll. 163–67, 292–93, 598–99, 809–12, 903–4), but in his confession to Guillaume, he only says: "Merci ... del mal que ai fait, des pecchez et dé lassetez" (ll. 2042–44). In *Guillaume*, Vivien's heroism is more patent than in *Aliscans*, and the confession scene follows much later, at a time when we remember only the heroic deeds en bloc, and without overconscientious subtleties. Something, however, lingers on in the entire cycle, a (paradoxical) notion that Vivien, of all men, has "failed" somewhere. Is Guillaume in the poem an antithesis to Christ? Or is the appeal to Guillaume somehow not inconsistent with an *imitatio Christi?* The meaning of the poem seems to reside in the second alternative. Guillaume, it can be shown, reaches a level on which he seems worthy of Vivien's appeal at the critical moment. Several steps lead to this level, and such is the mystery of the distinction between *or* and *argent* that the last step in Guillaume's development will be his acceptance of, and even his humility before, Rainouart, the inclusion of Rainouart as a member of the proud *lignage*, and Rainouart's succession to "tote la terre Vivien le ber" (l. 3501).

Guillaume is the *principium et fons* for all members of his *lignage*, whence they derive and whither they direct their system of values. The relationship between Guillaume and Vivien is the uncle-and-nephew relationship, rooted in Germanic social conditions.[60] The prestige of the *lignage* is realized and apprehended by Guillaume's enemies: the wretched Estourmi dissuades Tedbald from securing the help of Guillaume: "Vienge Williame e des suens n'ait que cinq, trois ou quatre, ... Tu [Tetbald] te combates e venques ... Si dit hom co que dan Williame le fist" (ll. 63–66). Later, the queen insinuates: "Williame ert dunc reis e Guiburc reine, Si remaindreie doleruse e chaitive" (ll. 2595–96). The villains oppose any appeal to Guillaume for help. Vivien insists from the beginning that his uncle's succor is necessary. Therefore, it is morally wrong, *couard*, to reject Guillaume's interference; it is morally right to bring it about.

For Vivien, Guillaume is much more than a Germanic "uncle." Immediately after his resignation to the will of God, when he prays that Guillaume may still come (l. 825), Vivien explains the relationship (ll. 828–34):

Deus, de tant moldes pot hom altre resenbler!
Jo ne di mie pur Williame al curb niés;
Forz sui ju mult, e hardi sui assez,
De vasselage puis ben estre sun per;
Mais de plus loinz ad sun pris aquité,
Car s'il fust en l'Archamp sur mer,
Vencu eüst la bataille champel.[61]

In what way does the poem show that Guillaume "de plus loinz [than Vivien] ad sun pris aquité"? In the earlier sections Vivien asks Girard, his messenger, to remind Guillaume of previous assistance which he, Vivien, had given his uncle (ll.

[60] W. O. Farnsworth, *Uncle and Nephew in the Old French chansons de geste* (New York, 1913).

[61] Italics added.

635–78). There is nothing in these recollections which would exalt the stature of the uncle above the level of the nephew. In the later sections Vivien is seen, resisting and dying as the true soldier of Christ, and the uncle twice flees from the battlefield (ll. 1219 ff., 2208 ff.), and bewails his withdrawals (ll. 1314, 2410 ff.).

In a more literal sense, Guillaume's prestige is "de plus loinz" in that he is somewhat ubiquitous. He and his wife are in Orange, but he is also "ert a Barzelune" (ll. 932, 933).[62] He is "Treis cenz ... e cinquante" years old (l. 1334), his father Aymeri is still flourishing *veridi senecta* at the king's court in Laon (ll. 2932, 2987, *et passim*), his wife Guiburc is young enough to be the sister of young Rainouart. Guillaume is "at home" in more than one language, "Salamoneis ... tieis ... barbarin ... Grezeis ... alemandeis, aleis, hermin, et les langues que li bers out ainz apris" (ll. 2170–72). He anticipates a *moniage* "en estrange regné, A Saint Michel al Peril de la mer, U Saint Pere ... U en un guast ..." (ll. 2414–17).

Obviously, he is not "de plus loinz" in this sense. The ubiquity of his whereabouts is interesting, however, as the misty background against which we notice outlines which are not misty. Guillaume is "de plus loinz" not only for prowess, but spiritually, as Vivien's confessor. The last confession is, in a higher sense, a confirmation in the faith, a baptism. In *Aliscans* (l. 830), the confession is literally called *baptisme*.[63] In *Guillaume*, the uncle of Vivien is confessor and baptiser. The first words he utters in the poem are a reference to Guiburc's baptism:

"Seor, dulce amie ... Bone fu l'ore que jo te pris a per, *E icele mieldre que eüstes crestienté*" (ll. 945–47). At the end, he and his christened wife sponsor the baptism of Rainouart (ll. 3492 ff.). Husband of a convert (beginning), godfather of a Saracen "kitchen lad" (end), Guillaume is (in the middle) the confessor of the purest Christian knight, his nephew. A socially ubiquitous *lignage* is closely held together by the Christian mystery of baptism (confession).

This is the foundation, in the poem, for Guillaume's prestige "de plus loinz." This aspect of his personality—one in accordance with the spirit of his clerical ancestor, Cuilhem-du-Désert—is made the more interesting, first, by a presentation of Christianity as a perilous blessing, a benefit which can be forfeited at any moment, and, second, by the insight given into Guillaume's development, his *schola humilitatis*. Arduous is the path, indeed, along which, on a zigzag between *or* and *argent*, Guillaume reaches the point where he becomes worthy of having been invoked by Vivien

Confessor and baptiser of heroes and heroines, Guillaume comes perilously close to where the benefits of baptism may be lost. On his first expedition to Archamp, he is accompanied by Girard and by Guischard, the nephew of Guiburc, whom she recommends to her husband. Now Guischard, a convert Saracen, dies a renegade (ll. 1039, 1041, 1189–1200). As he had promised his wife, Guillaume brings Guischard's body back to Orange. So slippery is the line between salvation and damnation that the dead renegade can be seen, mourned by Guiburc, whose own conversion we know to have been spon-

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[62] The county of Barcelona was, in theory, a part of France until 1258. That Guillaume is said to reside in Barzelune (ll. 932, 933) is inconsistent with the fact that he and Guiborc must be assumed to live in Orange. The inconsistency still lingers on in *Folque de Candie*. Cf. O. Schultz-Gora, *ZRP*, LXV (1949), 472–73. In *Guillaume* this inconsistency is only one among other aspects of the "ubiquity" discussed above.

[63] "A cest bautesme vuel estre ton parrain." Guillaume's function as confessor seems to point toward the Tafur complex. Pierre l'Hermite, the adviser of the Tafurs, is mentioned in one of the not too many references to conversion as an objective of the crusaders (cf. H. Hagenmeyer, *Epistulae et chartae* [Innsbruck, 1901], pp. 305 ff.).

sored by her husband. The gold (*or*) of Guillaume's house is dangerously alike to the silver (*argent*) of Tedbald. The picture of the dead Guischard ("Tote la lange li pendit sur senestre" [l. 1300]) is not altogether different from that of Tedbald on his shameful flight, when he saw the four thieves hanging on gallows, and "Li uns des penduz li [Tedbald] hurte lunc la boche" (l. 344). In both instances, a faithless mouth is made repulsive.[64]

Apropos of *schola humilitatis*, Guillaume is not unlike Job. He is now too old to fight effectively ("Vieil sui e feble, ne puis armes porter, Ço est failli que Deus m'aveit presté" [ll. 1336–37]). His wife, he says, was "femme Williame, uns rich hom, Un hardi cunte, un vaillant fereur" (ll. 1305–8). He is bereaved of his *lignage*, having lost Vivien, Girard (Guischard). If he dies, who will be his successor (11. 1434)? Gui, Vivien's brother, still a child, offers his arm to Guiburc, should anything happen to her husband. Guillaume accepts the child's offer. But is it not humbling to have to depend on this child? Gui follows the old man to the battlefield. The touching emphasis on Gui's smallness is also a reminder of how Guillaume's greatness is diminishing. "Dunc li vestent [Gui] une *petite* broine ... *petite* healme ... *petite* targe ... glaive *petite* ... curt ... estriver" (ll. 1541–49). Gui wishes to go, so that his aged uncle may not be utterly without any *ami charnel* (l. 1523). Still more remnants of pride are to be broken. From this second expedition Guillaume returns, "Paenes armes li pendent al costez" (l. 2232). His wife does not, or pretends not to, recognize him and calls him "Culvert paien" (l. 2241). The first time he comes home with the renegade on his arm; the second time he himself looks like an infidel. On his second expedition the child was his only *ami charnel*.[65] On his journey to Laon, to beg for assistance, no *ami charnel* is with him (Gui has been captured [l. 2074]), except "un equier ... un enfant" (l. 2455). The tiny squire cannot carry Guillaume's spear and shield. "Veit le Williame, merveillus duel l'en prent, Totes les armes ad pris de l'enfant" (ll. 2459–60). At court the old man is treated with contempt, "Cum povres hon" (l. 2494), by courtiers, by the king, and, worst of all, by the queen, his sister. Raging, demoralized, and reluctantly reassured, the proud champion of the proudest *lignage* is finally offered the services of Rainouart, "de la cuisine al rei ... un bacheler" (l. 2948). The lad, *vilissimum mancipium*, not yet a Christian, is destined to salvage the remnants of the *lignage* and to be recognized, even by Guillaume's companions (freed by Rainouart), as the decisive exterminator of infidels. Guillaume seems cheerfully resigned to this destiny.

But then the miracle is that Guillaume can well afford to be resigned, for never has his prestige been higher than when it had reached its lowest ebb. Rainouart has been able to win where Guillaume and Vivien have not. But Rainouart himself knows no reward higher than to be accepted by the *lignage:* there is a prestige higher than Rainouart's superhuman prowess, a prestige not in the feudal prowess of the *lignage* (we have seen them falter), but the prestige through which in the end Guillaume and his family appear as the natural sponsors of Rainouart's baptism, the same prestige which made Guillaume Vivien's confessor, the prestige of being the husband of the convert (Rainouart's sister). The circle is closed. In the poem this distinction is not the result of feats of arms—Guillaume recedes and mournfully admits it. It is for having emptied the bitter cup of humiliation. At the close, and only there, a cheerful Guil-

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[64] See also n. 59.

[65] According to Gui (l. 1523). There were *ami charnel*. The inconsistency is discussed below.

laume has become worthy of the dying Vivien.

The function of Rainouart may now be explained more specifically. He is not only "the strong man," and, in his role as *mancipium vilissimum*, he does not serve merely as an instrument for testing Guillaume's willingness to be humble. There is more to the paradox. Guillaume has been shown as a sturdy eater (ll. 1402–32), head of a family of sturdy eaters (see n. 16), and he is also the administrator of Vivien's Last Supper. In the robust simplicity of their faith, the Gargantuan "appetite" of this race is as spiritual as it is real, as real as it is spiritual. Bafflingly to the point, in this atmosphere the great avenger—a cook with an enormous appetite for the spiritual—is a member of the family.[66]

The basic unity of conception notwithstanding, there are inconsistencies. Certainly, the author's attempt to harmonize partially conflicting traditions has not always been successful, but most of the inconsistencies can be accounted for in the conceptual framework outlined above. Some details have been mentioned (Barzelune, Orange). Why, after an effective preparation for his role, is the youthful Gui lost, as a captive? Worst of all, on his second expedition, Guillaume was not (as Gui asserts, l. 1523) without *ami charnel;* his nephew Bertram was with him (l. 1721), "E Guelin e li vaillant quons Guischard [not the renegade], Galter de Termes e Reiner le cunbatant" (ll. 1722–23). It is true, however, that these unexpected *ami charnel* appear, only to be captured (*ibid.*) and later to be liberated by Rainouart (ll. 3024–82). They acknowledge profusely their gratitude (*ibid.*). They were captured when Guillaume's effectiveness was almost paralyzed, when

he bewailed, "Cum se vait declinant ma grant nobilité, E cum est destruit tut mun riche parenté!" (ll. 2081–82).[67] Clearly, Guillaume's *lignage*, his *ami charnel*, have their lesson, too, in his *schola humilitatis.*

Since Bertram and the others are freed, why not Gui? He disappears at the moment of Vivien's death (l. 2074), he is Vivien's brother, and, according to the Saracens, he is a Vivien *redivivus.* " 'Revescuz est Vivien le guerreier!' " (l. 1854). In this poem, where Guillaume learns how to lose the best kinsman, Guillaume could not be given such an easy compensation as *Vivien revescuz* in the form of another kinsman, one of the family, a younger brother. On the contrary, in this poem the prerogatives of the older would not be transferred to the younger brother, but rather to an outsider, the kitchen lad Rainouart.

The poet's treatment of Gui's horse Balçan seems in harmony with our conception. In *Aliscans*, enemy soldiers get hold of Balçan, and the author of *Guillaume* must have known this tradition. He shows us Guillaume cutting off the horse's head, saying: " 'Mais pur ço l'ai fait que n'i munte Sarrazin' " (l. 2167). Balçan, the horse given to Gui by Guiburc, for a short while bore Vivien's body. On Balçan, Guillaume "l'[Vivien] en voleit a Orange porter" (l. 2055). The horse, distinguished by such a burden, could not be risked to bear infidels, nor could Vivien's brother ride it henceforth. Nor could the brother remain in evidence, after Vivien's body had to be given up ("Colche l'en ad a terre, s'il comandad a Dieu" [l. 2067]). If the dead body of Vivien could not be defended, neither could the living body of

[66] About this mixture of the "comical" with the sublime see Auerbach (n. 13).

[67] Sitting on Gui's horse, "L'Espez li pendent desuz les estrius a l'enfant (l. 1882)." Guillaume is "comical" in the midst of his tragedy. Why could the "comical" Rainouart not add to the serious aspects of the poem?

his youthful brother. Whereas Vivien is left on the field and Gui is captured, Guischard the renegade has been carried home, and Guillaume and Guiburc have mourned his death. This gruesome paradox is another lesson learned by one whose supreme prowess is resignation.

Thus, in spite of several obvious minor flaws, the unity of the poem's composition is manifest. Without having seen "cum se vait declinant [Guillaume's] grant nobilité" (l. 2081), the reader (listener) cannot fully appreciate Rainouart as the last best hope for this *nobilité*. Without witnessing Vivien's agony and his confession, we could not really grasp the poem's preoccupation with Christian sacramentalism. Without such antecedents, the baptism of Rainouart would seem but a formality. It would be but an empty convention, unless the episode of Guischard is included as a reminder that the benefits of baptism can be lost. In this light the social distance between Guillaume and Rainouart shrinks into closeness. As on a triptych, we see on one side (beginning) the convert spouse, on the opposite (end) the convert brother, both exalted in the halo of conversion which emanates from the confession scene in the center.

To summarize, we have begun by studying the *Chanson de Guillaume* from the point of view best expressed under the heading "literature as institution" (Harry Levin), not only as a social document, but as a work of literature which responds to social conditions in terms of the requirements and traditions of a literary genre. *Guillaume*, we claimed, responds to certain "proletarian" trends spiritualized at the time of the First Crusade. Social trend and epic were seen in context, the former clarifying the latter and vice versa. The main question is: "Can people live in terms of the poem?" Normally, the feudal group around Guillaume stands or falls, depending on the strength of feudal ties. "Normally" they cannot go on living under the conditions given in the poem. According to the poem, they can. They find out—and we are witnesses—that their vitality rests on a foundation other than physical, feudal strength. What might be termed the "life-preserving power" of the poem consists in making the unexpected seem familiar and natural. No weakness has ever seemed more robust.

"Context," "literature as institution": can such terms of today be applied to elucidate something of 1100? After 1100, the poem was sung and appreciated, but it could not have been valued in terms of today. On the other hand, we do full justice to a poem of 1100 only when we apply the tools of today. We cannot study it today, pretending that our responses have not been refined across the years. However, while seeking this enrichment of experience by way of the accretions of eight centuries, we need not and must not lose sight of the particular ambience in which the poem was first created; the requirement that we seek a "medieval point of view" must not be altered or obscured. With this requirement fulfilled, it is then both permissible and desirable to insist that the "thing" called "experience of the poem" cannot be chalked off *ne varietur* at any given point of a Euclidean line. With these provisos in mind, it is appropriate to regard the experience called *Chanson de Guillaume* as something *en dehors du temps*.[68]

CENTRAL MICHIGAN COLLEGE

THE LITERARY FORM OF THE PROLOGUE
TO THE *CANTERBURY TALES*

J. V. CUNNINGHAM

THE Prologue to the *Canterbury Tales* is the only one of Chaucer's major works for which there is said to be no model, no genuine antecedents in the tradition. The *Book of the Duchess*, the *House of Fame*, the *Parliament of Fowls*, and the Prologue to the *Legend of Good Women*, for example, all belong to the well-recognized tradition of the dream vision, whose history and peculiar features have been described at length in a number of standard monographs. The antecedents of the *Troilus* are well known, and Chaucer himself assigns it to the medieval category of tragedy. The shorter complaints belong to a common literary type. But the most familiar of Chaucer's works and the one generally thought to be the best seems, as a whole, to be without literary predecessors, though there are, of course, sources for particular aspects and details. This circumstance has been construed by the literary historians in Chaucer's favor. They have seen in it the triumph of originality over convention and, of realism over artifice. They have pictured Chaucer going directly to reality and reporting what he found. And so the defect of literary history becomes the glory of literary criticism.

The state of the question is summarized by one scholar: "For the *Prologue*, as for the general device of the Canterbury pilgrimage, no real model has been found." Another remarks: "There had never before . . . been the like of that singularly *modern* thing—to use our most complacent term of approbation—the Prologue." And a third: "no source for"

the Prologue, "the most distinctive of Chaucer's works, has ever been discovered."[1] The features which scholarship has particularly distinguished as unprecedented are the series of portraits in the Prologue and the device of a journey, and especially of a pilgrimage, as the frame for a series of stories. For example, the scholar continues in the passage just alluded to, "No such series of descriptions [of characters] is to be found in any work of ancient or medieval literature which could have come to Chaucer's attention."[2] It is recognized, of course, that "individual sketches of knights or priests or peasants are common enough," that the "allegorical writings of the age, both sacred and secular, abound in personified types . . . some of which Chaucer clearly imitates." But the general conclusion is that "in none of his predecessors has there been found a gallery of portraits like that in the *Prologue*, and there is very little that is comparable in later English poetry except in Chaucer's avowed imitators."[3]

For the second feature—the general idea of a frame story—it is agreed that no particular model need be sought. Chaucer had already used it in the *Legend of Good Women*, and the idea was common in the tradition. For the device of a journey, and especially of a pilgrimage, there is a distant analogue in Boccaccio's

[1] *Works*, ed. F. N. Robinson (Boston, 1933), p. 2; John Livingston Lowes, *Geoffrey Chaucer* (Boston, 1934), p. 198; Robert Dudley French, *A Chaucer Handbook* (2d ed.; New York, 1947), p. 203.

[2] French, p. 203.

[3] Robinson, pp. 2–3.

Decameron and a closer one in a contemporary Italian work in which the tales are actually told by a single figure in the course of a journey. But the difficulty here has been that, though Chaucer could have been acquainted with these works, we have no evidence that he was. Furthermore, what has seemed to modern scholarship the special merit of Chaucer's device—the interplay of personalities on the journey—is only rudimentary in these possible models. The conclusion has been, as the latest writer on the subject puts it: "There is really no necessity to search for the 'source' of Chaucer's pilgrimage. It would, indeed, have been strange had there been no reflections in imaginative literature of the common medieval custom of going on a journey with a party of travellers."[4] This is the general opinion. "For his particular device of a group of persons on a pilgrimage to Canterbury on horseback," we are told in the standard work, "he needed only to draw on life about him. . . . Thus the device of a pilgrimage as a narrative framework was repeatedly presented to him in actual life, and he was at liberty to adopt it for his literary purpose with whatever degree of realism he found convenient."[5]

It is noteworthy that this flight to reality on the part of eminent scholars is always subsequent to a search for an antecedent of the motif and a failure to find it. This is almost too obviously making a virtue of necessity and suggests that perhaps the search for antecedents has been misconducted. It has been a search for the prior appearance of the particular motif. And when this search fails, it has been felt that the only alternative is the recourse to reality. But the alternative is as unsatisfactory as the original undertaking, for it does not explain what it pretends to explain.

The pilgrimage was undoubtedly a common occurrence in Chaucer's day, and he had in all likelihood seen a good many groups of pilgrims among whom were to be found close analogues to the characters in the Prologue. Scholars have been concerned to establish that he lived in Greenwich on the Canterbury road, where he could have seen groups of pilgrims passing before his window, perhaps while he was writing the *Canterbury Tales*. Kittredge is willing to wager he had undertaken a Canterbury pilgrimage himself.[6] The argument is that what he found day after day in real life he needed no literary precedent to invent. But this is not so. It is not the direct observation of murders and of the process of detection that leads to the construction of a detective story. Nor was it the perception of violent death in high places that prompted the Elizabethan dramatist to compose a tragedy. What a writer finds in real life is to a large extent what his literary tradition enables him to see and to handle.

There is, for instance, nothing in the actual fact of a pilgrimage that accounts for the conventional and ornate nature description that introduces the Prologue, though the description is not inappropriate to the subject. It may be conceded that experience is sometimes obtrusively at odds with tradition. We can see that it is, for we can see how tradition has been modified to render it more supple to experience. But the one term is always tradition, not unalterable but never

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[4] William Witherle Lawrence, *Chaucer and the Canterbury Tales* (New York, 1950), p. 38.

[5] Robert Armstrong Pratt and Karl Young, in W. F. Bryan and Germaine Dempster (eds.), *Sources and Analogues of Chaucer's "Canterbury Tales"* (Chicago, 1941), p. 2.

[6] George Lyman Kittredge, *Chaucer and His Poetry* (Cambridge, Mass., 1915), p. 149: "There is not one chance in a hundred that he had not gone on a Canterbury pilgrimage himself."

abandoned, as, of course, the other term is always experience. The one is form, method, a way of apprehending; the other is matter, realization, and what is apprehended. What we should be concerned with, then, is to discover, if possible, a literary form extant in Chaucer's tradition of which the Prologue to the *Canterbury Tales* is a realization. It must be a form that will account not only for particular motifs, for the device of the journey or the series of portraits, but also for the other elements of the work and for their order and succession.

A literary form exists only in what I shall call a "tradition." I use that word in the sense in which we speak of the "tradition" of the hard-boiled detective story or say that Shakespeare's sonnets are in the "tradition" of the *Astrophel and Stella* sequence or, more generally, in the Petrarchan "tradition." A tradition is the body of texts and interpretations current among a group of writers at a given time and place. The description of literary traditions is a principal subject of literary history, and the nature of a tradition can be reconstructed only by the methods of literary history. If one were to construct, for example, the tradition of a number of contemporary poets in America, it could be described in terms of the poetry of Eliot, of Pound, Hopkins, Auden, and some fragments of Donne and Marvell, together with the associated body of commentary, the "new criticism." When a poet in this tradition undertakes what he has learned to distinguish as a metaphysical poem, the principles that determine the realization of what he regards as a particular literary form—the appropriate subject, devices, and structure—are principles located in that tradition.

It follows from this that a literary form

is not simply an external principle of classification of literary works, as is the Dewey Decimal System in the public library. It is a principle operative in the production of works. It is a scheme of experience recognized in the tradition and derived from prior works and from the descriptions of those works extant in the tradition. It is, moreover, a scheme that directs the discovery of material and detail and that orders the disposition of the whole. If a literary form is an idea, it is an idea only in the sense that it is the idea that the writer and reader have of the form. Thus a literary form may vary somewhat from work to work, since it is only a summary description of those elements of the tradition that entered into the conception and realization as into the appreciation by a qualified reader of the particular work.

I come now to my thesis, which may as well be stated clearly and simply at the start. The literary form to which the Prologue to the *Canterbury Tales* belongs and of which it is a special realization is the form of the dream-vision prologue in the tradition of the *Romance of the Rose* and of the associated French and English poems of the subsequent century and a half. This is certainly to find the answer in the most obvious place, to find it, like the purloined letter, in plain sight. For if one were to look for the source of anything in Chaucer, the first place an experienced scholar would look is in the *Romance of the Rose* and its tradition. The *Romance*, it has been said, "probably exerted on Chaucer a more lasting and more important influence than any other work in the vernacular literature of either France or England."[7] There are throughout Chaucer innumerable borrowings in detail from that work, and four of

[7] Robinson, p. 663.

Chaucer's most extended poems are clearly in the form of the dream vision: one of them, indeed, is explicitly a prologue framing a series of tales, as is the masterwork of Chaucer's contemporary and friend, John Gower. If one asks why the similarity of the Canterbury Prologue to this well-known type has not been seen before, the answer lies in the method by which the form has been described in the scholarship on the subject. It has been described in terms of particular motifs, but the motifs have not been generalized and regarded as functional in a structure. One scholar, for example, enumerates "the regular features of the love-vision": "the introductory device of reading a book, the discussion of sleeplessness and dreams, the setting on May-day or in the springtime, the vision itself, the guide (who in many poems takes the form of a helpful animal), and personified abstractions, Love, Fortune, Nature, and the like."[8] There is only one element in this description that is also to be found in the Canterbury Prologue, and that is the setting in spring, an element which is common to many other literary forms in the Middle Ages.

But if we describe the Canterbury Prologue in terms of the scheme of experience which orders it, in terms of its elements and their succession, we will find a striking similarity to—in fact, an identity with—the scheme of the dream vision. The Prologue can be described accurately enough in this fashion: at a certain time of the year—and the season is then described—the author comes to a place, to the "Tabard" in Southwark. He there meets a company, who are then depicted, one after the other in panel fashion. After a brief digression, one of the company, not described so far (our host, Harry

8 *Ibid.*, p. 315.

Bailly), is singled out as a master of ceremonies and proposes the device that orders the remainder of the poem, the telling of tales on the journey.

I shall now describe in the same fashion the opening of the *Romance of the Rose* and of a number of English poems in the same tradition. The *Romance* begins with some expository remarks on the truth of dreams, illustrated by the dream related in this book whose name is the *Romance of the Rose* and whose subject is an autobiographical account—for everything fell out just as this dream relates—containing the art of love. After a brief prayer and praise of the lady, the dream begins. It is May, and there is an extended description of the season. The author walks out into the fields, crosses a stream, and comes to a garden inclosed by a wall. He then describes, one after the other, a series of allegorical portraits painted on the wall, ten in number. He wants to enter the garden but can find no way in. Walking around the wall, he comes finally to a wicket gate and pounds on it. The porter Idleness opens the door, "whose hair was as yellow of hue as any basin newly scoured," and leads him into the garden, which is described at length. He finds Sir Mirth dancing and singing there in company and depicts the company in a series of set portraits, fifteen in number. He then walks in the garden, followed by the God of Love with his arrows ready. The garden is leisurely described, including the well where Narcissus died, which leads to the interpolated tale of Narcissus. In the well he sees a rose bush full of roses; there is one bud in especial which he has a great longing to pluck. At this point the God of Love, who has been stalking him, looses an arrow, and the author is committed to the senti-

mental enterprise which directs the remainder of the poem.

These are the elements and their order: after the preliminary matter and the dream, at a given time of the year—and there is a description of the season—the author comes to a place where he sees a number of allegorical characters painted on a wall and describes them; a guide then appears and leads him to another place, where he sees a company in action, though the characters are personifications, and describes them in the same manner. There follows a framed tale, and then one of the characters initiates the action which leads to the remainder of the poem. This character is not strictly a master of ceremonies, but he might in another poem and in other hands develop into one. The form is clearly not too unlike the form of the Canterbury Prologue, particularly if we collapse into one movement the two instances of an author's coming to a place and substitute for allegorical characters and personifications realistic portraits of representative members of society.

In other poems of this tradition the dream-vision prologue appears now as a separable and independent form, now as an element and sometimes a repeatable element in a work of larger scope, and most commonly as an introduction to a poem that continues now in one way, now in another. It is so used in the Confessio amantis. In this poem, after a discursive and sententious preface, similar to, but more extensive than, the one in the Romance of the Rose, the author comes to his matere. He walks out in May and comes to a wood, where he begins to complain of his woe and falls into a swoon. On recovering, he utters a prayer to Cupid and Venus, whereupon he sees both of them come by. The King of Love, as he passes, throws an arrow through his heart, but the Queen pauses and speaks to him. On hearing what he has to say, she proposes the device: he shall confess to her priest, Genius. The essential structure of the Romance is here preserved, though in summary fashion. The nature description is quite brief, as are the descriptions of the characters. A swoon supplants the dream, and the interpolated prayer, an element in the opening of the Romance, occasions the appearance of the figures. Nevertheless, the author goes out at a certain time of the year and comes to a place where he sees figures riding by, one of whom proposes the device that directs the remainder of the poem.

The scheme of the vision is repeated, this time without the dream, in the course of one of the tales that form the bulk of Gower's work. This is the tale of Rosiphelee.[9] Before dawn on a May morning she walks out in a park through which runs a great river. She bids her women withdraw. She sees the flowers blooming, hears the birds singing, and sees all the animals, male paired with the female. As she looks around, she sees a company of ladies riding by, whose dress is then described. She wonders who they are and then sees a woman on a horse, who is described at length. She questions her about the company of ladies and receives the answer which changes the course of her life. Here is the typical nature description, the character who comes to a place where he sees a company, and, finally, the master of ceremonies, who disposes the particular device of this poem. And in this case it is no dream.

So much for Gower. Chaucer himself had written, if we allow the accepted chronology of his work, four dream visions by the time he undertook the Prologue to the Canterbury Tales; indeed,

9. 1245 ff. Works, ed. G. C. Macaulay (Oxford, 1901), II, 335 ff.

while he was engaged in the composition of the *Tales*, he rewrote with considerable thoroughness the last of these, the Prologue to the *Legend*. The earliest, the *Book of the Duchess*, begins with preliminary matter on the melancholy and sleeplessness of the author, who reads a book to pass the time, the tale of Ceyx and Alcyone. At one point in the tale Alcyone prays Juno for sleep and a dream, and the author decides to try the same method, whereupon he falls asleep and dreams. It is a May morning, with birds singing. He finds himself in a room with glass windows and full of pictures depicting the whole story of Troy and the whole *Romance of the Rose*, both text and gloss. He hears the sound of hunters, rises, takes his horse, and comes to a field, where he overtakes a great company of hunters. He inquires of one of them, "Who is hunting here?" and is told the Emperor Octavian. He follows the chase. When the hunt ends, he walks from a tree and follows a whelp into a field full of flowers, where he becomes aware of a man in black. This is the figure that introduces the device of the poem.

The *House of Fame* is a poem in the same tradition. It begins with preliminary matter similar to that in the *Romance* and the *Book of the Duchess*, a proem on dreams and an invocation. It continues with the dream. Exactly on the tenth of December—there is in this case no description of the season—the author falls asleep and in a dream finds himself in a temple made of glass. There are many images there, finely wrought portraits, among them one of Venus, "naked fleeting in a sea," of Cupid, and of Vulcan, "that in his face was full brown." As the dreamer walks about, he sees on the wall the story of the *Aeneid*, portrayed in a series of panels. These are described at length, one after the other—"There saw I," "There saw I"—in a manner and in a position in the scheme of the poem analogous to the portraits on the wall in the *Romance* or the portraits of the pilgrims at the "Tabard." The author then leaves the temple, finds himself in a barren desert, looks up to heaven in prayer, and becomes aware of an eagle larger than any he has ever seen. The eagle is the figure who disposes the device which accounts for the remainder of the poem.

I come now to the Prologue to the *Legend of Good Women*. The later of the two versions is more relevant to our purpose, since it is closer in form to the scheme of the Canterbury Prologue, though the differences between the versions are not sufficient to call for separate treatment. The poem begins with preliminary matter, in this case of exceptional distinction, and then the poet late in the month of May falls asleep and dreams. He finds himself in a field—"With floures sote embrouded was it al"—where "The smale foules, of the seson fayn" sing a hymn to St. Valentine. There appear the God of Love and his Queen, Alceste, whose dress in particular is described at some length. Behind the god the author sees nineteen ladies in royal dress, and after them an extraordinary number of women. There follows the action which leads to the device: the King and especially the Queen as masters of ceremonies impose on the author the task of writing a series of tales of true lovers as penance for his heresy in love.

The underlying scheme of the dream-vision prologue should now be clear. If we set aside the preliminary matter as not relevant to the form of the Canterbury Prologue and begin, as it does, after the dream, we will find the following elements in this order. The poem is set at a given time of the year, generally in May, but perhaps exactly on the tenth

of December, or sometime in the latter part of April, as the astrology of the Canterbury Prologue indicates. The time of the year leads in many cases to a description of the season, which may be brief or leisurely, simple or, as in the case of the Canterbury Prologue, ornate, with elements drawn from the introductory nature descriptions of other literary forms. The author, usually as the dreamer, is a character in his own poem, though when the scheme is used in a narrative, as in the tale of Rosiphelee, the principal character takes the place of the author. He comes to a place, usually a field, but sometimes a chamber or temple of glass, and in one case the "Tabard" in Southwark. He sees there a company, or occasionally one or two persons, and sometimes some birds who are treated as characters. Or he sees a number of portraits depicted on a wall, or incidents in a famous story, and then, after another journey, comes to a company. These may be described at length, one after another, in panel fashion, or they may, especially if the material is common in the tradition, be briefly and summarily denominated. At this point, or after another journey, or, as in the case of the Canterbury Prologue, after a brief digression, one of the company or another character who is now met, the man in black or Harry Bailly, initiates the action of the poem. This may consist, as in the Prologue to the *Legend* and the Prologue to the *Canterbury Tales*, in proposing the relation of a series of tales.

But the *Canterbury Tales* extend beyond the Prologue. Is there any precedent in the tradition for the particular way in which Chaucer proceeds to develop the poem? Of course, there is precedent in the *Legend* and in Gower for the framed tales, but I have in mind some-

thing more definite and limited than this. I have in mind the problem of the principles of order in the work as a whole, of which the idea of the frame story is only one. I have in mind a very restricted question: Is there in the tradition or in those realizations of the tradition that Chaucer had already accomplished any scheme of development from the dream-vision prologue that is similar to the development in the *Canterbury Tales?*

The whole problem of the construction of the *Canterbury Tales* is a vexed and difficult one. The work as it has come down to us consists of a number of fragments, each disjoined from the others and each consisting of several tales and of the prologues to and links between the tales. The general Prologue, for instance, is followed by three tales with the links between them and breaks off abruptly, shortly after the beginning of a fourth tale. This section is usually called the "A Fragment." I will concern myself only with this.

It is clear from the state of the manuscripts, then, that the project was never one that was complete in design though incomplete in execution. The design itself was in a fluid state. The general outlines of the framework were perhaps clear: it would involve a pilgrimage, and the completion of the journey would coincide with the completion of the design. The characters of most of the pilgrims, at least, were determined. There was to be a leader of the party, the Host, whose word was law. Each pilgrim was to tell a given number of tales, and the tales he told were to accord with his rank and nature according to the ancient principles of decorum. But within what was already determined there was much that was indeterminate, especially the principle or

congeries of principles that would determine the succession of speakers and tales.

What principles had Chaucer? He begins with the principle of lots which could have served to order the whole, but he uses it only to determine the first speaker. Again, the principle of lots, whether by chance or by Providence guiding chance or by the manipulation of the Host, serves to pick out the man of highest rank in the company as the first to speak. This again would have served as a sufficient principle; the order of precedence in society could have determined the order of precedence in the telling of tales, and the Host, who was a proper man to be a marshal in a hall, could easily have settled the questions of etiquette. But this principle breaks down immediately after the Knight's tale. The Host calls on the Monk, who would probably be considered next in social rank, to relate something that will fit in with the Knight's tale. But the Miller, who is a churl and will abide no man for courtesy, cries out in Pilate's voice, "I know a noble tale with which I will repay the Knight's." His tale, of course, is just the opposite: it is an ignoble tale of churls and obscenity rather than a noble tale of princes and high love.

Is there any precedent for this in the tradition? There is, in the scheme of experience of a dream vision which Chaucer wrote some years before this, the *Parliament of Fowls*.[10] In that poem, after the customary preliminary matter, the author falls asleep and dreams. A guide leads him to a spring scene, a garden full of birds and trees, where he sees Cupid and Will, his daughter, and many other allegorical figures and a temple of brass with more figures inside it and the story of many

[10] Suggested by Émile Legouis, *Geoffrey Chaucer*, trans. L. Lailavoix (London, 1928), pp. 85–86.

famous lovers painted on the wall. He walks forth again from this place and comes on the Figure who disposes the device that orders the rest of the poem. This is Nature, who is holding a parliament of birds on St. Valentine's Day. The birds are then summarily described. Nature opens the parliament and stipulates that the birds shall speak in order of rank; and so they do until suddenly the lower orders break out, crying "Have don, and lat us wende! . . . Whan shal youre cursede pletyng have an ende?" The subject has been high courtly love, and now the vulgar point of view is urged by a vigorous churlish personality amid a certain amount of general uproar.

Obviously, the scheme of progression at the beginning of the *Canterbury Tales* is similar in these general respects to the scheme of the *Parliament of Fowls*. It is not only the form of the Prologue that derives from the dream vision, but from the particular scheme of a particular dream vision which Chaucer had written some time before derives the underlying principle of order of the A Fragment as a whole. In both, the master of ceremonies, by stipulation and by lot, appoints the highest in rank to speak first. The discourse is on high courtly love. It is interrupted by the lower orders of society, who urge a vulgar point of view, and there follows strife among the churls. This is developed in the A Fragment by a new principle, the principle of retaliation. The Miller tells a tale about a carpenter, and the Reeve, who had been a carpenter, answers with a tale about a miller. The Cook offers to go on in this vein, begins, and the fragment breaks off. It is open to question whether or not in this instance the form of the dream vision itself broke down, whether or not it was inadequate to handle the material which Chaucer

wished to explore by its means. But it does not seem to me open to question that the form of the Prologue and indeed of the A Fragment is, if we understand by a "literary form" the method by which material is discovered and ordered, the form of the dream vision in whose terms Chaucer himself had learned to feel and think through many years of love and apprenticeship.

The identity of the literary form of the Prologue to the *Canterbury Tales* with the conventional form of the dream-vision prologue can be regarded as established. It may be felt, however, that the distinctive feature of the Canterbury Prologue—the series of portraits—has not adequately been accounted for. No one, I trust, will ask one to account for the greatness of Chaucer's portraits, for his peculiar skill in writing. If such matters can be explained, certainly they lie outside the scope and method of this paper. The question is rather, I should say, Is the technique of portraiture in the dream-vision convention of the same kind as Chaucer's technique in the Prologue? It is. The model in the tradition—and the model to which Chaucer recurred here—is the double series of portraits at the opening of the *Romance of the Rose*, the portraits that occupy the same place in the scheme of that poem as Chaucer's do in the scheme of his.[11]

I would distinguish several points of similarity of technique in the portraits themselves and two further points in their connection with the remainder of the poem. The portraits are given in succession in both poems, without transition or with the most summary form of transition: "And next was peynted Covetise," "Elde was paynted after this," "And alderlast of everychon / Was peynted Pov-

ert al aloon," "And next hir wente, on hir other side," "Love hadde with hym a bacheler." Chaucer's technique is similar: "With hym there was his sone, a yong squier, / A lovyere and a lusty bacheler," "A Monk ther was." There are a number of such portraits, a group of ten and of fifteen in the *Romance* and twenty-one in the Prologue, plus the five guildsmen who are treated as a unit and several others who are just named. The portraits are of varying length, but they vary roughly within the same range: in the *Romance* they run from four to ninety-six lines, averaging around thirty-two; in the Prologue they run from nine to sixty-two lines, averaging around thirty-one. The peculiar coincidence in the averages, of course, is of no significance. The portraits in each are introduced by brief critical remarks in which the terms derive from the medieval arts of poetry. The second series in the *Romance* begins (I quote the medieval translation of the poem which is often ascribed to Chaucer):

> Then gan I loken ofte sithe
> The shap, the bodies, and the cheres,
> The countenaunce and the maneres
> Of alle the folk that daunced there,
> And I shal telle you what they were.[12]

Chaucer begins with an explicit remark, "Me thynketh it accordaunt to resoun," that is, *secundum rationem*, in accordance with the law of the kind. He begins the *Complaint of Mars* with a similar remark, indicating an awareness of the requirements of a literary kind:

The ordre of compleynt requireth skylfully.

He proceeds:

Me thynketh it accordaunt to resoun
To telle you al the condicioun
Of ech of hem, so as it semed me,
And which they weren, and of what degree,
And eek in what array that they were inne. . . .

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[11] Howard R. Patch, "Characters in Medieval Literature," *MLN*, XL (1925), 1–14.

[12] Lines 812–16 in the M.E. version; ll. 796–800 in the original (ed. Ernest Langlois [Paris, 1920]), Vol. II.

These are the principal technical correspondences. But one might observe further that the method in both poems is one that allows not only objective presentation and analysis but also author's comment and that the portraits in both contain a good deal of sharp realistic detail of the same type. For example, of Hate:

> Hir heed ywrithen was, iwis,
> Full grimly with a greet towayle. . . .

Avarice is clad

> Al in an old torn courtepy
> As she were all with doggis torn.[13]

There are two further points that concern the relation of the portraits to the remainder of the poem. The first is that some at least of the characters described act and interact as the poem goes on—this is obvious in the *Canterbury Tales* but is also true in some measure of the *Romance*. The second is that the author who describes these characters as an external observer becomes involved in action with them.

In brief, the technical features of the portraits in the Canterbury Prologue have exact analogues in the portraits of the *Romance*. There are in each a number of portraits of moderate length, containing realistic detail, introduced by critical remarks, described by the author in his own person, and presented one after another with the minimum of transition, as in the description of a panel of portraits on a wall. If a composition instructor were to assign the portraits in the *Romance* as a model for imitation and stipulate that the method there exhibited be applied to a range of figures from contemporary society, his better students

would produce a series of characters not too unlike the series in the Prologue. If his student were Chaucer in his maturity, the series would be the series in the Prologue. And if he should extend his assignment to the whole scheme of the opening portion of the *Romance* and of the associated poems in the tradition, the result could well be the Prologue to the *Canterbury Tales*.

In these terms the development of Chaucer's career becomes intelligible. We must give up the naïve conclusion of literary criticism and literary scholarship that in his earlier work Chaucer had yielded "with docility to medieval schematism" and then suddenly broke "with all such rigid notions of order." We can no longer say, as the latest writer on the subject does, that "one of the most astonishing things about the *Canterbury Tales* is that Chaucer, a courtly artist, steeped in French, Latin, and Italian models, chose as a framework a direct departure from them. He did not have to go to sleep and dream in order to get started. . . ."[14] For Chaucer did not simply go to reality; he apprehended reality by the means he had learned and cultivated. He was original and traditional at the same time, and his originality lay in the application to fresh material of the old method—new wine in the old bottle. He brought to life a tradition that had grown, perhaps, too contrived, though the Prologue to the *Legend* is an exquisite thing of its kind. But he brought it to life within the framework of the tradition. He was an artist, and he worked by artifice, for he knew that realism is artifice.

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13 M.E., ll. 160–61, original, ll. 150–51; M.E., ll. 220–21, original, ll. 208–9.

14 Kittredge, p. 166; Lawrence, p. 30.

THOMAS BAKER AND *THE FEMALE TATLER*

JOHN HARRINGTON SMITH

I

IN THE 1930's Professors Paul Bunyan Anderson and Walter Graham argued as to the authorship of *The Female Tatler* (1709–10) (hereinafter called simply "the *Tatler*") and disagreed. In the introduction to Thomas Baker's *The Fine Lady's Airs* (1709) ("Augustan Reprints," No. 25 [1950]), I stated that I was giving the matter fresh consideration. I have done so, using a microfilm of the *Tatler* kindly furnished by the Bodleian Library, and I feel that Baker's authorship can be quite conclusively demonstrated for at least a part of this puzzling and composite periodical.

It exists in several series, and the facts, though they have been stated in print before, may be briefly rehearsed here. No. 1, written by "Mrs. Crackenthorpe" and printed by B. Bragge, is dated July 8, 1709.[1] This series, printed triweekly, continues through No. 18 (August 17). With No. 19 (August 19) two series begin to appear side by side, both claiming to be written by Mrs. Crackenthorpe, but one printed by B. Bragge, the other by Mrs. A. Baldwin. (In subsequent issues each paper denounced the other as spurious, the Mrs. Crackenthorpe of Baldwin No. 20, for instance, asserting that she had made the change through "finding her self disingenuously treated by the first printer of this Paper.") The rival issues continue to be published side by side for about two months. With No. 44 (October 17) the Bragge paper expires. The Bald-

win Mrs. Crackenthorpe retained title for seven subsequent issues. In No. 51 (November 2) she announces that she has "resign'd her Pretentions of Writing the *Female Tatler* to a Society of . . . Ladies." Thereafter, the paper is headed accordingly. It expires with No. 111 (March 31, 1710).

In the 1920's the *Tatler* had been attributed to Thomas Baker by the standard authorities, including Mr. Graham in *The Beginnings of English Literary Periodicals*. In an article in *Modern Philology* for February, 1931,[2] Professor Anderson called attention to the fact that some issues of the *Tatler* had continued to be published by the printer (he knew of the existence of but two and labeled these the "spurious" series) after Mrs. Crackenthorpe had transferred the "original" to A. Baldwin. He identified Mrs. Crackenthorpe as Mrs. Manley. But Thomas Baker had been placed at the scene of the crime, so to speak, by the *British Apollo*, which, in the process of a feud which it carried on with the *Tatler* from August to October, unmasked "Mrs. Crackenthorpe," naming its opponent in No. 49 (September 14)—

But others will swear that this wise Undertaker

By Trade's an At——ney, by Name is a B——r—

and taunting him about "the discipline of a cane he met with, for Abusing the Deputy and his Daughters in No. 24." Professor Anderson attempted to meet

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[1] Each issue is given an inclusive dating, as "From Wednesday, July 6, to Friday, July 8." I shall, throughout, give only the latter date as the date of issue.

[2] Paul B. Anderson, "The History and Authorship of Mrs. Crackenthorpe's *Female Tatler*," *MP*, XXVIII (1930–31), 354–60.

this threat to his candidate by theorizing that, when Mrs. Manley switched to A. Baldwin, Bragge called in Baker to continue the series, now to be designated (because no longer written by the original Mrs. C.) the "spurious" one; that Baker noised it about town that he was Mrs. Crackenthorpe and that thus the *Apollo* got its Crackenthorpes mixed:

Thomas Baker, as editor of the spurious rival paper, striving to maintain his precarious enterprise, and to establish its authenticity, would have been more likely than Mrs. Crackenthorpe herself to be indiscreet in proclaiming his authorship of the *Female Tatler*. That Thomas Baker had a large part in these roguish projects, and a rogue's reward for them, is a reasonable . . . assumption [p. 357].

Feeling that he had settled the authorship of the two Crackenthorpe series, Professor Anderson proceeded, in subsequent articles, to study problems of authorship posed by the "Society of Ladies" series, from No. 52 on.[3]

In the meantime, Mr. R. T. Milford,[4] of the Bodleian Library, called attention to the fact that the Bodleian had a complete set of the *Tatler*, including the series issued by Bragge from August 19 to October 17, inclusive. Mr. Graham got the whole photostated and, in *Modern Philology* for February, 1937,[5] undertook to defend the attribution to Baker in his *English Literary Periodicals*. He questioned Professor Anderson's assumption that the continuation by Bragge from August 19 to October 17 was the "spurious" one and offered arguments to refute those offered by Professor Anderson for Mrs. Manley's authorship and (converse-

ly) arguments to support Baker's candidacy. In some of these he found continuity from the "Mrs. Crackenthorpe" series to the "Society of Ladies" series[6] and thus, by implication at least, claimed Baker's authorship for the whole of the series begun by Bragge and continued by Baldwin, from No. 1 to No. 111. In the end, however, it was plain that his attitude toward Professor Anderson's theory was mainly defensive:

Such are the evidences, very circumstantial, no doubt, which one finds supporting the ascription of authorship to Thomas Baker. At least they create, taken together, a strong presumption in favor of the Baker tradition.

In view of the confusion resulting from the existence of two periodicals with the same title and their conflicting claims and contradictory statements, the problems of authorship will probably never be solved in any satisfactory way. Until a more conclusive case can be made for Mrs. Manley, or some other contemporary, it appears better to accept the tradition that Thomas Baker was the author of the Bragge-Baldwin *Female Tatler*. In any event the case which Professor Anderson has ingeniously erected for Mrs. Manley's authorship can hardly be accepted until further explanations are made [p. 272].

I think that it is possible to be rather more definite than this.

II

In the first place, the Bragge-Baldwin paper is quite obviously not by the same hand (or hands) throughout all the hun-

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[2] See *PQ*, XV (1936), 286–300 (for Bernard Mandeville as one of this "Society"), and XVI (1937), 358–75 (for Mrs. Centlivre).

[4] In *MP*, XXIX (1932), 350–51.

[5] Walter Graham, "Thomas Baker, Mrs. Manley, and the *Female Tatler*," *MP*, XXXIV (1936–37), 267–72.

[6] The first number written by the "Society" was No. 52. In the article (p. 271), Graham cited "the very intimate knowledge of players . . . shown in the *Female Tatler* (see Nos. 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 37, 39, 47, 52, and 69)," and pointed out that "Thomas D'Urfey was attacked by the author of the *Female Tatler* both before and after Mrs. Manley was thought by Professor Anderson to have severed her connection with the paper (see Nos. 26 and 95), while in the preface to his *Modern Prophets* in 1709 D'Urfey mentions Baker as one of two 'bloody male criticks' from whose 'barbarous assassinating attempts' he had suffered. The animus shown toward D'Urfey is, therefore, common to Baker and the *Female Tatler*."

dred and eleven issues but clearly separable at (or about) No. 51;[7] with subsequent numbers I do not wish to be concerned. Examination of the file shows, also, that no confusion really ought to exist as to which of the series by rival printers which ran side by side from August 19 to October 17 is the original and which the "spurious." Despite the "conflicting claims and contradictory statements" of the two, it is clear that the Baldwin continuation is the original. In the last number printed by Bragge before the split—No. 18 (August 17)—the author had described a bad school for boys and its master, Mr. Sullen, and promised to continue with a companion sketch of a good school and its master, Mr. Affable. Bragge No. 19 attempts to carry out this plan but makes a miserable failure of it; Baldwin No. 19, on the other hand, carries on brilliantly, and (a point which the would-be imitator acting for Bragge missed) compares the *wives* of the masters in such fashion as to establish its genuineness beyond question.[8] Nor does the Baldwin writer fail to twit those who are trying to carry on at Bragge's after his departure for their failure in this instance.[9] He was confident of his over-all superiority to the rival—"Mrs. Crackenthorpe thinks she may, without vanity, desire those who are still impos'd on by the Spurious Paper . . . to compare two or three of 'em with hers, and she fancies they'll be soon undeceiv'd"[10]—and he had reason to be so. The Bragge continuation is without literary quality; "spurious" is none too harsh a term for it; and thus I beg leave to dismiss it from the text of this article.

There are several other respects in which continuity can be traced from the first eighteen numbers printed by Bragge into the continuation by Baldwin, and I should like to examine two, since they bear on Baker's authorship. When D'Urfey, in the preface to *The Modern Prophets*, named Baker as one who had attacked him, the reference is probably not to attacks in the *Female Tatler*, as Professor Graham supposed;[11] the *Prophets* was acted in May, 1709, and would normally be printed within the month following, before the first issue of the *Tatler* appeared. Instead, what roused D'Urfey's ire would seem to have been the prologue ("By the Author of Tunbridge-Walks," i.e., Baker) to Mrs. Centlivre's *The Busie Body*, also acted in May, and obviously later in that month than D'Urfey's play, for the prologue refers to it:

Tho' modern Prophets were expos'd of late,
The Author cou'd not Prophesie his Fate;
If with such Scenes an Audience had been
    Fir'd,
The Poet must have really been Inspir'd.
But these, alas! are Melancholy Days
For Modern Prophets, and for Modern Plays.[12]

This reference to the failure of D'Urfey's play would account for his charge in the preface to the printed version of the

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[7] Professor Anderson (*PQ*, XVI, 358) finds some of the "new editors" in this paper and thus assumes that they began their reign with it. But No. 51 also includes an attack on ladies' gaming which looks back to the manner of earlier issues, not forward, and so this passage may be by the retiring writer. With No. 52 the cleavage is complete, and the new writer (or writers) in complete control.

[8] Thus, Bragge No. 18, *re* Mrs. Sullen: "her Pride is so infinitely above her Business, that the Boys seem so many Lacqueys to attend her. . . . And if any Boy happens to be her Favourite, 'tis he that lugs about her great Girl, for a whole Afternoon, in return of which she excuses him his Exercise." Baldwin No. 19, *re* Mrs. Affable: "she has a Notion above sending 'em of Errants, their helping to shell Peas, and lugging about her Children, but has Servants do what is proper for Servants."

[9] Baldwin No. 20 (August 22): "Note, 'Tis to be further observ'd that they give so imperfect an Account of Mr. Affable, knowing nothing of the Man, that Mrs. Crackenthorpe is quite asham'd on't."

[10] Baldwin No. 28 (September 9).

[11] See above, n. 4.

[12] Ed. of 1709: "Augustan Reprints," No. 19 (1949), with introduction by Jess Byrd.

Prophets that Baker's *Fine Lady's Airs* had been "deservedly hist." It would be natural for Baker to retaliate, and thus the game made of the *Prophets* and its author in the *Tatler* when it appeared in July does seem to point to Baker as its author. Notices begin with No. 4 (July 15), in which Nick Dainty-Boy, "as empty a Coxcomb as ever whistled for want of Thought," is said to have set down in his diary the entry, "Read over carefully Mr. D'Urfey's *Modern Prophets*, which I take to be an incomparable good Play." The *Tatler* has another flirt at D'Urfey in No. 8 (July 25). In No. 26 (September 5) appears another coxcomb, who sets himself up as "a very great Judge of Plays. . . . And has declar'd, That the *Modern Prophets* has a prodigious deal of humour in it, and that the *Plain-Dealer* is but a heavy kind o' business." In the same issue appears a burlesque notice in which D'Urfey's creditors are invited to convene "on Thursday next at the Cyder Celler in Covent Garden, to receive some stuttering Proposals about their Debts." He is writing "a Comedy call'd, The Modern Poets, which he's assured will have Prodigious Success . . . and will make over to 'em the profits of the Third Night, provided they pay in Contributions to support him." The whole is too long to quote but evinces a brand of wit with which the angry D'Urfey was well advised not to try to cope.[13]

A second point of continuity from the paper as published by Bragge to the Baldwin continuation is furnished by the quarrel with the *British Apollo*. In this the *Tatler* was the aggressor. It opened fire early with squibs in Nos. 7 (July 22) and 8 (July 25) and then—the *Apollo* not having yet been "drawn"—launched a heavy attack in No. 21 (August 24). The *Apollo* sprang to the fray in its No. 45 (August 31), and the battle raged there-

after until the final blast by the *Apollo* in a lead article in its No. 61 (October 26). But by this time the author of the *Tatler* was preparing to hand on the torch to a continuator.

In the *Apollo's* identification of Baker as its (at least in the journalistic sense) enemy, there is to be found, it seems to me, the best evidence for identifying him, not Mrs. Manley, as Mrs. Crackenthorpe. At first the "Society of Gentlemen" who conducted the *Apollo* did not know what person had attacked them: in Nos. 45 and 47 they do not refer to Baker by name. But they evidently made inquiries—the true authorship could scarcely be kept a secret, even if Baker had wanted it to be, which to me seems doubtful—and in No. 49 they call him by name and charge him with having suffered a caning. In subsequent numbers they taunt him with the alleged failure of his *Fine Lady's Airs*.[14] Surely it is reasonable to believe that the *Apollo* knew its man. Professor Anderson, on the other hand, would give poor Baker (whom he supposes to be writing the

[13] It may be pointed out, too, that *Female Tatler*, No. 41 (October 10), contains a compliment to Mrs. Centlivre and *The Busie Body*: this is interesting in view of Baker's having written the prologue which initiated the tiff with D'Urfey. The presumption of friendly relations between Baker and Mrs. C. would also support Professor Anderson's theory that, when the original writer gave up the periodical, it fell into Mrs. C.'s hands (see Anderson, *PQ*, XVI, 358–75). Besides D'Urfey's *Prophets*, another play by which Mrs. Crackenthorpe was amused (and rightly) was *The Lawyer's Fortune: or, Love in a Hollow Tree*, by the eccentric William (afterward Viscount) Grimston. This curious piece was never acted but was printed in 1705 and 1736. The *CBEL* (I know not on what authority) attributes to Baker the anonymous preface to it, which does not do very well by the author but, on the whole, as well as could be done. If the *CBEL* is correct, this makes another link between Baker and the *Female Tatler*, which twice facetiously notices Grimston's play. In No. 33 it announces that "Yesterday was published the Seventeenth Edition . . . written for the Use of all Young Play-wrights, by a Gentleman that always stands upon the Stage in Time of Acting, and consequently must have a True Knowledge of it"; and in No. 37 it refers to the play as "that famous Comedy."

[14] *Apollo*, Nos. 50, 61.

Bragge paper) the name without the game and has him not only bearing with innocence and patience the counterblows of the *Apollo* but actually taking a caning for a satirical sketch of a Deputy which appeared in the Baldwin paper and was actually (in Professor Anderson's view) written by Mrs. Manley. Well, it seems more reasonable to claim both name and game for Baker—except for the caning, which I take to be a comic fabrication out of whole cloth.[15]

Once one begins to believe that the *Apollo* knew what it was about and turns to comparing the *Tatler* with Baker's plays, numerous similarities emerge. Professor Graham noted that "the Ap Shinkins of Wales mentioned as among Mrs. Crackenthorpe's suitors in *Female Tatler*, No. 43, appeared also in Baker's *Hampstead Heath*."[16] There are numerous others, and I beg leave to cite some of these, though admitting the dubious nature of such internal evidence. Parallels with Baker's first play, *The Humour of the Age* (1701), are lacking—but when it was composed Baker was fresh from college and not so well acquainted with the town as he later became. Parallels with his second play, *Tunbridge-Wells* (1703), are numerous. Hillaria asks, "How d'you manage your self, Brother?" and Reynard answers, "Like a true Town-Spark; One day at Court, and the next in Jayl"; in *Tatler*, No. 17, Mrs. Crackenthorpe observes, "We see, Lac'd Suits one day at Court, and the next in Goal." "Beau May-Pole" is mentioned in the play and is fully characterized in *Tatler*, No. 26. Belinda suggests that Hillaria write a play, but the

[15] If Baker was actually thus disciplined for the sketch of Deputy Bustle and his daughters in No. 24, he would seem to have been singularly unchastened by the experience, for he "follows up" on the Bustles (a rich, vulgar City family) in Nos 30, 39, 43, 47, and 50.

[16] Graham, p. 271. But the spelling differs—it is Mrs. Ap Shinken in the play.

latter demurs: "No really, Belinda, a Poetess is so scandalous a Character; for when a Woman has the Face to appear in Rehearsals, and teach Actors their Parts, her Assurance will scruple nothing"; the same situation and thought turn up in *Tatler*, No. 41: "This discourse made my Lady Harriot Lovely hint to me to write a Comedy, which was only opposed by Mrs. Cavil, who asserted that no Woman ever yet turn'd Poetess, but lost her Reputation by appearing at Rehearsals." Mr. Maiden's set of fellow-effeminates in the same play—"the prettiest Company at a Bowl of Virgin-Punch; we never made it with Rum nor Brandy . . . but two Quarts of Mead to half a pint of White Wine, Lemon-Juice, Burridge, and a little Perfume"—are fairly matched in *Tatler*, No. 5, by a set of effeminate Baronets who were discovered by "some prying Ladies" to "understand Needlework, and are very Curious in Crossstitch," who have a Sweet-meat Club, where they meet "to work a fine Wastecoat for a Brother Beau's Wedding" and refresh themselves with "a Collation of wet Sweet meats, and every one had a Pint of Sack and an Orange." In the play, also, Squib, a Captain in the City Train-Bands, is made great fun of. He is spoken of as always ready to "Storm the Outworks of a Venson Pasty"; Penelope, who aspires to marry him, looks forward to going "to the Artillery-Ground o' Training Days, that the Soldiers may let off their Muskets, and cry Heav'n Bless the Noble Captain's Lady"; but Woodcock diagnoses him as one who "flies at a showr of Rain"; these traits of the militia, even to the "shower of rain," are twice noticed in the *Tatler* (Nos. 10, 49).

In *Hampstead Heath* (1705), Deputy Driver, like Deputy Bustle in *Tatler*, No. 24, is a member of a Reforming Society. When his wife Arabella refuses to return

to his bed and board, he threatens to "put an Advertizement in the *Observator*, —Whereas Arabella, the Wife of Deputy Jehosophat Driver, has elop'd from her Husband, That no Body trust her with Patches, Pomatum, or false Hair, on pain of losing their Debt." No doubt this led, four years later, to a delightful burlesque advertisement in *Tatler*, No. 15:

Arabella Ticklepulse, Wife to Tho. Ticklepulse, Doctor in Physick, has elop'd from her Husband; She's a little blackish Woman, has a languishing Eye, a deli[c]ious soft Hand, and two pretty jiggetting Feet: She's suppos'd to be gone her Husband knows not where, nor has she sent him word, when she will return, therefore, all Templers, and other general Lovers, are desir'd not to harbour her, for the Doctor will not pay for her Board. She'd no occasion to run away, having a Sufficiency of every thing for a Reasonable Woman: However, though this be her third Elopement, if she submits her self by the end of the Dogdays, the Doctor has good nature enough to receive her again.[17]

This separation, like the one in the play, ended in a reconciliation, for in *Tatler*, No. 17, it is announced that she "is come home again, has ask'd Pardon for her Excursions, and the Doctor is very well pleas'd." In the play also, Chum, for purposes of the intrigue, is disguised as a "Beau-Jew." "Beau-Jews, that talk obscenely in modest Women's Company, then stare 'em in the Face, and burst out a laughing," are satirized in *Tatler*, No. 3. The term may be of Baker's coinage—I have not encountered it elsewhere.

The Fine Lady's Airs (1708) also supplies its instances. Shoplifting at India-Houses is referred to, and *Tatler*, No. 2, rehearses the experience of an India-House proprietor with a shoplifting lady. Nicknack, the "beau-merchant" of the play,

who imports "nothing but Squirrels, Lapdogs, and Guinea-piggs to insnare the Women," has great news for Lady Rodomont: "The Bawble Friggat, Captain Gewgaw Commander, is just arriv'd laden with Parrots, Parrokeits, Monkeys ... and all the Rarities imaginable"; *Tatler*, No. 8, carries the announcement that "A Ship laden with Monkeys, is lately come into the River; the young ones are fit for Ladies Pages, the middle ag'd ones, Ladies Impertinents, and the old ones will make admirable C——n C——l-Men." Gloves made up in walnut-shells are referred to in Lady Rodomont's scene with the tradespeople and also in *Tatler*, No. 3. And a similarity in style is unmistakable between Lady Rodomont's vivid statement of the attention attracted by an unmarried belle and Mrs. Crackenthorpe's remark upon the ubiquity of people by the name of Smith.[18]

So far as such parallels may be trusted, they support the *British Apollo*'s identification and suggest that the *Female Tatler* was written either by someone who admired Baker and copied him closely or by Baker himself. Baker seems the logical choice.

I shall not expatiate on the merit of Baker's three and a half months of work as a periodical essayist but shall permit the excerpts already quoted to speak for him. Not all the first fifty-plus issues, perhaps, are from his hand. Professor Anderson

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[17] For a striking instance of the inferiority of the spurious publication see the attempt to imitate this in the Bragge paper, No. 25.

[18] Lady Rodomont: "Oh! what Transports do I feel, to provoke the Eyes and Whispers of the Multitude,—Whose Equipage is that?—My Lady Rodomont's—Whose Visiting-day is it?—My Lady Rodomont's—Who bespoke the Play Tonight?—My Lady Rodomont—But when she's once marry'd—What Gentlewoman's that with the great Belly?—Sir Marmaduke Mortgage's Wife . . ." (I have corrected the punctuation of the first edition slightly). *Tatler*, No. 21: "Mrs. Crackenthorpe would be glad to know how the Famaly of Smiths came so infinitely to outspread other names. She can't make a visit, but in comes Madam Smith, and Miss Smith; what smart Fellow's that?—Beau Smith; whose fine House is this?—My Lady Smith's."

has shown[19] that the whole of the story related in No. 32 is drawn from a translation, dating 1700, of La Bruyère. Occasionally Baker may have permitted friends to assist him. The story of Clarissa in No. 14 is, I should guess, by another hand, and I am also suspicious of No. 29. But, on the whole, this first section of the *Tatler* is patently done by the same person, and well done.

But, well written though it was, the paper was too satirical to please the town, and in No. 51 Baker threw up the sponge: "Mrs. Crackenthorpe resenting the Affront offer'd to her by some rude Citizens, altogether unacquainted with her Person, gives notice that she has resign'd her Pretentions of writing the *Female Tatler*. . . ." This "affront" was, in all probability, not the alleged caning, as has been thought,[20] but a presentment of the *Tatler* by the grand jury shortly before October 19.[21] Perhaps this was through the activities, completely unauthorized by Baker, of an impostor, against

whom readers were warned in Nos. 44 (October 17) and 45 (October 19): he tried to collect money from people on the threat to expose them in the *Tatler*. Presumably Baker was able to clear himself, for he continued to publish until the end of the month. But he was tired of the struggle. There are indications in the *Tatler* that in this summer of 1709 he was oppressed by a sense of his poverty and the difficulties of making his way in literature.[22] The grand jury's action was the last straw. But it is my view that a good writer of periodical essays, as well as comedies, was lost when, in 1711, Thomas Baker retired from the literary scene to become Rector of Bolnhurst, Bedfordshire.[23]

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[19] Anderson, *PMLA*, LII (1937), 102.

[20] By Professor Anderson (*MP*, XXVIII, 358). But even he admits that the "well-known incident of the cudgelling was then two months past"—which would have been too far back, one would think, to have caused a decision to suspend at the end of October.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 356.

[22] I take the advertisement for a place for a "Gentleman" at the end of No. 1 and the sketch of Tom Careless in No. 22 to be (with appropriate ironies) self-portraits. Professor Anderson (*PMLA*, LII, 100, n. 1) thinks that Tom Careless is Thomas Lydal. But Lydal was an arithmetician who (if *Tatler*, No. 35, can be trusted to be more than merely facetious and whimsical) was smitten with literary ambitions and turned to assisting the author of the spurious paper; he was certainly not the fellow made fun of in spurious paper No. 29. There is nothing of the arithmetician about "Tom Careless," and I read "Tom Baker."

[23] Thus I finally dispose of him in the introduction to *The Fine Lady's Airs* ("Augustan Reprints," No. 25), p. vi.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ARTICLE

NOTES TOWARD A MATTHEW ARNOLD BIBLIOGRAPHY

A RNOLD students have been hampered by the lack of any complete edition and of any complete bibliography of his work. The Arnold canon is still unsettled; remarkably little has been done to establish it in the sixty-odd years since his death. T. B. Smart's *Bibliography of Matthew Arnold* (London: Davy, 1892) is neither complete nor quite accurate; it omits, for instance, American editions of his writings, though they were occasionally the first to appear. The revision of Smart's bibliography in Volume XV of the "De luxe" edition of Arnold's works (London: Macmillan; Smith, Elder, 1903–4) is hardly at all amplified and retains various errors.

The following check list is submitted as a supplement to existing bibliographies of Arnold. Perhaps a complete bibliography will never be possible. The difficulties in the way of identifying all Arnold's anonymous contributions to the *Pall Mall Gazette* and of compiling a list of all his speeches are formidable. Such a list may deserve no place, moreover, in a finished bibliography. Some of the newspaper reports of speeches given here contain excerpts of genuine value, but others are mere announcements, without even a summary of contents: the latter are included here chiefly in the hope that they may lead to the discovery of printed versions of addresses hitherto unknown.

Unless indication to the contrary is given, the items in this list are ones which have not been noted before or have been wrongly classified—for instance, as "criticism of Arnold" rather than as his own work.

I. ESSAYS

1. February 15, 1872. "La Réforme intellectuelle et morale de la France. ..." A review in the *Academy*, III, 61–64. This (the first) publication of the essay is not listed in bibliographies. E. J. O'Brien reprinted it in *Essays in Criticism: Third Series* (Boston: Ball, 1910) without revealing his source. Critics have also used a reprint which appeared in *Every Saturday*, I (new ser.; March 23, 1872), 316–19, under the title "Matthew Arnold on M. Renan."

2. 1887. Preface to Mary S. Claude's *Twilight Thoughts: Stories for Children and Child-Lovers*, ed. Mary L. Avery (Boston: Ginn), pp. 3–4. Arnold mentioned this brief preface in a letter to his daughter, Lucy Whitridge, November 27, 1886. See *Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1848–1888*, ed. G. W. E. Russell (London: Macmillan, 1901), II, 412. It has never been listed or used, apparently, by Arnold critics.

II. LETTERS

The following list comprises letters which Arnold wrote for publication and personal letters which were published during his lifetime by other persons.

Some preliminary observations must be made: In 1933 Mr. T. H. Vail Motter published "A Check List of Matthew Arnold's Letters" (*Studies in Philology*, XXXI, 600–605), with the excellent intention and effect of "co-ordinating the material available to October 15, 1933." Since that date many more letters have come to light. M. Louis Bonnerot, especially, catalogues many in an appendix to his *Matthew Arnold, poète: Essai de biographie psychologique* (Paris: Didier, 1947). The present writer is about to publish a greatly expanded list of personal letters, though one still very far from being complete. Meanwhile, certain revisions in the section of Mr. Motter's list relevant to this bibliographical note should be made; that section is "III.B. To Periodicals and to an Editor."

1. Of the two letters Mr. Motter describes as "private letters to the editor of the *Pall*

Mall Gazette, dated January 13, 1886, and September 19, 1886," printed in the *Pall Mall Budget,* XXXVI (April 19, 1888), 12, the first had already been printed during Arnold's lifetime (see item 8 in this section). A third letter appeared in the same issue of the *Budget,* p. 6; it was written to the Prefect of Library at Winchester, dated London, June 1, 1875.

2. The letter printed as "English at the Universities" in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of January 7, 1887, is not only "on the same subject" as three letters to J. C. Collins listed by Mr. Motter in Section II, "Editions of Letters," but actually *is* the third of those letters. It is dated Cobham, December 29, 1886, and was printed without mention of Collins in "English at the Universities. VII," *Pall Mall Budget,* XXXV (January 6, 1887), 14, and in "English at the Universities. IX," *Pall Mall Gazette,* January 7, 1887, pp. 1–2. It was partly printed in [Collins' ?] "A School of English Literature," *Quarterly Review,* CLXIV (January, 1887), 251–52, and in his letter to the editor of the London *Times* on "The Matthew Arnold Memorial Fund," May 7, 1888, p. 12, col. 6, before he printed it with two other letters in *Letters from Matthew Arnold to John Churton Collins* (London: Privately printed, 1910).

3. "Roman Catholics and the State" was not dated, as Mr. Motter says, but rather was *printed* on April 8, 1875, in the *Pall Mall Gazette,* pp. 2–3.

4. Five pieces printed in the *Pall Mall Gazette,* on May 30, 1870, May 3, 1877, February 14, 1882, November 8, 1882, and January 7, 1887, are described by Mr. Motter as "letters on the theatre, not reprinted." The description must be revised:

   a) May 30, 1870. This letter, which Arnold signed "A Friend to the Church," was entitled "A First Requisite for Church Reform"; it was not concerned with the theater, nor were the five following letters.

   b) May 3, 1877. This item is not a letter at all, but an unsigned review by Arnold of Wiese's *Deutsche Briefe über englische Erziehung,* entitled "German Letters on English Education."

   c) February 14, 1882. This letter dealt with the use of the word *clôture;* it was printed only in part, in "Occasional Notes."

   d) November 8, 1882. This item is not a letter, but an unsigned leading article by Arnold concerning the French educator Rapet and entitled "A French Worthy" (see *Letters,* ed. Russell, II, 207, for listing).

   e) January 7, 1887. This is the letter discussed in 2 above.

   f) Mr. Motter does not mention another letter (noted in Arnold bibliographies) which appeared in the *Pall Mall Gazette.* It was dated August 11, 1884, and was printed on August 12, 1884; it was reprinted in the Édition de luxe of Arnold's works, keeping its original title, "George Sand."

   (The actual dates of the letters on the theater are summarized by Mr. Motter on p. 601. He records, also, their reprinting by Brander Matthews in *Letters of an Old Playgoer* [New York: Dramatic Museum of Columbia University, 1919]. Four of the letters had, however, already been collected by Clement K. Shorter in *Matthew Arnold as Dramatic Critic* [London: Shorter, 1903].)

5. Arnold's letters to the London *Times* printed on May 22, 1886, and August 6, 1886, were reprinted in *On Home Rule for Ireland* (London: Privately printed, 1891). The second letter was written from America and dated July 24, 1886.

The following letters have not been listed previously:

1. A letter to Hugh Owen, written before September 4, 1866, and printed in a report of "The Eisteddfod," *Pall Mall Gazette,* September 5, 1866, p. 6; reprinted in "The Eisteddfod," *Times* (London), September 6, 1866, p. 5, col. 6; partly printed in Arnold's preface to *On the Study of Celtic Literature* (London: Smith, Elder, 1867).

2. A letter to Thomas Hughes, dated Harrow, May 23, 1872, and printed by Hughes in

Memoir of a Brother (London: Macmillan, 1873), pp. 45–46.

3. A letter to Miss [Rose or Mary] Kingsley, written shortly after January 23, 1875, and printed by Mrs. F. E. G. Kingsley in *Charles Kingsley: His Letters and Memories of His Life* (London: King, 1876), II, 471. It was printed later in Russell's *Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1848–1888*, II, 140–41, but with some differences of wording and punctuation.

4. A letter to the editor of the London *Times*, printed as "The Irish University Question," July 31, 1879, p. 10, cols. 4–5.

5. A letter to the editor of the London *Times*, printed as "Cost of Elementary Schools," October 20, 1879, p. 6, col. 5.

6. A letter to an American correspondent, dated April 18, 1884, and partly printed in an unsigned letter from that correspondent, dated Washington, D.C., April 30, 1884, to the editor of the *Nation* (New York), XXXVIII (May 8, 1884), 404–5, under the title "Mendacious Personal Gossip."

7. A letter to the editors of the *Critic and Good Literature* (New York), dated London, August 6, 1884, and printed in an article entitled "1809.—Oliver Wendell Holmes. —1884," II (new ser.; August 30, 1884), 97.

8. A letter to the acting editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, dated Cobham, January 13, 1886, and partly printed in "The Best Hundred Books. By the Best Hundred Judges. IV," January 29, 1886, p. 4; reproduced in facsimile in "Two Autograph Letters," *Pall Mall Budget*, XXXVI (April 19, 1888), 12. This letter appeared also in *English Literature and How To Study It . . .*, *Pall Mall Gazette*, "Extra" No. 32 (London: Pall Mall Gazette, [1887]), pp. 20–21. The *Budget* printing is listed in bibliographies.

9. A letter to J. C. O'Connor, Jr., dated Buffalo, New York, June 28, 1886, and printed in a report of a meeting of the Irish Loyal and Patriotic Society of New York as "Mr. Matthew Arnold Instructing Americans on the Irish Question," *Pall Mall Gazette*, July 19, 1886, p. 4.

It seems very probable that the two following letters were written by Arnold: content and manner are characteristic, and the nom de plume suggests the terminology of the struggle against Philistia which was being introduced at just the period of the letters.

10. A letter to the editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, signed "A Lover of Light," printed as "Education and the State," December 11, 1865, p. 4.

11. A letter to the editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, signed "A Lover of Light," dated December 21, and printed as "Education and the State," December 22, 1865, p. 3.

Of possible value in establishing Arnold's authorship of these two letters is a comment in a letter he wrote his mother on February 3, 1866: "I mean to do hardly anything for the *Pall Mall Gazette*, partly because it is not much use writing letters when I am immediately guessed, and so what I urge does not get the benefit of coming with the weight of impersonal newspaper authority—partly because the habit of newspaper writing would soon become too fascinating and exciting" (*Letters of Matthew Arnold, 1848–1888*, I, 366).

12. M. Bonnerot points out that extremely brief excerpts from two letters from Arnold to Sainte-Beuve, dated March 8, 1855, and July 26, 1861, were printed by Sainte-Beuve in, respectively, the second edition of *Chateaubriand et son groupe littéraire sous l'Empire* (1860), p. 356, n. 1, and the second edition, revised, of *Nouveaux lundis* (1870), III, 3. M. Bonnerot prints these and other Arnold letters to Sainte-Beuve in full in an appendix to *Matthew Arnold, poète: Essai de biographie psychologique*.

III. OXFORD ORATIONS AND LECTURES

A. CREWEIAN ORATIONS

Arnold delivered the Creweian Oration every other year during his tenure of the Chair of Poetry at Oxford. Only two of his orations appear to have been printed; all five were briefly reported in the London *Times*.

1. June 16, 1858. *Oratio Anniversaria in Memoriam Publicorum Benefactorum Acade-*

miae Oxoniensis; ex instituto Honoratissimi Domini et Patris admodum reverendi, Nathanielis Domini Crewe, Olim Baronis de Stene, et Episcopi Dunelmensis; habita in Theatro Sheldoniano XVI Kalendas Julii, A.D. MDCCCLVIII (Oxford: Shrimpton, 1858).

2. June 20, 1860. Creweian Oration. See "University Intelligence," *Times* (London), June 21, 1860, p. 9, col. 6.

3. July 2, 1862. *Oratio Anniversaria In Memoriam Publicorum Benefactorum Academiae Oxoniensis Ex Instituto Honoratissimi Domini et Patris Admodum Reverendi Nathanielis Domini Crewe Olim Baronis de Stene et Episcopi Dunelmensis Habita in Theatro Sheldoniano VI Nonas Julii A.D. MDCCCLXII* [n.p., n.d.]. The printed form of this oration is listed in the revision of Smart's bibliography, but not quite correctly; it is repeated here for the sake of completeness.

4. June 8, 1864. Creweian Oration. See "University Intelligence," *Times* (London), June 9, 1864, p. 14, col. 4.

5. June 13, 1866. Creweian Oration. See "University Intelligence," *Times* (London), June 14, 1866, p. 14, col. 4. •

B. PROFESSORIAL LECTURES

Some of Arnold's Oxford lectures were never published; the very titles of some are unknown. The first person to make use of what meager records there are was Mr. E. K. Brown, in his *Matthew Arnold: A Study in Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). The lectures are listed below in tabular form for the first time, with a few corrections of and additions to Mr. Brown's entries. In each case, announcement of the lecture was made in the "University Intelligence" column of the London *Times*.

1. November 14, 1857. Inaugural lecture, announced in the *Times*, November 5, 1857, p. 5, col. 6; printed as "On the Modern Element in Literature," February, 1869.

2. May 8, 1858. A "public lecture," announced in the *Times*, April 27, 1858, p. 12, col. 6. This lecture is omitted by Mr.

Brown. The subject is not known. In early January, 1858, Arnold asked his sister Jane Forster for "my Bouddhisme [a book] to make a reference for my next lecture" (*Unpublished Letters of Matthew Arnold*, ed. Arnold Whitridge [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923], p. 43); perhaps for *this* lecture?

3. May 29, 1858. A continuation of the "introductory course of lectures on the Modern Element in Literature," announced in the *Times*, May 20, 1858, p. 9, col. 5.

4. December 4, 1858. A continuation of the "introductory course of lectures on the Modern Element in Literature," announced in the *Times*, November 30, 1858, p. 10, col. 4.

5. March 12, 1859. A continuation of the "introductory course of Lectures on the Modern Element in Literature," announced in the *Times*, March 7, 1859, p. 10, col. 1. This lecture is omitted by Mr. Brown.

6. May 19, 1860. A resumption of the "introductory course of lectures upon the Modern Element in Literature," announced in the *Times*, May 14, 1860, p. 9, col. 4. Mr. Brown dates the lecture itself "May 14."

7. November 3, 1860. A lecture "On Translating Homer," announced in the *Times*, October 25, 1860, p. 7, col. 1; printed in 1861 in *On Translating Homer*.

8. December 8, 1860. A lecture "On Translating Homer," announced in the *Times*, November 28, 1860, p. 12, col. 4; printed in 1861 in *On Translating Homer*.

9. January 26, 1861. A "third and last lecture 'On Translating Homer,'" announced in the *Times*, January 23, 1861, p. 9, col. 2; printed in 1861 in *On Translating Homer*.

10. June 8, 1861. A lecture on "The Claim of the Celtic Race and the Claim of the Christian Religion to have originated Chivalrous Sentiment," in continuation of the "course on the Modern Element in Literature," announced in the *Times*, May 29, 1861, p. 9, col. 6.

11. November 30, 1861. A "fourth lecture 'On Translating Homer,'" announced in the

Times, November 25, 1861, p. 8, col. 6; printed in 1862 as *Last Words on Translating Homer*.

12. March 29, 1862. A lecture on "The Modern Element in Dante," in continuation of the "course of lectures on 'The Modern Element in Literature,'" announced in the *Times*, March 24, 1862, p. 9, col. 6; printed, presumably, as "Dante and Beatrice," May, 1863.

13. November 15, 1862. A lecture on "A Modern French Poet," announced in the *Times*, November 10, 1862, p. 9, col. 6; printed, probably, as "Maurice de Guérin," January, 1863.

14. March 26, 1863. A lecture on "The Modern Element in Romanticism," announced in the *Times*, March 19, 1863, p. 9, col. 6.

15. June 13, 1863. A lecture on "Heinrich Heine," announced in the *Times*, June 9, 1863, p. 14, col. 1; printed as "Heinrich Heine," August, 1863.

16. November 28, 1863. A lecture on "A French Coleridge," announced in the *Times*, November 26, 1863, p. 5, col. 6; printed as "Joubert; or, a French Coleridge," January, 1864.

17. March 5, 1864. A lecture on "Pagan and Christian Religious Sentiment," announced in the *Times*, March 5, 1864, p. 11, col. 6; printed as "Pagan and Christian Religious Sentiment," April, 1864.

18. June 4, 1864. A lecture on "The Influence of Academies on National Spirit and Literature," announced in the *Times*, May 31, 1864, p. 7, col. 6; printed as "The Literary Influence of Academies," August, 1864.

19. October 29, 1864. A lecture on "The Functions of Criticism at the Present Time," announced in the *Times*, October 26, 1864, p. 12, col. 5; printed as "The Functions of Criticism at the Present Time," November, 1864.

20. December 6, 1865. A lecture on "The Study of Celtic Literature," announced in the *Times*, November 24, 1865, p. 9, col. 6; printed as "On the Study of Celtic Literature," March, 1866.

21. December 7, 1865. A lecture on "The Study of Celtic Literature," announced in the *Times*, November 24, 1865, p. 9, col. 6; printed as "On the Study of Celtic Literature," April, 1866.

22. February 24, 1866. A "third and last lecture on the Study of Celtic Literature," announced in the *Times*, February 19, 1866, p. 9, col. 6; printed as "On the Study of Celtic Literature," May, 1866.

23. May 26, 1866. A lecture on "The Celtic Element in English Poetry," announced in the *Times*, May 18, 1866, p. 11, col. 3; printed as "On the Study of Celtic Literature," July, 1866.

24. June 4, 1867. A lecture on "Culture and its Enemies," announced in the *Times*, June 1, 1867, p. 9, col. 6. Mr. Brown dates the lecture "June 1," following an announcement to that effect in the *Times* of May 28, p. 14, col. 4; but it was "unavoidably postponed" until June 4 (see the *Times* of June 1, p. 9, col. 6). It was printed as "Culture and Its Enemies" in July, 1867.

IV. ADDRESSES AND OCCASIONAL SPEECHES

The following list contains only speeches, prepared or extemporaneous, which Arnold did not himself publish but which were noted and/or printed in journals of the day.

1. October 22, 1873. A speech in response to a toast to "Literature, Science, and Art," at the Jubilee of the Oxford Union; reported but not printed in "Oxford Union Society Jubilee," *Times* (London), October 23, 1873, p. 5, cols. 1–3.

2. May 1, 1875. A speech in response to a toast to "Literature," at the Royal Academy banquet; printed in "Banquet at the Royal Academy," *Times* (London), May 3, 1875, p. 9, cols. 1–4. This speech was reprinted by J. B. Orrick in "Hebraism and Hellenism," *New Adelphi*, II (new ser.; September, 1928), 50–56.

3. January 16, 1877. A speech in response to a toast to "Literature and Science," at the opening of New Hall, Balliol; reported but not printed in "University Intelligence,"

Times (London), January 17, 1877, p. 10, col. 5.

4. February 28, 1884. A speech at the Authors' Club, New York; printed in "Mr. Arnold and the Literary Class," *Critic and Good Literature*, I (new ser.; March 8, 1884), 113. (Arnold's answer to an introduction by Joseph H. Choate on March 2, 1884, is very briefly cited in the same article.)

5. November 29, 1884. A speech at the unveiling of a mosaic copied from Watts's "Time, Death, and Judgment," at St. Jude's Church, Whitechapel; printed in "A Lay Sermon by Mr. Matthew Arnold," *Pall Mall Gazette*, December 1, 1884, p. 6, and in "Mr. Matthew Arnold in Whitechapel," *Times* (London), December 1, 1884, p. 10, cols. 4–5. A fragment of the speech is printed by Messrs. C. B. Tinker and H. F. Lowry in *The Poetry of Matthew Arnold: A Commentary* (London: Oxford, 1940).

6. July 29, 1885. A speech at the distribution of prizes at Dulwich College; printed in "Dulwich College," *Times* (London), July 30, 1885, p. 8, col. 2.

7. August 27, 1885. A speech at the Eisteddfod; summarized in "The National Eisteddfod of Wales," *Times* (London), August 28, 1885, p. 6, col. 2.

8. November 12, 1886. A speech at a banquet given Arnold by the schoolmasters of the Westminster district; printed in "Thirty-five Years of School Inspecting: Mr. Matthew Arnold's Farewell," *Pall Mall Gazette*, November 13, 1886, p. 6, and in "Mr. Matthew Arnold and the Westminster Teachers," *Times* (London), November 13, 1886, p. 5, cols. 5–6. Fragments of the speech are printed in G. W. E. Russell's *Matthew Arnold* (New York: Scribner's, 1904), pp. 48, 54, 55–56, 76.

MARION MAINWARING

MOUNT HOLYOKE COLLEGE

REVIEW ARTICLE

THE TEXT OF MARLOWE'S *FAUSTUS*

WHERE there is great or complicated divergence between the editions, as in the case of Marlowe's *Faustus*, the production of a resultant text which may be relied upon to represent the ultimate intention of the author is well-nigh impossible." This quotation from the *Britannica* article on "Textual Criticism" heads Greg's smaller volume, *The Tragical History*, a conjectural reconstruction of *Faustus* in the form of a critical modernized text; but it is the true *raison d'être* for his larger parallel-text edition.[1] *Faustus* represents perhaps the most complex and obscure textual problem in Elizabethan dramatic literature. Two major versions exist: the so-called "A-text," first(?) printed in Q1 of 1604, and the B-text from Q4 of 1616, which is longer by about 600 printed lines. Some episodes are common to both, some peculiar to each. In certain of the common episodes, the texts run parallel, with nothing more than minor variation; in others the action is the same, but the texts have only occasional verbal resemblance. Generally, the B-text is close to A in the scenes from the tragic action but elaborates or adds to the comic episodes.

Before an editor can begin the reconstruction of a text which will attempt to represent the author's original intentions, he must come to grips with the central problem of whether the elaborations in B are later additions and therefore unauthoritative or whether they are omissions from A and hence to be taken as authoritative restorations. Within the general framework of this problem he must also decide the relations of the A-text and the B-text to each other, to the author's manuscript,

[1] *Marlowe's "Doctor Faustus," 1604–1616: Parallel Texts.* Edited by W. W. Greg. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950. Pp. xiv +407. *The Tragical History of the Life and Death of Doctor Faustus by Christopher Marlowe: A Conjectural Reconstruction.* By W. W. Greg. New York: Oxford University Press, 1950. Pp. ix + 66. The parallel-text edition presents the texts in diplomatic form.

and to theatrical productions. Particularly, a decision must be made as to whether either A or B contains the additions for which Henslowe paid Rowley and Birde in 1602. For many years editors chose the A-text as the purer, in the belief that B represented the revised Rowley-Birde version. Not until the Boas edition of 1932 was a coherent defense of the B-text undertaken and an edition regularly based on B, although Boas still believed that the additional material, though in part original, contained also some of the unauthoritative 1602 additions. But the Boas text was not editorially consistent, and, before Sir Walter Greg's present volumes, no fully comprehensive theory of the nature and relationships of the A- and B-texts had been evolved to serve as the necessary basis for scientific editorial reconstruction.

The most notable recent contribution was made by Leo Kirschbaum, who demonstrated that the A-text was a reported version, or "bad quarto." Greg properly acknowledges the priority of Kirschbaum's investigations in his parallel-text edition, which now, in 150 pages of introduction and 110 of notes, essays precisely the complete view of the nature and history of the texts which has previously been wanting. The total problem is so complex that, before any comment may usefully be made on Greg's views, a digest must be presented of the major points in his argument.

The first concern is the dating of the play's composition, which has commonly been assigned to 1588–89 but which Greg sets in 1592 on the evidence for a lost first edition of Marlowe's source, *The Damnable Life*, in May of that year. The chain of proof seems almost unassailable, and Greg has considerable confidence in his position. On the subject of the Rowley-Birde additions Greg points out that the comic episodes peculiar to B or expanded from A are of a piece. In A the episodes are

fragmentary and disjointed in their text, whereas in B they are coherent. It is much easier, as experience shows, to believe that organic episodes in B have degenerated in A than that imperfect and isolated comic incidents in A have been revised into an articulated whole, especially in view of the strong evidence in the text that A has, in fact, cut down fuller scenes in B. Since, finally, reminiscences from these scenes in the B-text (but not in A) appear in *A Shrew* (1594) and the *Merry Wives* (composed 1600–1601), at least these cannot be from Rowley-Birde additions. Close examination of references in A to business preserved only in B and copious evidence of the manner in which A's text seems to have been cut lead to the flat conclusion that none of the passages peculiar to B represent the 1602 additions and that—structurally at least—the B-text preserves the original form of the play, whereas A is often a maimed and debased version.

The A-text, therefore, is a reported text, "drastically curtailed for performance within a limited time, and then at some points elaborated to tickle the palate of a more vulgar audience" (p. 37), preserving alternative episodes to be given according to the resources of the company. Is it, however, a printed copy of a debased promptbook (like Greene's *Orlando*), or, instead, a report of an abridged good promptbook (like Peele's *Alcazar*)? All the characteristics of memorial reconstruction are present, and the whole evidence leads Greg to decide that Q1 was itself printed from a promptbook prepared for provincial performance, not in an orderly manner by cuts but reconstructed memorially from a London performance, with further degeneration as the company's resources declined. (Some gags are introduced bearing on events in 1594–95.) Conjecturally, Pembroke's men owned the play; when the plague in London drove them on tour, they sold the prompt copy to Henslowe in 1593 and later reconstructed the text from memory to make up a new book.

The B-text is of composite origin. Much of it was printed from an independent manuscript, but in part it was also printed from the A-text of Q3 of 1611. In some places, but not in

all, the Q3 copy was revised by comparison with the manuscript, and occasionally the parts printed from manuscript contain additions from A, especially in the stage directions. An editor of B was definitely present: this editor also performed some clumsy censoring. The A-text from Q3, Greg believes, was used as printer's copy because MS was incomplete, although some parts were not so dilapidated that variants could not be deciphered and transferred as annotations to Q3. Signs of revision in MS lead to the belief that it was not itself a promptbook but, instead, Marlowe's foul papers, together with those of his collaborator (whom Greg is willing to accept as Samuel Rowley). The original promptbook for the London performances of 1592–93 (to which the A-text distantly relates through memorial reconstruction) was, then, made up from the very foul papers which served as a basis for much of the B-text. However, the debased A-text preserves a few instances of revisions made in writing up the original promptbook from these papers. Both texts, then, have some authority. That of B is much the greater, but A contains these prompt revisions and in other cases must be consulted to restore the original readings altered in the personal revision and censorship undertaken by the editor of B.

A lengthy section is devoted to a detailed discussion of the text in an attempt to separate Marlowe's hand from that of his collaborator. The result is a table (pp. 138–39) which breaks down the shares in a more precise manner than heretofore available, the conclusion being that 814 lines by Marlowe are preserved of the 2,109 in the B-text (omitting the duplicated chorus). The A-text independently preserves Marlowe's second internal chorus, wanting in B, and through A's text are scattered 16 Marlowan lines censored or otherwise missing in B, as well as 4 additional lines due to revision in the promptbook. Therefore, of what Marlowe originally wrote, 834 lines survive.

No summary can do justice to the ordering of Greg's complex argument which results in these conclusions, and no one but another editor, forced to deal with each of the hundreds of pieces of evidence bearing on the conclu-

sions, is perhaps competent to offer more than a general opinion. What Greg has accomplished is the construction of a complete and coherent hypothesis which accounts in scrupulous detail for the most minute features of the text. As an exercise in logic it is a magnificent structure, with every brick neatly laid in place. The complexity is, of course, disturbing, a matter of which Greg is well aware. Moreover, he states at the outset that he holds some parts of the argument with more conviction than others[2] and that no one would be more surprised than he, were some miraculous revelation to demonstrate that he had been invariably correct. The business of a commentator, therefore, is not to confuse the bushes with the trees; it would be a serious mistake for anyone to permit doubts about various of the details to affect his general estimate of the validity of the central arguments.

About these, in my opinion, there can no longer be any real question. The demonstration we are given is too conclusive to be doubted, and we may take it as fully proved that (1) the A-text is a reconstruction from memory of the play as originally performed but shortened for provincial acting and progressively debased; (2) the B-text was prepared by an editor on the basis of an authoritative manuscript, very likely the foul papers, with reference to the A-text from Q3 for certain substantial parts as well as for a number of interpolations, the whole colored by editorial alterations and cuts, mostly on the score of profanity but some few for literary reasons.

Questions may arise, I think, only when we come to some of the explanatory details by which this skeleton is given flesh. It is only human to suspect the details of a too complete hypothesis, and I take it that no one need be accused of indoctrinating despair if he believes that in extraordinary problems like this some inexplicable features may always remain.

As an example, we may examine the important question of the reporter of the A-text. Unfortunately, Greg does not devote so systematic an examination to this problem as to other questions of the A-text, and throughout he speaks of the reporter in the singular without investigating the alternative that the report was made up, like that of *Lear*, by a group of reciting actors. At one point (see especially p. 59, n. 2), he seems to argue for an actor or prompter in the provincial company. That the Chorus character is given as Wagner apparently relates to the actor who took both parts, and Greg believes that the assignment may thus be due to an actual performance for which A was intended. Moreover, the relative accuracy with which the Friars' Dirge appears (A 915–27) may result from the script from which it was read in the original London performances being available to the reporter. It would seem that both circumstances direct our attention to someone in the company itself. Yet on page 123 Greg is forced to argue that no actor would have had the requisite knowledge of the *Damnable Life* used in at least one place in the A-text to reconstruct a scene for which memory was insufficient. The case is left at that, but further inquiry is needed, for, if the reporter were not associated with the company giving the provincial performance, then how can the A-text have come from their promptbook?

There are curious anomalies in this reported A-text, one of which is the fact that the tragic parts are reproduced with considerable exactitude, although the comic are often recalled only in the barest outline. Greg is evidently much tempted to a complex explanation involving a revision of the comic scenes for the 1594 production by the Admiral's men, the reporter being present in the theater and attempting to pick up these additions to his memory of the play. Eventually, however, he concludes that "the unevenness of the reporting may be due merely to the temper of the reporter"; since the tragic action is "the essence of the play and alone gives it interest and value," the breakdown may be due to no more than a lack of interest. I submit this is not a convincing argument, since it imports modern sensibility into an estimate of the

[2] His own convictions about the relative validity of the various parts of the whole hypothesis are not always clearly indicated in his development of the argument, however.

contemporary interest in the two sides of the play. The answer, I suspect, cannot be given until more work is done on the identification of the reporter(s). Either he was a theatrical man (or men) or he was not. If he was not, it is hard to see how he memorized large portions of the play so successfully; if he was, why was his memory so dim about the comic action?

A prompter does not seem to fit into this pattern, for there would be no particular reason for him to be professionally more interested in the tragic than in the comic action, and it is a question whether the reporting of the tragic parts is not too good for a prompter. It would seem that no single actor could have reported this text, for in the tragic portions Mephistophilis is as well reported as Faustus, and other characters seem to hold their own. Was the report, then, made by a group of actors who had participated in the original London performances, the decline in the comic scenes being explained by the fact that those actors did not join the company on tour? There are some difficulties but not, I think, insuperable ones,[3] and the theory is tempting, for it would explain the difficulty very simply. Possibly there is some fact against it so obvious that Greg did not bother even to discuss it as a theory, but I rather wish he had given his reasons.[4] The exact nature of the reporter(s) is more than an academic question, since it bears on various textual problems. For example, it is not beyond possibility that some of the features in A which Greg assigns to changes made in the original prompt copy might rather be assigned to the reporter(s) or editor of the A-text if we knew more about this matter. Clearly, the final word has not been said about the details of the A-text as a report, even though there

can be no question that it is, in fact, a memorial reconstruction of some kind.

The second matter to which less than justice has been done is the question of the exact nature of the printer's copy for B. That it is an edited combination of MS and Q3 is clearly established. Greg, however, assumes without mentioning any other alternative that whenever possible the actual sheets of the foul papers were given to the printer and that the leaves of Q3, with or without annotation, were substituted as printer's copy only when MS was too dilapidated to be printed from or else was wanting. Whether or not this was the exact mechanical process by which the copy was made up and handed to the printer is of more than casual interest, for it has a distinct textual significance. If, for example, the compositor of B1 set type from the very pages of A3, any variants from A3 must be established as editorial annotations to these leaves when they cannot be assigned as compositor's errors. As a consequence, when these variants are surveyed, all that cannot further be explained as conscious editorial interventions for one reason or another must be assigned as authoritatively copied from MS. Yet if we conjecture, on the other hand, that the editor of B, instead, made a complete new manuscript copy which served the printer, the authority of the variants is somewhat lessened; for as copyist he would be subject to memory lapses and hence some of the presumed editorial variants would be inadvertent instead of calculated, as in Greg's theory.[5]

When we examine the text against Greg's chart reconstructing the copy for B1 (p. 74), several possibly significant facts emerge.

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[3] That Faustus should have been able to report the comic scenes in which he appears is true; but since in these a great deal of cutting and rearrangement seems to have been done, he may well have known these less well in their final version. These are scenes, moreover, particularly susceptible to extemporaneous playing on the basis of a "plot."

[4] Any report transcribed from the lips of a group of reciting actors would need editing and smoothing out, even for production. Is it too much to conjecture that the company called on some hack literary man to assist them at this juncture and that he supplied the material from the *Damnable Life?*

[5] Moreover, whether he made the transcript for printing or to substitute for the lost original (or later) promptbook for a contemporary performance would then enter into question. This, in turn (though not considered by Greg), might have something to do with the nature of the revisions. One might speculate, although the point is doubtful, that the censorship the editor applied was more appropriate for stage performance than for printed copy. (For the view that the *Act of Abuses* applied to the stage but not to printed texts, see Chambers, *William Shakespeare,* I, 239.) The large use made of stage directions imported from A in some parts set from MS may point in the direction of a copy prepared for acting, although not necessarily ever used. I am concerned to indicate only that other, unmentioned possibilities exist than that this copy was made up just for printing.

First, except for one brief passage in Act III, scene 1 (B 802–25), the use of Q3 as copy is confined to the early part and to the very ending of the play. Thus Q3 is used for the prologue, for I, 1, I, 3, and parts of II, 1; but not again (barring the editorially misplaced chorus between II, 1 and II, 2 and the fragment in III, 1) until V, 1. At first this division suggests the damage which Greg infers occurred in the first and last sheets of a carelessly stored manuscript, but one must point out that, since the comic and farcical scenes usurp the major action of Acts III and IV and these are scenes in which A is deficient, there was less opportunity to use A as copy in the midsection, and therefore the unequal division may be less significant than at first appears. When the B-editor chooses MS over Q3 in these middle acts in cases where both contain the same episodes, MS is ordinarily much superior.

Second, it is a curious fact that the shifts between the use of Q3 and MS frequently coincide with scene or other literary divisions of the text rather than with the physical features of Q3 or with what we may presume to have been those of MS. Moreover, the shifts at these points are not always enforced by any marked degeneration of the A-text from that portion previously utilized as copy. We may take as a typical example the first time MS appears as copy, at the start of I, 2 (B 190). Since the text of Q3 in this scene is not notably different from MS, we should ordinarily have expected that, even though I, 2 marked the first fully legible page of MS, Q3 would have continued to serve as copy at least to the end of its page. Instead, eight lines from the bottom of Q3, sig. B1^v, the transfer is made at the beginning of the new scene. If the actual printed Q3 page served as copy, therefore, the editor of B must have crossed out the last lines on the printed page (although practically identical with MS) and placed the MS sheet for the scene on the pile of copy. Moreover, unless for some odd reason he crossed out part of the upper portion of this page of MS, we must suppose further that I, 2 headed the MS page.

Only thirty-six lines later, MS is dropped and Q3 introduced again at the start of I, 3,

although the Q3 text begins only on the third line from the bottom of sig. B2^v. At the start of I, 4 (the fifth line from the top of Q3, sig. B4) MS returns, and for a very good reason, since the texts diverge widely. Nevertheless, if we are not again to suppose that in MS a fresh scene invariably began on a new page,[6] we must suppose that at least part of the MS page containing the end of I, 3 was preserved and was crossed out so that the printer could continue to use Q3 to the very end of the scene, even though MS may have been available.

A very curious interposition of Q3 occurs at the start of II, 1, where the first thirteen lines of the scene come from the quarto (sig. C1), and then, at the precise point when the Good and Bad Angels enter, MS takes over, although the two texts remain fairly close for a time. According to Greg's theory, MS must have been damaged at this point, but I find the coincidence of the use of MS at the entrance of characters rather odd and the shift, just possibly, explicable for another reason. Thereupon, except for the bond (B 487–507) and the misplaced chorus (B 557–68) which come from Q3, MS serves as copy until once more at the start of a scene, III, 1, the quarto re-enters. If Greg is right about the nature of the copy here (I am not sure the case is really demonstrated), MS must have been defective for twenty-four lines (I should say as likely for only sixteen), but it is remarkable that in this case a new scene must again have headed a MS page, and it is worth noticing that, a few lines after MS takes up again, the two texts begin seriously to diverge.

In Act V, if Greg's assignments again are accurate, the two do not alternate largely by scene division, as they have done earlier; but the use of Q3 for 19, 46, and 38 lines, respectively (excluding the epilogue), does not seem to suggest full pages of lost or illegible MS.

Even though we grant the accuracy of Greg's division of the copy,[7] the facts do not,

[6] I know of no preserved dramatic manuscript which does this, but it might well be a convenience for the foul papers of a collaboration.

[7] Some of this division, based on errors in Q3, is certainly incontrovertible, but I am not altogether happy about other parts, such as the first 19 lines of V, 1, for example, in which the demonstration is not

in my opinion, entirely fit his theory that Q3 was used either to replace whole missing pages of MS or parts of seriously defective pages. It is uncomfortable that he is sometimes forced to infer sufficient damage or illegibility in MS to prevent its use as copy, although it must have been whole enough to have supplied a number of readings to annotation of Q3 in these same places.

Since in no case does the end or the beginning of a use of Q3 coincide with the first or last lines of its printed page, we are bound to assume—if the printed pages were indeed used as printer's copy—that the editor of B was determined to make a maximum use of MS as copy, at least on a scene basis. If he did so, however, we are able to detect oddities. In the first place, the MS seems to have started each scene with a fresh page. In the second, no reasonable printer would have preferred foul papers to normally annotated printed copy if printed copy were available. We might, perhaps, suppose that the editor of B was unfamiliar with printing-houses and therefore provided the compositor with the worst possible copy whenever he could, even to the extent of crossing out printed lines in Q3 which were so close to MS that only a few annotations would serve to bring them into conformity with MS. I should not wish to argue in favor of this hypothesis myself, however, and I suggest that we should look for some other theory of the nature of the printer's copy for B1 which may better fit the facts.

I am inclined to conjecture that what we may have, instead, is a scribal or editorial transcript serving as printer's copy, this transcript having been made from a combination of Q3 and some independent manuscript, very likely foul papers, with sporadic cross-consultation. I believe that at the start the scribe, aware of the comparative faithfulness of the text for the tragic portions in A,

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textual or bibliographical but, instead, is posited upon our acceptance of an earlier hypothesis concerning the composition of the lines and revision. It is surprising that in his assignments Greg chiefly relies on literary rather than bibliographical evidence. Perhaps the paucity of bibliographical links enforced this practice, but, if so, the fact may well be significant, as I shall suggest later.

intended as a general practice to save himself some trouble by transcribing from the printed text.⁹ It is perhaps significant that MS me-

⁹ It would be tempting to believe with Greg that this early part was printed, certainly with greater convenience, from the leaves of A3; and, in fact, Duthie has recently demonstrated that just such a method was employed in Q2 of *Romeo and Juliet* (see below). However, I am inclined to favor the hypothesis that not the leaves but, instead, a transcript of the leaves served as printer's copy for the following reasons:

1. In at least one case (see text below) the quarto may have been transcribed for a portion of the copy.

2. Although I have not made a thorough comparison of the "accidentals" of B1 in portions where A3 and where MS served as copy, my impression is that the play is typographically consistent and does not reflect in its compositorial habits any major differences of copy. It is possible, of course, that the compositor's habits were so strongly fixed that they overrode such considerations. Nevertheless, a study now in progress, with which I am familiar, concerning the Shakespeare First Folio, shows that the compositors' habits were in part affected when they set from printed copy as against manuscript.

3. After a spot comparison of portions of B1 against a microfilm of A3, I see no weighty positive proof that A3 was the actual copy, and some evidence that transcription may have intervened. For example, in the early section both A3 and B1 customarily agree in setting names in roman (the text is black-letter), and in B 266, 288, and 290 *Lucifer*, as customarily, is roman in both. Yet shortly, in B 295, 296, 297, 298, and 312, though the name is roman in A, it is printed in black-letter in B, roman not reappearing until B 323. If there is a rational explanation for this anomaly, a variable transcript appears to offer more possibilities than that the B-compositor deliberately or carelessly ignored his copy in a practice which he otherwise was inclined to follow, although one may consult the general prologue and also the misplaced chorus after II. 1 for other marked instances of divergence which seem difficult to account for on the basis of printed copy. Possibly, also, the faulty setting in roman of *ha* in B 66 for A3 black-letter is likely to be the result of following a transcript instead of being a simple misprint. Partial evidence of this sort is notoriously untrustworthy, however, and I offer it in no sense as proof but only as a suggestion that the question is still perhaps open.

4. Of more pertinence is the apparent fact that with B1 there comes a considerable recasting of the punctuation system, so that B1 differs more considerably from A3 than A3 from A1, in spite of the intervention of A2. We may, of course, be dealing with a strong-minded compositor. Nevertheless, my experience with reprints has indicated that they are likely to be more conservative in following the punctuation of their printed copy than its spelling, and I should be hard put to it to illustrate a similar major recasting within a few years of the date of the copy. Moreover, if we compare such portions of text in A3 and B1 as the general prologue, we see that there has been a frequent omission of necessary or advisable line-ending punctuation in B1 when it is present in A3. The state of the punctuation here in B1 resembles

chanically interposes itself only for the complete brief I, 2, in which Wagner's speech to the Scholars introduces the first comic motif. Thereupon Q3 returns for the serious I, 3 until MS again appears mechanically to take over for farcical I, 4. That done, Q3 briefly starts II, 1 until, with the entrance of the Angels, MS begins within the scene and thereupon in effect continues until Act V. I suggest that the pattern, thus seemingly established at the start, of utilizing Q3 as copy for the transcript in the serious parts, but turning to the more difficult MS for its authoritative comic scenes, is significant and that it seriously controverts Greg's theory for a defective MS.[9] Why, under these conditions, the shift to MS was made early in II, 1, I do not know, but it is true that the text of A shortly begins to show more and more variance from that of B, and it may be that the transcriber felt it safer to stick with MS.

I am not prepared to argue the case for transcription in detail. However, I would point out one place in which, though Greg did not notice it, transcription seems to be a necessity. Greg assigns the copy for the misplaced chorus after II, 1 in B 557–68 to Q3. This chorus occupies part of sig. D2^r in Q3, and, if this leaf were abstracted and placed as printer's copy after B II, 1, I do not see how

the printer thereupon, at a much later date, was able to make use of the same leaf as copy for the opening of III, 1 (B 802–25), for these lines, again set from printed copy according to Greg, occupy the rest of D2^r and follow over to its verso. Rather than conjecture that the editor had two copies of Q3 by him or that, when he came to these lines in III, 1, he scrambled back through his pile of copy until he retrieved the missing leaf and transcribed it by necessity, I should prefer to believe that the misplaced chorus was transcribed after II, 1 in an orderly way, without tearing out a leaf of Q3 to serve as copy; and, if this is so, it follows that transcription may well have been the normal procedure throughout.[9a]

I am the more emboldened to bring forward the possibility of a transcription, since it is in part what, under similar circumstances, G. I. Duthie has found happened in Q2 of *Romeo and Juliet*.[10] It is true, however, that, although he demonstrates that Q2 was

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very closely what we might expect in setting from a casually punctuated manuscript, but not a reprint of A3. (We cannot seriously entertain the theory that the B1 editor would tinker extensively with punctuation.) Some few similarities exist, such as the same occasional use of word-division hyphens, but no more than might be expected to filter through a transcript. Again, I do not offer my incomplete analysis as a demonstration but only as an indication that Greg's case needs further examination.

5. If one conjectures that the transcript used as copy for B1 was primarily made with the stage, and not the printer, in view, there would be every necessity to make a complete manuscript copy. Greg tacitly assumes that the editorially revised text of B1 was intended only for the printer, and this colors his assumption about the physical use of A3 as copy. The other possibility, however, should at least be considered.

Further arguments in favor of a complete transcript appear below.

[9] The theory cannot be entertained that all of Marlowe's own portion of the foul papers was missing here until II, 1, for Greg establishes rather constant reference to MS in these early leaves, as far forward, indeed, as the prologue.

[9a] I am fortunate to be able to add, in proof, the following privately communicated comment from Greg, which materially clarifies his views on the nature of the printer's copy over those presented in his Introduction: "I don't think that a copy of A3 was torn up and inserted in MS. That would almost certainly have called for two copies. All the editor had to do was to write notes in MS at certain points directing the printer to insert such and such a passage from the quarto and strike out a bit of the MS (if necessary). In some cases he, of course, had emended the text of the quarto by comparison with the passage he crossed out in MS. I think that such a line as B 548 proves that the compositor was setting from MS itself (see Introduction, p. 107)." The point about B 548 is a pretty one. It should be mentioned, however, that if the theory for a complete new transcript were to be held, for the conjectured operations of the compositor at this point we should need only to substitute those of the scribe, provided that we stipulated that he did not bother to refer back to Q3 to determine the right readings. The theory that the compositor was furnished the whole of Q3 and MS with directions for their respective use removes my objections to the copy for the text on the verso of the misplaced chorus and would assist materially in explaining the curious shifts in copy according to scenes at the start, though not toward the end. If the hypothesis for a transcript is to be maintained, therefore, more relative evidence must be sought, and this I have inserted below.

[10] Duthie's investigation was first read as a paper before the English Institute on September 9, 1950, under the title "A Shakespearian Editorial Problem Requiring an Eclectic-Text Solution." In revised and expanded form it has recently appeared as "The Text of Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*," *Studies in Bibliography*, IV (1951), 3–29.

printed from a transcript of what he takes to be Shakespeare's own manuscript and from some printed leaves from Q1, he is able to argue convincingly that the scribe tore out leaves from Q1 to serve as printer's copy for certain passages in the play. But what is notable in his investigation for our purposes here is (1) he is able to show that Greg's earlier theory about *Romeo and Juliet*, Q2, which coincides with that he holds for *Faustus*, is incorrect, since the *Romeo and Juliet* scribe used Q1 for pure convenience and not because of the defective manuscript that Greg (and later Sidney Thomas) had posited (*Editorial Problem*, p. 62); (2) the scribe made a transcription from Shakespeare's papers instead of turning over the mixture of foul papers and printed leaves to the press; (3) during the course of transcription the scribe seems occasionally to have consulted Q1; (4) a rather convincing textual demonstration is made that Q2 was in part set from the printed leaves and not from a transcript of them.

Precisely this last demonstration is, in effect, absent from Greg's case, and, though it would be notably delicate work to distinguish between the results of composing B1 from Q3 direct or from a transcript of Q3, yet I think it is a slip on Greg's part that a rigorous effort was not made or its necessity even envisaged. Wanting such a strict bibliographical investigation, it is possible in the meantime to hold out for a transcript of the whole as a hypothesis at least as plausible as the one that Greg has offered us without serious demonstration.[11]

In fact, further evidence (although it can be only preliminary) favoring a complete scribal

[11] Greg largely confines himself to pointing out (pp. 64–65) the coincidence in a hyphenated word in one place and the omission of a necessary comma in a Latin quotation apparently because the inking was extremely faint in Q3. Elsewhere (p. 402) he points out a place where B1 followed A3 in an erroneous comma. He also suggests in this same passage some small agreements in spelling but admits that this evidence does not amount to much. The facts he adduces, when combined with his extensive examination of the substantive readings and line-division, definitely prove that A3 and not some other extant quarto served as ultimate copy; but his evidence is as applicable to a transcript as to the physical leaves of Q3, and it is precisely this last demonstration which is the crucial one, though absent.

transcript may be adduced. In the nature of the case, the best evidence is that for a compositorial blunder in the sections set from Q3 which would more naturally have resulted from a misreading of handwritten than of printed copy. Several of these may be observed. The first is the misreading in B 137 of *Sworne* for *Swarme* of Q3. By itself this error would mean nothing, since it could readily be explained as compositor's memorial confusion. But when in B 148 we find the misprint *Lopland* for Q3 *Lapland*, it is reasonable to attribute the two confusions of *a* for *o* to a similar set of conditions, that is, to handwritten copy. The *a-o* confusion is not unknown in texts printed from manuscript. In B 337 we find the reading *desir'd* for Q3 *desire*. The reading is indifferent, for either would do; but, since *desire* is perhaps a shade preferable, if we have other evidence for handwritten copy, we could impute the variant in B to the common *e-d* confusion in printing from manuscript. These are far from constituting a demonstration, but the last piece of evidence is one that I should myself be inclined to take as conclusive. In B 238, set from Q3 text, we have the blunder *euening Starres* for Q3 *erring Starres;* and significantly in B 613, set from MS, the same blunder is repeated. Greg (p. 92) imputes this repetition to a compositor "persuaded that heavenly bodies could not err," and (p. 311) insists that, since in the first instance the error cannot be graphic, Q3 being the physical copy, the repeated error must be set down to the compositor's aberration. I do not think this explanation is a very satisfactory one, and I should wish rather to impute both errors to the compositor's misreading of the scribe's handwriting, once when the scribe was transcribing from Q3 and once from MS. As a graphic error, it is an easy one, and the compositor's reconstruction to *euening* a nice case of rationalization.

When, in connection with these errors in setting from handwriting, we add what I consider to be the important matter of the almost complete revision of the punctuation of the Q3 sections, commented on in footnote 8 above, and combine with this the numerous small changes beyond the province of a compositor in matters of capitalization and of

spelling of names,[11a] especially when these occur in sections seemingly not otherwise touched by a scribe annotating Q3, we come close to what I think is a demonstration that the B text was set throughout from an editorial transcript made from a mixture of Q3 and MS copy.

Since Greg did not consider such evidence in the line of his argument, some of the examination of the supposed annotations from MS or by reason of conscious editorial tinkering may need qualification, since at least a few of them may be unintentional copyist variants.[12] So perhaps with other matters, such as the amplification of a few stage directions (p. 78), which Greg conjectures may have come out of the editor's own head. Some errors he assigns the compositor (see pp. 68 and 92 especially) may instead have originated in transcription, especially the variants in the bond, which I find troublesome. As a consequence, Greg is led to give to many of these cruxes a precise answer which in the last analysis is based on an untested hypothesis concerning the nature of the printer's copy.

This is perhaps the most important matter

[11a] There is not space to go into the details of these minor changes, which are not indifferent. I should, however, instance the consistent changes in the spelling of Q3 *Wertenberg*, *Belsibub*, and *Mephastophilis*, the name *Belsibub* also in a Latin passage where a compositor is most likely to follow copy literally; the reduction to lower case from a capital in *stipendium* (B 66), the raising to a capital in *Logicis* (B 36), *Studious* (B 82), and *Acherontis* (B 242); the loss of parentheses about *Faustus* (B 163); the beginning of line B 142 with a lower-case letter, a characteristic of manuscript copy; and the setting in boldface of *Ocean* (B 110, 331) from the roman of Q3. None of these should I wish to impute to a compositor, and I do not fancy all of them as fussy annotations on the Q3 leaves by a scribe. Possibly one might add the expansion in B from the Q3 form of the speech prefixes for Cornelius and Valdes on their first appearance, an unlikely compositorial change.

[12] The countertheory of a transcript would also affect statements like "This being so, we shall naturally attribute B's use of A in other parts of the play mostly to defects in MS, and since these defects can hardly have been other than accidental, the probability is, that MS was generally in a rather dilapidated condition. While therefore we may feel confident that the editor's failure to correct some errors of A was due to oversight, it will be more charitable and reasonable to assume that *in most instances* [italics mine] damage to or illegibility of MS rendered correction impossible" (p. 79).

to which less than justice is done. There are various minor points where Greg's interest in an exact accounting for every discrepancy leads him to rather tortuous reconstructions, as in the theory that the bond was written by a third hand on a separate piece of paper (pp. 104–5),[13] the prompt additions to the foul papers, the discussion of the B revision of A 19–20,[14] and, throughout, a general tendency to pursue a plausible line of argument into a blind alley before attacking the recommended hypothesis, without suitably warning the reader that the argument so convincingly being presented will presently be disproved. In part some of the difficulty in following the chain of argument at all points also arises from what seems to be a certain amount of second thoughts presented in the footnotes, perhaps at some stage of the proof (as p. 132, n. 1, and perhaps p. 144, n. 2), not always completely consonant with earlier parts of the introduction itself.

That Greg has so clearly lived with the *Faustus* problem for years and over a long period turned it over in his mind in every detail, seeking to find a logically coherent explanation for every possible anomaly, is responsible perhaps for some occasional desperate rationalizing.

The appendix on the variants in the B2 quarto is a case in point. This second edition of the B-text is, without question, set from B1, but very oddly there appears in it a handful of significant readings which at least in part may have authority. Some of these readings revert to the A-text, the most notable example being the restoration of the line (censored in B) "See where Christ's blood streams in the firmament," and the most

[13] One should note that ll. 469 and 508, omitting the bond, make a perfect join and that the bond, being already sealed, requires no reading to make it effective. If one chose, one might speculate that the bond never existed in MS because it was not planned and that it may represent an addition to prompt copy. If so, then one need not hold the theory that the two collaborators brought in a third person to write it for insertion in the foul-papers copy and that Marlowe subsequently patched the joints.

[14] May not the reading have been, before memorially corrupted, "whose sweet delight's dispute"? Greg's discussion of whether theological dispute is sweet strikes me as quibbling, if seriously intended.

minute being the restoration of A's "azur'd arms" for B's "azure arms" (1892). Other variants in B2 are unique in cases where A and B1 agree. The problem is a most difficult one, and perhaps even insoluble. Collation of B1 against the text of some A-quarto seems inherently improbable and will not solve all the difficulties if, as Greg believes, some few of the unique readings possess authority.[15] On the other hand, in view of the random nature of the variants and the numerous defects overlooked, collation against some manuscript seems improbable as well.

As a consequence, Greg is forced to posit an editing of the quarto by someone who made revisions from his memory of current performances. This is a logical position, but it does not invite belief as a probable one, in view of the slightness of the changes in some readings which were not wholly unsatisfactory. Moreover, it is unlikely that any one actor, the most logical choice perhaps, could have made them, for, though five belong to Faustus, apparently significant variants are also found in speeches by Bad Angel, Wagner, Horse-corser, and Valdes. A spectator's memory, on the other hand, is not likely to have been so exact, and I do not fancy a prompter.

The amount of space devoted here to finding fault has been quite disproportionate, and even churlish, in view of the really unique scholarly achievement which this edition as a whole represents, a huge task—one ventures to believe—which could have been under-

taken so successfully by no other living scholar. It must be emphasized again that, for the first time, a major hypothesis which carries conviction for its central thesis has been evolved to put in order the important difficulties of the *Faustus* problem. With confidence we may say that the play in its major features is a problem no longer. That quibbles may arise about various of the minor questions should not affect our estimate of the solid structure of the central thesis. As a sourcebook for textual study because of its searching minuteness of inquiry, this two-text edition will stand as a monument of modern scholarship.

The slim additional volume in which Greg applies to a reconstruction of the text his two-text examination of every line offers certainly the most trustworthy version of the play that we have. The text is necessarily eclectic, and Greg has assumed full editorial responsibility by emending or conflating according to his strict theories of the nature and history of the quarto texts. Hence, though the basis is the B-text, emendation is made on occasion from A and in a few instances from B2.[16] The text is modernized. Since a large part of the B-text comes from MS, which there is some reason to believe may have been foul papers, one may perhaps query Greg's statement that "in such an essentially eclectic text as the present no object would be served by following the spelling of any particular early edition." If only as an object lesson in Greg's techniques for dealing with a critical old-spelling edition, another choice would have had superior scholarly value.

Footnotes detail the source of readings which are present neither in A nor in B1, but all other critical material is found in the notes and introduction to the two-text volume.

FREDSON BOWERS

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

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[15] Greg very properly inquires into and then rejects the possibility that these variants may have originated in unknown press alterations present in the B1 quarto used as copy for B2. Some greater precision might have been given his table in p. 142, n. 2, if he had investigated the presswork of B1. For example, press correction, according to the table, might have taken place in both inner and outer formes of gathering B. This situation would obtain only if one skeleton-forme had printed the sheet. If two skeletons were employed, one or the other forme in all likelihood would have been invariant. No case can seemingly be made for press corrections, but in small part they might well have existed, and hence Greg's flat conclusion that it is unlikely that *any* variant in B1 can account for a B2 reading is perhaps more than a little strong.

[16] One may wonder, however, whether the line is really "See see where Christ's blood streams in the firmament" as he prints it from A, where the repetition might be an actor's expansion, or "See" without repetition as in the metrically regular B2, if this latter edition has the independent authority Greg asserts for it.

BOOK REVIEWS

Middle English Literature: A Critical Study of the Romances, the Religious Lyrics, "Piers Plowman." By GEORGE KANE. London: Methuen & Co., 1951. Pp. x+252.

Unlike most accounts of early English literature, this book is not a digest of research plus a series of synopses of documents studied but a work of criticism. For this criticism there is no other basis than the analysis of a keen mind and the effect produced on that mind by the poems studied. In general, Kane's judgments will meet with agreement from those familiar with Middle English literature, but he has a curious inability to appreciate *The Awntyrs of Arthure*, the first part of which seems to me one of the most striking poems in Middle English; and he tends to overstress the purely technical interests of the alliterative poets—from his comments one would not realize that the alliterative romances are so superior to the romances in rime as they surely are.

Kane classifies the romances, interestingly, in three groups: the unsuccessful, those in part successful, and the successful. With his allocation of the different romances and his critical remarks on them, probably most readers will agree. But to what extent the individual romances are successful'or otherwise because of the quality of their sources he does not attempt to show. That he realizes the importance of that matter, however, he reveals by a footnote on page 11. His favorable comments on *William of Palerne* surely must be due more to the story derived from its French source than to its English form and style.

The analysis of *Piers the Plowman* is based on the supposition that all texts are by the same author. Like Dr. Donaldson, Kane regards the C text as in most respects an improvement on B. "When". C "is concerned with doctrinal points he never fails to make them clearer by his revising, although they may seem to become unduly long; when his purpose is artistic he almost always improves on the earlier work." If these two scholars are right, it is curious that the B text usually has

been praised and quoted in preference to C and that R. W. Chambers, who maintained common authorship of A and B with such heat, was not eager to claim C as the work of the B author. Yet it is true that the F Prologue of the *Legend of Good Women* is more attractive to many readers than Chaucer's revision of it; perhaps, as in that case, the C author merely obscured some of the spontaneity of B.

In general, Kane's purpose in his study of *Piers the Plowman* is to exhibit the qualities of the author "as a man and an artist" and by means of these to throw light on the poem itself as a work of art. He sees it as the product "of a roaming and discursive mind made stern by disappointment, by indignation at greed, injustice, selfishness and uncharity, and of a vast, sweeping and at the same time intense imagination equalled by few divine poets other than Dante and Milton."

Granted his premises that all texts are by the same author or regarding his account as an analysis of C, Kane's interpretation is valuable, a study which should be helpful to anyone desiring to understand the poem. He does not overpraise it but recognizes that it is "a remarkable mixture of diffuseness and felicities, of flatness and the sublime." In that statement and in another quoted below, Kane falls into the trap which, as Manly pointed out long ago, is set for all who accept unity of authorship. Here is the second sentence: "Instead of a well-ordered and beautifully proportioned whole the reader of *Piers Plowman* has to deal with a wild and luxuriant work which apparently outgrew and overgrew its original general plan." That is an admirable characterization of B or C but does not apply at all to A, one of the simplest and most well-ordered allegories in existence.

It is pleasant to note that Kane does not contribute to the Langland myth; as far as I have observed, he does not use the name Langland, and it is not in his index.

J. R. HULBERT

University of Arkansas

Francesco Petrarca, Invective contra medicum: Testo latino e volgarizzamento di Ser Domenico Silvestri. Edited by PIER GIORGIO RICCI. Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1950. Pp. 205.

Early in 1352 Petrarch wrote to Clement VII, then seriously ill, a brief letter, now famous (as *Ep. fam.*, V, 19), in which he attacks the medical profession in general and urges the pope to dispense with the throng of disputing physicians gathered at his bedside and to put his faith in some one physician whom he may judge to be *non eloquentia sed scientia et fide conspicuum.* Quite naturally, one of the pope's physicians replied; to this reply Petrarch replied at some length; the physician replied again, also at some length; and Petrarch, early in 1353, wrote a very long final reply. Soon afterward he combined his earlier and later replies into the single work, in four books, which is commonly called *Invective contra medicum.* The original title is uncertain: the available evidence suggests that it was something like *Contra procacem et insanum pape medicum libri quatuor.*

The importance of the *Invective* lies not primarily in the fact of Petrarch's hostility to the generality of the physicians of his day, though much that he has to say on this score is of interest, but in his reaction to his antagonist's countercharge against poetry: the work is then a defense of poetry and a noteworthy, if acrimonious, document in the long debate between the humanities and the sciences (which are, for Petrarch, the *artes liberales* and the *artes mechanice*).

Pier Giorgio Ricci, to whom the editing of all the Invectives of Petrarch for the *Edizione nazionale delle opere di Francesco Petrarca* has been intrusted, has as yet found it possible to collate only nine of the thirty-nine known manuscripts of the *Invective contra medicum;* but he has found in those nine manuscripts (which represent two families, each subdivided) a sufficient basis for the preparation of the provisional critical edition that he has now released. Its publication serves two purposes: the provisional edition invites such suggestions for revision as may help to perfect the definitive edi-

tion; and it makes available at once, in a very satisfactory form, an important work that had never before been published in a scholarly edition and had not been published at all since 1581.

Ricci's editorial technique is all that could be desired, sure in its classification of manuscripts and adequate in its report of the variants that may go back to Petrarch himself and of such others as may give clues to the classification of the manuscripts that are still to be collated. Ricci's treatment of the problem of punctuation is of more than ordinary interest: he had published some years ago a notable study, based on the autograph manuscripts of the *De ignorantia*, of Petrarch's own punctuation; and in accordance with the results of that study he punctuates abundantly, in this edition, as he thinks Petrarch would have done, marking *tutte quelle pause che sono necessarie a determinare in modo minuzioso e preciso l'intima membratura del periodo e delle singole proposizioni.* Footnotes give the immediate or ultimate sources of Petrarch's explicit quotations and the identifiable sources of many other passages. The nonbiblical authors represented include Apuleius, Aristotle, Augustine, Boethius, Brutus, Cicero, Gregory, Homer, Horace, Hugh of St. Victor, Jerome, Juvenal, Lactantius, Livy, Lucan, Macrobius, Ovid, Persius, Plato, Pliny, Sallust, Seneca, Statius, Suetonius, Terence, Valerius Maximus, and Virgil.

The inclusion of an edition of Domenico Silvestri's previously unpublished contemporary Italian translation of the *Invective* adds notably to the value of the book: Silvestri, a devotee, in particular, of Boccaccio, was himself a very interesting person (well studied, recently, by Ricci). The combination of patient industry and brilliantly good judgment shown by Ricci in the difficult construction of this text on the basis of two varying and defective manuscripts and the thoroughness and clarity with which he renders his account of what he has done are a scholarly delight.

ERNEST H. WILKINS

Newton Centre, Massachusetts

The Meaning of Shakespeare. By HAROLD C. GODDARD. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. xii+691.

Whether impelled by a theory of literature which conceives of poetry as the communication of meaning through a special use of language and hence seeks a "structure of meaning" in all literary works or by a theory which maintains that a special subject matter, such as imaginative vision or myth, is the essence of great poetry, a number of Shakespearean critics of the last twenty years have been occupied with the attempt to interpret Shakespeare's plays allegorically or, as they prefer to call it, "symbolically." Professor Goddard's book is the latest addition to this body of criticism that began so vigorously with G. Wilson Knight's readings of the visionary Shakespeare and that continues to flourish—witness Robert Heilman's *This Great Stage: Image and Structure in "King Lear"*—oblivious of the voices that have been raised against it.[1] Goddard's book provides instructive reading, not so much for the understanding of Shakespeare as for the light it sheds upon the methods of this mode of criticism, particularly its principles of proof, since the extremity of his position and the candor of his presentation lay bare the kinds of assumptions which, though common to this mode, are too often hidden in other critics by the dazzling ingenuity of their interpretations or the sophistication of their prose.

The Meaning of Shakespeare was composed over a space of fifteen years, and it bears many signs of having been a labor of love. Not only does it present the fruits of long musing over the works of Shakespeare, revealing many an unsuspected correspondence among the plays, but it also records the experiences of a lifetime in reading the world's masterpieces and offers a theory of the nature of man and his ethical problems. It is unfortunate, then, that a con-

[1] See W. R. Keast, "Imagery and Meaning in the Interpretation of *King Lear,*" *MP,* XLVII (1949), 45–64. Also see Oscar James Campbell's discussion in "Shakespeare and the 'New Critics,'" (*Joseph Quincy Adams: Memorial Studies* [Washington, D.C., 1948], pp. 81–96); and E. E. Stoll, "An *Othello* All-Too Modern," *ELH,* XIII (1946), 46–58, and "Symbolism in Shakespeare," *MLR,* XLIII (1947), 9–23.

centration on the methods of the book will fail to do justice to its generous ambitions.

Goddard justifies the labor of these many years on the ground that "ours is a time that would have sent the Greeks to their oracles. We fail at our peril to consult our own" (p. v). After such patient attendance upon the words of the oracle, he concludes that all Shakespeare's plays are fundamentally saying the same thing, his earlier plays prefiguring, however obscurely, the meanings that were to be more amply embodied in his mature works, as an embryo contains the potentials of full growth. "The embryo has an integrity dictated to it as it were by the future. The meaning of each organ is read back into it by the function it achieves after birth" (p. 16). Thus Shakespeare's "plays and poems deserve to be considered integrally, as chapters, so to speak, of a single work" (p. vi).

It is impossible to state precisely Goddard's conception of the meaning of Shakespeare, since this is embodied in truths which, as will be seen later, can be perceived only by the imagination and hence defy intellectual exposition. Goddard can therefore only suggest them, varying his language in the hope of awakening the proper insights within the reader. Since these insights are concerned with the nature of good and bad, he employs a host of shifting contraries, now expanding the number of his terms, now collapsing them to fit the occasion. One of his more central dichotomies is spirit and flesh, which, in turn, generates a series of others: purity-lust, celestial-demonic, imagination-intellect, renunciation-ambition, forgiveness-murder, liberty-imperialism, etc. One gathers that the "meaning" to be found in Shakespeare is the rather conventional view that man is of a dual nature, participating at once in the bestial and in the angelic orders of existence, and that his problem is to reconcile the two aspects of his being. "There are few more fruitful ways of regarding his [Shakespeare's] works than to think of them as an account of the warfare between Imagination and Chaos—or, if you will, between Imagination and the World—the story of the multifarious attempts of the divine faculty in man to ig-

nore, to escape, to outwit, to surmount, to combat, to subdue, to forgive, to convert, to redeem, to transmute into its own substance, as the case may be, the powers of disorder that possess the world" (p. 80).

As a consequence of this doctrinal framework, Goddard reads all the plays as battlegrounds where these forces contend for man's soul. "Hamlet is like Thermopylae, the battle that stands first among all battles in the human imagination because of its symbolic quality—a contest between the Persian hordes of the lower appetites and the little Greek band of heroic instincts" (p. 342). In this doctrinal system there are four possible kinds of plays: those in which the evil forces dominate the protagonist throughout the action and at last destroy him (*Richard III*); those in which the protagonist at the outset is predominantly in the sway of the good but later submits to the powers of evil (Brutus in *Julius Caesar*); those in which the protagonist at the outset is controlled by his lower nature but which end with the triumph of the good (*King Lear*); and, finally, those in which the good forces are uppermost throughout (*The Tempest*).

The chapter on *Hamlet* nicely illustrates this mode of interpretation not only because *Hamlet* is a crucial test of any critical theory but also because in this play, according to Goddard, the two contending forces are most evenly matched. "Having given us in Hal-Henry . . . a divided man easily won by circumstances to the side of violence, and in Brutus a man so won only after a brief but terrible inner struggle, what then? Why, naturally, the next step in the progression: a divided man won to the side of violence only after a protracted struggle" (p. 338). In the allegory, then, "just as Hamlet's father is the symbol of physical force, so his mother has now become in his mind the symbol of sensuality. Hamlet is the child of violence and lust. . . . And Claudius, murderer-lover, is the link between the two" (pp. 351–52). Hamlet is torn between the demands of the primitive order of force, revenge, and blood and the demands of his high spiritual nature that would reject these in favor of love, imagination, art, etc. "Up to the play scene, the opposing na-

tures in Hamlet are in something like equipoise. With the play, blood gains the upper hand and confirms its victory in the murder of Polonius. From that point on, Hamlet gives the impression of a man whose will has abdicated in favor of fate" (p. 373).

Goddard's reductive interpretations, which, among other things, collapse the radical differences between the comedies and the tragedies and the differences among the tragedies, are so disturbing to the reader's sense of the variety of Shakespeare, his feeling of the complex moral bases of the plays, and his conception of their moving power, that his first impulse is not to contest the conclusions but to inquire into the causes that produce such novelty in *The Meaning of Shakespeare*. Indeed, this is the wiser course. Since Goddard's interpretations are dependent upon special assumptions concerning the nature of poetry and are defended by principles of validation growing out of those assumptions, it is more illuminating to meditate on his first principles than to challenge his particular conclusions.

For an examination of Goddard's theory of poetry we may return to his remark that Shakespeare is an oracle, for in his first chapter he makes clear that this is not a fanciful metaphor: "The oracle remains the type of the purest poetry. Oracles are *ambiguous* (a very different thing from *obscure*). They are uttered, as the world seems to be made, to tempt men to meet them halfway, to find in them one of at least two fatally different meanings" (p. 11). The cogency of this analogy depends on the author's theory of the imagination. Goddard finds the reality of man's being in the realm of the unconscious mind: "Now the unconscious, whatever else or more it may be, is an accumulation of the human and prehuman psychic tendencies of life on the planet, and the unconscious of any individual is a reservoir that contains latently the experience of his ancestors. This potential inheritance is naturally an inextricable mixture of good and evil" (p. 503). The imagination is the faculty which mediates between the unconscious and the conscious mind, and it does so by projecting on all external objects the content of the unconscious, thereby rendering them symbols

of the elements of the inner life. Goddard acknowledges the psychology of Jung as one source of this theory and indicates some debt to the assumptions of projective testing, referring indirectly to Rorschach with the comment that "the supreme imaginative literature of the world is a survival of the fittest ink blots of the ages, and nothing reveals a man with more precision than his reaction to it" (p. 13). Thus, as the oracle is the medium of divine truths, so poetry is the medium of the truths stored in the unconscious mind; and, as the gods are the agent of the oracle, so the imagination, "formerly known as the Will of God, or the will of the gods" (p. 16), is the agent of poetry, revealing its truths ambiguously, as does the oracle, in the language of symbols.

The reader, in order to interpret the signs of the oracle, must expose his own imagination to the suggestive influence of the symbols which will awaken or allow him to project the buried truths within him and thus reveal the meaning of the text. "Poetry is not something that exists in printed words on the page. It is not even something that exists in nature, in sunshine or in moonlight. Nor on the other hand is it something that exists just in the human heart or mind. It is rather the spark that leaps across when something within is brought close to something without, or something without to something within" (p. 3). The validity of the reader's interpretation is guaranteed by the universal nature of the imagination. "In the end, whatever its pretension, any new book about Shakespeare can be no more than just one other man's experience with him. Yet in so far as its author is true to himself and true to the spirit of Shakespeare . . . he cannot help giving more than an individual interpretation to the poet's works. For in its deeper ancestral layers, from which the imagination emerges, our experience has been the same" (p. 13).

Goddard shares with all critics who interpret literature didactically the kinds of conclusions he reaches. Assuming that a given work is an indirect statement of doctrinal propositions, those who practice this mode generally conclude that the characters stand for, or are like, the subjects, and that the actions are like the predicates, of those propositions.[2]

Thus Hamlet is like the subject of the proposition: the gifted man who subverts his great gifts to the demands of more primitive forces destroys himself; and Hamlet's death in the final act is an instance of the predicate of this same statement. The other characters of the play become "symbols" of the good and evil forces contending for his soul, much as in an early morality play. Hamlet's father, it will be recalled, is "the symbol of physical force," his mother "the symbol of sensuality." The dual between Hamlet and Laertes, "like so many duels in literature, is symbolic, condensing into a sudden image the meaning of the play. . . . [Hamlet] converts art—in this case the art of fencing—into death" (p. 379). In this system character and action are the primary agents of meaning, and not diction and imagery, as is maintained by critics such as G. Wilson Knight, Cleanth Brooks, and Robert Heilman. Thought, diction, and imagery operate to supplement the meaning conveyed by character and action and must often be taken in a double sense. Thus the thoughts employed by Hamlet in drawing for his mother a comparison between the elder Hamlet and Claudius (Act III, scene 4) are not merely the rhetorical devices of a pleading son. "The idealized picture of the father and the debased portrait of the uncle, whatever incidental truth they may have as applied to their ostensible subjects, are primarily nothing but the divine and diabolic sides of Hamlet's own nature . . ." (p. 372). When Hamlet cries out,

Haste me to know't, that, I, with wings as swift
As meditation or the thoughts of love,
May sweep to my revenge,

Goddard comments: "Wings, meditation, love: what inappropriate equipment for a deed of blood! As so often in Shakespeare, the metaphors undo the logic and tell the truth over its head" (p. 349). Again, when Hamlet says, "Now to my word," after the interview with the ghost, Goddard asks, "Why 'word'? Why not, 'now to my deed'? Because two Hamlets speak in one in an unconscious pun. By 'now to my word' Hamlet thinks he means 'now to my

[2] For further analysis of this point see E. Olson, "William Empson, Contemporary Criticism, and Poetic Diction," *MP*, XLVII (1950), 238–39.

promise.' But the Other Hamlet means 'now to the world of words, the world of thought in contrast to the world of blood' " (p. 353).

In these assertions to the effect that one thing stands for another, it will be observed that the term "stands for" has several meanings. Hamlet stands for "the gifted man" in the sense that he is a representative instance of this class of men and his action in the duel is a typical instance of his self-betrayal. However, the ghost and the Queen, instead of being instantial, are a species of personification standing for a class of ideas. In the third sense of the term, Hamlet's thoughts, images, and diction are taken literally as signs of an inner state of the unconscious mind, a part standing for a whole.

Since these assertions are not immediately obvious, an inquiry must be made into Goddard's methods of demonstration. We shall first attend to his methods of arguing the instantial nature of the characters and actions in Shakespeare's plays. It is the nature of reasoning and demonstration that it proceeds from what is better known to what is less well known. In didactic interpretation there are two possible starting points for reasoning, either the particulars of the work or the doctrines which they state. The demonstration will differ, depending upon which of these alternatives is taken as better known. If the doctrinal matter is taken as better known, as is the case when the author has explicitly stated his doctrines (Dante, for example), the problem is to illustrate how the particulars of the work embody the doctrine. Keeping the doctrine constant, the interpreter considers the various ways the particulars may be taken and selects that one most in keeping with the body of doctrine. When the particulars of the work are considered to be better known than the doctrine, as is the case if the author's intentions are unknown or only vaguely set forth (Spenser, for example), the particulars are held constant, and the interpreter seeks among the various possibilities that doctrine which best explains them.

Whichever of the two directions of reasoning is taken, the criteria for the adequacy of the interpretation should be the same. All the

poetical facts should imply the doctrine, and the doctrine should imply all the facts, since it is the nature of a successful didactic work that everything in it exists and has its peculiar character in order to exhibit the doctrine. The proof that one thing is an instance of a general proposition will rest upon the establishment of likeness between the traits of the thing and the parts of the proposition. The problem involves three phases: the establishment of the relevant traits of the particulars in the work, the demonstration of their likeness to the parts of the doctrine, and the demonstration of the exclusive nature of the relationship. In establishing the traits in the work, it is necessary that the work itself be the authority, that is, the literal meaning of the text should not be violated and the meaning of the particulars should be guaranteed by its use in the text. The degree of likeness between two things is increased, whether likeness is taken literally or analogically, when they are alike in essential, rather than accidental, traits; when they are alike in several traits and not just one; and when none of the traits in one thing are incompatible with those in the other. But even if the degree of likeness is considerable, it must be further shown that the same degree does not obtain between the particulars and other possible doctrines. Once the interpreter has completed these steps of the demonstration, he may then support his conclusion by arguing that the thesis was one that the author could have held on historical grounds; that he probably would have held it, given his character, education, associations, etc.; and that, given his artistic habits, he would have constructed such a didactic work.

It is clear that Goddard's reasoning proceeds from the doctrine to the particulars of the plays. That which is better known in his demonstration is the truth of the imagination, which, it will be recalled, concerns man's dual nature. This truth is better known in the sense that it resides within the reader prior to any experience with literature. Conversely, the particulars of the literary work are less well known, since their essential characteristic is ambiguity. "The vocabulary of the imagination consists of hundreds, if not thousands, of . . . self-contradictory images. If a single one

of them can have such polar range, what must poetry, that is a web and complex of them, have?" (p. 66). In this system the work of art loses its character as an artistic product and tends to be absorbed into the realm of natural objects. This is accomplished through Goddard's location of the imagination in a forest of symbols in which nature, life, and art are trees of equal standing (it will be recalled that he regards the battle of Thermopylae and *Hamlet* as having equivalent symbolic value). The real poet in this system is the reader. "Life, as he [Shakespeare] had long since discovered, reveals as much of herself to any man as he brings to her—and no two bring the same. Bright or dark, the world seems contrived to confirm whatever idea of it we conceive it under. A poem, in proportion as it is like life, like that world, will do the same" (p. 676). The interpretive problem, then, is to illustrate how the ambiguous, malleable particulars of a great work fit the preconceived truths of the imagination. This follows from the assumption that if a work is great, it must embody these great truths.

Not only is the direction of Goddard's reasoning affected by his theory of poetry, but it also determines his criteria for establishing the relationship between particulars and thesis. The traits of the objects or actions as presented in the work are no longer the primary reference for supporting the interpretation. Rather, the basic guaranty is the imagination, which uncovers the meaning within our own unconscious minds. Goddard takes this doctrine so seriously that he prefers the responses of the innocent child, who is in closer touch with the unconscious, to the opinions of the experienced reader. "I like to get the fresh reaction of innocence to a masterpiece, uncontaminated by traditional critical opinion" (p. 382). The meaning of the particulars of a play established by the imagination may be supported by reference to the way these particulars have been used in other great literature, on the ground that all great literature reflects the same truths. "The authority of imaginative literature resides in the fact that its masterpieces, whenever or wherever written, confirm one another" (p. 114). The imagination is fur-

ther confirmed in its reading of a play by Shakespeare by reference to his other works wherein the attachment of meaning to characters and actions is more explicit. By reading Shakespeare's later plays, "we are enabled to see in *Hamlet* what was already there but hidden from us" (p. 338). This order of reference occurs repeatedly, and an example may be picked at random. In arguing that Hamlet's hatred of Polonius is an instance of Hamlet's hatred of his father, Goddard writes:

> We tend to hate anyone we obey against the grain of our nature. "I'll shoot you!" says the small boy to his father, giving vent to his instincts. But after childhood, when anyone we love exacts obedience, unless we can forgive we suppress the hatred and to that extent become divided within. ("Who does not desire to kill his father?" says Ivan Karamazov.) Hamlet knows that he loved his father when he was alive. He does not know how he abhors that father when, dead, he orders him to kill. But any despotism is a kind of killing, and so he projects his abhorrence on another father who exacts obedience. How otherwise can we account for Hamlet's treatment of Polonius? . . . As in the case of Antonio's loathing of Shylock, only buried forces that Hamlet does not comprehend can account for it [pp. 356–57].

As can be seen from this passage, not only is the interpretation validated outside the play, but it also violates the literal meaning of the text. There is no direct evidence that Hamlet hates his father, and Hamlet's dislike of Polonius is not such a mystery as Goddard would have us believe. Hamlet continually speaks of him as a fool and a meddler, and he knows Polonius to be engaged on the side of his uncle.

But, even if the traits within a work are diminished in importance as the guaranty of meaning, the interpreter is still obligated to employ adequate criteria of likeness between the particulars and the thesis. Goddard's failure to employ such criteria allows him to extend the meaning of likeness to its limits, as, indeed, he must if he is to maintain that Shakespeare's plays are all alike. The possibility of finding this unity in Shakespeare rests upon the discovery of some trait common to all the plays (to all literature, for that matter, since Goddard finds all great works alike). The

common trait he has hit upon is conflict, a characteristic of nearly all plots, since conflict is one of the primary sources of that general literary pleasure, suspense. To show the likenesses among a group of plays, one has only to locate the conflict in each one and then to use the same pairs of abstract contraries in defining the opposing forces in each play. Goddard's flexible set of contraries is admirably suited for identifying these various opposing forces. He sees *Hamlet* as illustrating the conflict between the demands of the old order of revenge and blood and the new order of forgiveness and conversion, and thus Hamlet's hesitation in killing his uncle is like the hesitation of a man struggling between his higher and his lower natures. To demonstrate this likeness, he is obligated to show (1) that Hamlet is like the "divided man"—that he is, in fact, primarily concerned with making a choice between competing higher and lower impulses and duties and that the central issue for him is whether to kill Claudius or to make him repent; (2) that the killing of Claudius is like a return to a primitive order of blood; (3) that the ghost is a symbol of lower nature; (4) that Hamlet's actions in the play scene, his slaying of Polonius, and the eventual stabbing of Claudius are signs of the defeat of his higher nature; and (5) that his death is the consequence of this self-betrayal. The literal facts of the play do not immediately induce one to perceive these likenesses between characters, situations, and actions and the parts of this didactic proposition, for in all cases the likenesses, if they exist at all, are neither essential nor numerous. Indeed, some of the traits of the particulars are incompatible with the thesis. The conclusion that Hamlet is to be taken as a "divided man" would be supported by evidence that he seriously debated the question of whether or not he should kill Claudius and that he did so out of a moral repugnance to killing as such. But, since the play yields no such direct evidence, Goddard is forced to argue from indirect signs, chiefly Hamlet's melancholy and his hesitation to act (pp. 341, 354–55, 370). Hamlet does indeed share these traits with the "divided man," but these are not essential likenesses, for men are melancholy and hesitate to act for

many reasons, not solely because they are faced with conflicting demands arising from their higher and lower natures. For example, they are melancholy when they suffer the loss of loved ones, as Hamlet does, or when they experience an instance of evil in others and from this one case conclude the whole world to be "an unweeded garden," or when they are disillusioned by persons they believed in, or when they doubt their own capacities. Among other things, men hesitate to act when the facts of the case are not clear, as they are not to Hamlet during Acts I–III, or when the occasion is not opportune, as it appears not to be to Hamlet in Act III, scene 3. Because these alternative explanations can be suggested for Hamlet's behavior, it is clear that the traits of melancholy and hesitation do not make Hamlet essentially like, or even in many respects like, the "divided man." And there is no evidence in the play that the killing of Claudius is to be taken as an evil act. Hamlet does not regard it as such, and no one attempts to dissuade him from the deed on these grounds, not even the wise and temperate Horatio. The deed is made a crime only in the light of Goddard's ethical doctrine: "Yet there is a sense in which the dictum 'Thou shalt not kill' has remained just as absolute in the kingdom of the imagination as in the Mosaic law. . . . To the finer side of human nature it is just bloodshed" (p. 335). And it is only in the light of this doctrine that the ghost can be taken as a symbol of the primitive order, for such an identification is scarcely justified by the traits exhibited in the play. That the ghost speaks on one occasion from below the stage, that it wears armor, and that it expresses a Christian acknowledgment of its sins hardly suggest such dire symbolic significance as Goddard would have us believe they do (pp. 348–50). And if it is no longer clear from the play that the killing of Claudius is an evil act, it can no longer be argued that the accomplishment of the deed is a sign of degeneration on the part of Hamlet or that Hamlet's own death is a consequence of a betrayal of his higher nature.

To proceed in his reductive interpretation of *Hamlet* in the face of so many intractable facts, Goddard is forced to employ a further

device other than a liberal use of the term "likeness." It will be recalled that he also uses the term "stands for" in the sense of a part standing for a whole. All reading of literature is a process of inferring the whole from the parts—thoughts and passions are inferred from words, character from thoughts and passions, and so on; and these inferences are based upon the reader's general knowledge of mankind. Goddard, however, extends his theory of the mind, which maintains that the unconscious part of man continually projects itself on external objects, to the behavior of dramatic characters. Their words, images, thoughts, and feelings are not to be taken in their normal sense but rather as projections of the content of their unconscious. "Now the moment we put Hamlet to this test we perceive that those around him become looking glasses in which, unknown to himself, his secret is reflected" (p. 355). Examples of this kind of interpretation have already been presented in Goddard's reading of Hamlet's speech comparing his father and uncle and in the interpretation of Hamlet's attitude toward Polonius. By this theory of psychological signs, Hamlet need never once explicitly mention the nature of his inner conflict, yet it will most infallibly be reflected in what he thinks, says, or feels about other persons. The convenience of this device for the interpreter is indisputable, for by employing it he may read almost anything into a play. Unfortunately, it casts the poet, the characters of the play, and the reader into such a world of looking glasses that objective reality is lost. We must conceive of the reader projecting his own unconscious on a play, which, in turn, has characters projecting their unconscious on other characters, and the play, in its turn, is nothing but an ambiguous projection of the poet's unconscious mind.

Finally, it must be urged against Goddard that he does not attempt to argue the exclusive nature of his interpretation of Shakespeare. To this he replies that works are capable of as many meanings as the reader can perceive in them and that, even if there is one ultimate meaning, its truth can be validated only by an act of the imagination and not by a process of demonstration. To the charge that he fails to

support his conclusions by consideration of what it was historically possible for Shakespeare to have believed, he replies that the imagination remains unchanged by time.

Though the interpretation of Shakespeare offered by Goddard remains unconvincing, yet his candid presentation of his methodological assumptions and his bold solution of the problems of validation render his work useful in illuminating the tacit assumptions of those modern critics who assume all literature to be a vehicle of meaning, who begin their interpretations of a work with preconceived notions of doctrinal content, and who prefer to violate the text rather than modify their assumptions.

On behalf of Goddard's belief that the reader is the true poet, it remains to be said that a personal element does enter into all our reading of imaginative literature. We need all our personal store of experience to bring life to the highly complex and indirect signs presented to us on the written page. And not only do we use our store of experience to make inferences, but we often find ourselves analogizing between the situations of characters in books and our own and between their character and our own. Some characters and books even become personal symbols with significance far beyond that intended by the author. Nevertheless, however much the pleasure of reading is a creation of our own experience and our own imagination, the work of art has an objective existence, and the critic who undertakes to assess it is obligated to remove as much as possible the accidental factors that surround his reading of it—unless, of course, he prefers the creations of his own imagination to those of the poet, as Goddard so candidly does.

CHARLES A. McLAUGHLIN
University of Chicago

Newman at Oxford: His Religious Development. By R. D. MIDDLETON. London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1950. Pp. viii+284.

The observance in 1945 of the centenary of Newman's conversion proved a telling reminder that of the cardinal's formative years, apart from his own letters and *Apologia*, no de-

tailed account was available, Wilfrid Ward's standard biography being chiefly concerned with the period after 1845. Since then there have been three attempts (excluding Robert Sencourt's short biography) to supply the need. Two appeared almost simultaneously in 1948: *Young Mr. Newman* by Maisie Ward and *Journey into Faith* by Eleanor Ruggles. Each had its merits, but both were disappointing. Miss Ruggles, the author of a successful life of Gerard Manley Hopkins, presented a readable and accurate by-product of that work, but she offered no new material, and she wrote as if her realization of the issues involved in Newman's life and in the Oxford Movement were at best "notional" and never "real." The reader is not seriously engaged by her account, and the Newman who emerges is but a shadow of the dynamically complex personality portrayed for us in the memoirs of contemporaries like James Anthony Froude. It is not surprising, therefore, that *Journey into Faith* has apparently come to its end on the tables reserved for publishers' remainders.

From Maisie Ward, in view of her unrivaled background, a good deal more might have been expected. She is the granddaughter of W. G. Ward, *enfant terrible* of the Oxford Movement and later Tennyson's "most generous of ultramontanes"; and she is the daughter of the distinguished critic, essayist, and biographer, Wilfrid Ward, whose beautifully tempered life of Newman is an enduring memorial as much of the writer as of his subject. She is also a historian in her own right of the Catholic Revival in England, for which Newman, more than any other man, is responsible. *Young Mr. Newman*, however, scarcely lived up to the expectations it aroused. It is the product of a certain amount of original research; it does show a more vivid realization of the issues; and it is a richer, livelier, and more charming account than that of Miss Ruggles. Yet it is also an uncritical book, often too femininely chatty in approach; it shows signs of haste in the writing; and, too frequently, when the author does not seem certain of what to do next, it simply falls back on a less effective reworking of Christopher Dawson's undeniably valuable *Spirit of the Oxford Movement*.

The third and most recent version of the Anglican years is the work of R. D. Middleton, historian of Magdalen College and author of *Newman and Bloxam: An Oxford Friendship*. Attempting less than Miss Ruggles or Miss Ward, Middleton is more satisfying than either. As the subtitle indicates, his book is not a full biography but rather an account of Newman's religious development, in substance a companion volume to Newman's *Apologia*, very helpful and, indeed, the only thing of its kind available in English. (Abbé Nédoncelle's edition of the *Apologia* [Paris, 1939] covers the same ground but less fully.) The point of view of the author may be indicated quite simply: "It seems no exaggeration to say that the most important and profitable period of Newman's life was during his years at St. Mary's. . . . To the ministry of these years is due in a very large measure the success of the Oxford Movement, and therefore, we may say, the spiritual revival of the English Church" (pp. 92–93). The closest thing to an unfavorable criticism of Newman in this very sympathetic account is the remark, with its admiring side glance at men like Pusey, that he "suffered through extreme sensitiveness and an unfortunate desire for outward manifestations of regard and of approval from his ecclesiastical superiors. Great as Newman was in many ways, he clearly was in the long run not the man to plough a lonely furrow—happy in the important work he had the good fortune to do for the Church, with a steadfast eye to the future and a complete disregard for the approval of infinitely smaller men who happened to be placed in higher circles than he" (p. 112). There is no real attempt, however, to account for Newman's final step in terms of the *ressentiment* theory most recently stressed by F. L. Cross; and even Middleton's own criticism seems tempered as he goes on later to emphasize Newman's theory of ecclesiastical unity in the words cited by Newman in 1840 from St. Cyprian's *De unitate:* " 'The Bishop is in the Church and the Church in the Bishop and whoever are not with the Bishop are not in the Church' " (p. 162).

What Middleton has done is to follow closely the narrative in the *Apologia* and sup-

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ply fuller accounts, largely from standard but sometimes not very accessible sources, of the characters Newman introduces, and extended quotations from the contemporary writings, chiefly of Newman himself but to some extent from such colleagues and opponents as Keble, Hurrell, Froude, Pusey, and Wiseman. For all but the Newman specialist the result should prove illuminating, and even the specialist will be grateful to find brought together in one volume a generous selection of poems from the *Christian Year* and the *Lyra apostolica*, a summary of Wiseman's influential lectures of 1836 on Catholicism, and detailed accounts of such works of Newman as are peculiarly relevant to what the author regards as Newman's most important achievement: the consolidation of the *Via media*. So it is that we are given not only the *Lectures on Justification* and the *Prophetical Office of the Church* but such now little-known works as Tract 71, *On the Controversy with the Romanists;* the *Letter to the Rev. Godfrey Faussett* in defense of Froude and Tractarian principles; and the answer to Wiseman that took the form of a review in the *British Critic* of January, 1840, of Perceval's *Apology for the Doctrine of the Apostolical Succession.* If Middleton is not invariably skilful enough as a writer to bring his characters roundly to life, at least he is always pointedly informative. His account of the importance of Hawkins of Oriel, for example, is one of the best available; and his gentle rebuke of Newman for his behavior toward Archbishop Whately seems more than justified on the basis of the account so carefully given here. There is a fascinating appendix containing letters between Hawkins, Pusey, and Newman relative to Pusey's edition of Tract 90 in 1866, proving how the deep scars of that crucial battle survived curious lapses of memory about the details. And there is an appendix of letters, one of them very touching indeed, from a devoutly Anglican family that had entertained Newman in 1827 and remained, forty years later, as indelibly impressed by his character as they were firm in their own faith.

The principal fault of the book is a limitation in scope which unhappily lessens its value for even the cultivated nonspecialist. (To be

sure, the precise reader Middleton has in mind is not easy to describe.) It takes too much for granted. It is called *Newman at Oxford,* but little is provided in the way of orientation to the slowly reawakening university. Those who do not already know a good bit about the Oxford Movement had better read something else first—many of its chief episodes, like the Hampden affair, are here glimpsed only in passing and never with the sense of urgent drama which one still gets from Dean Church. A fair-sized theological vocabulary is a prerequisite. If *The Wreck of the Deutschland* is really what Bridges called it, a great dragon forbidding entrance to the work of Hopkins, what can now be said of the *Apologia* for the secularized modern reader whom it so commonly introduces to Newman and confronts with the strange phantoms of the Council of Chalcedon, Petavius, and the heresy of the Monophysites? Middleton, at any rate, does too little to allay his natural fears. If, however, the book is intended for the fairly well-informed, insufficient attention is devoted to the other works of Newman that to many students will seem quite as important as those treated here at length: to the essays on miracles, for instance, to the cardinal theory of religious belief outlined in the *University Sermons,* and to the idea and process of doctrinal development. One would expect to find the nature and origin of these highly distinctive works of Newman more carefully explored and their present status in the theological world at least indicated. Or do they no longer have very much significance for our time?

Apart from the unnecessarily limited scope of the book and its somewhat cloistered and uncritical spirit, objection may be taken to a series of minor annoyances. The author sometimes introduces names without identifying them until later, if at all: e.g., Golightly is mentioned for the first time but in a familiar tone on page 146; he is not identified, however, until page 181. Frederick Oakeley is introduced on page 150, mentioned twice later, and never really identified at all. On page 168 we are told that "Bloxam had been staying at Alton Towers with Dr. Rock"; but how many even of English readers should be expected to

know what family owned Alton Towers, much less who Dr. Rock was? The praise given to the poetry of Keble must now seem excessive to even a sympathetic reader, and the suggestion that the *Lyra apostolica* has a message for to-day is ingenuous in view of the specimens pre-sented. Middleton seems unaware that the idiom of poetry has so changed that what were indeed "stirring poems" a century ago may now evoke, if not ridicule, at best a sense of ir-relevance. In a book remarkably free of error of any kind (Moxley *for* Mozley [p. 121] is the only typographical slip I have noted), it is dis-concerting to find Newman's rapier-like attack on utilitarian educational theory, which we know as *The Tamworth Reading-Room*, de-scribed as written "to urge the establishment of Mechanics' Institutes" (p. 181). Finally, it does seem that the author's almost unfailing generosity deserts him in his treatment of W. G. Ward, who is scarcely given his due.

Such slight blemishes, however, will blind no one to the considerable value of this informa-tive book. Middleton has performed a service in writing it, and future students will remain indebted to him for greatly easing their bur-den. *Newman at Oxford* is not, of course, as the author would probably be the first to acknowl-edge, the picture of the Anglican years for which we have been waiting. When one recalls the many books on Newman of greater preten-sion than Middleton's, it seems inescapable that the great majority have been more or less patently inadequate. Apart from Wilfrid Ward's Life and certain specialized studies, few have emanated from writers alert and criti-cal enough to come to grips with their object, who was, after all, probably the most sophisti-

cated of the great prose masters of his age. The enduring influence he exerted on such richly en-dowed and diverse contemporary spirits as Matthew Arnold, James Anthony Froude, Mark Pattison, and Gerard Manley Hopkins can scarcely be exaggerated. Nor has it ceased in our own time. "Of the great figures of the Victorian past," according to Lionel Trilling, "there is none that stands the years so well as Newman." As Crane Brinton has pointed out in *Ideas and Men*, he anticipates a whole school of modern thinkers so otherwise unlike him as Spengler and Pareto, and he might have added, of Existentialists from Kierkegaard to Gabriel Marcel. He was the favorite prose writer, we have recently been told, of James Joyce. He is for T. S. Eliot second only to Pascal in the na-ture and depth of his appeal. Yet who would ever begin to suspect all this from most of the books that have been written about him? Abbé Bremond's *Mystère de Newman* and Geoffrey Faber's *Oxford Apostles* were, in some ways at least, steps in the right direction—they were vividly written, critical, and often highly perceptive. However, since Bremond did not really know enough of Newman or his work to justify his psychobiographical ap-proach and since Faber strained what he did know through a curiously simplistic vision that might fairly be described as Kingsley-*cum*-Strachey-*cum*-Freud, neither came close to sat-isfying the student of Newman. That task re-mains to be done. Although the material is abundant and the *Zeitgeist* is now in its favor, it is not a challenge to be accepted lightly.

MARTIN J. SVAGLIC

Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois